

**PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SARTRE
AND MERLEAU-PONTY: A CRITICAL STUDY**

Thesis submitted for the fulfillment of the award of Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

M. ARULAPPAN

Under the Guidance of

Dr. P. KESAVA KUMAR

Assistant Professor




**DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES
PONDICHERY UNIVERSITY
PUDUCHERRY - 605 014
INDIA**

AUGUST - 2012

Dr. P. KESAVA KUMAR

Assistant Professor

Department of Philosophy
Pondicherry University
Puducherry – 605 014



CERTIFICATE


This is to certify that the thesis entitled “**Phenomenological Psychology of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty: A Critical Study**” is submitted to Pondicherry University for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy is a record of original research work done by M. Arulappan, during the period of his study 2002-2012 in the Department of Philosophy, Pondicherry University, under my supervision and guidance. The above work has not been previously formed the basis for the award of any other Degree, Diploma, Associateship and Fellowship on any other similar titles to the candidate. This independent research work of the candidate is an original contribution towards the discipline of philosophy.

(Dr. P. KESAVA KUMAR)

Supervisor

M. ARULAPPAN

Ph.D. Research Scholar
Department of Philosophy
Pondicherry University
Puducherry – 605 014



DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the thesis entitled “**Phenomenological Psychology of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty: A Critical Study**” submitted to Pondicherry University for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy is a record of original research work done by me under the supervision and guidance of Dr. P. Kesava Kumar, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities, Pondicherry University, and the work has not formed before the basis for the award of any Degree, Diploma, Associateship, Fellowship on any other similar title.

(M. ARULAPPAN)

COUNTERSIGNATURE

(SUPERVISOR)

(HEAD I/C)

(DEAN)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am deeply grateful to my guide and supervisor Dr. P. Kesava Kumar, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Pondicherry University whose guidance and direction the thesis emerged as a complete work and also a special thanks to his personal effort and concern.

I am also thankful to the doctoral committee members for their valuable suggestion in shaping the thesis, Dr. R. Panneerselvam, Professor, Department of Management Studies and Dr. K. Srinivas, Professor and Head (i/c.), Department of Philosophy, Pondicherry University.

I wish to express my indebtedness to Dr. R. Venguattaramane, Dean, School of Humanities, Pondicherry University for the moral and official support that encouraged me to complete this work.

I remember a special person with a sense of admiration and thankfulness, Rev. Fr. Dr. P. A. Sampath Kumar, Centre Head, Escande Chair in Asian Christian Studies, Pondicherry University for his affection and love.

I thank, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, for the financial support through Junior Research Fellowship.

I am thankful to all the faculty members, administrative staffs and student friends of both the Department of Philosophy and Escande Chair in Asian Christian Studies for their timely help, love and concern.

I also remember with gratitude all my former teachers who shaped me as a student and a person. A special thanks to Rev. Sr. Michael, Carmelite Sister, Nagpur, Rev. Fr. Dr. Lawrence Fernandes, former Principal of St. Francis de Sales' College, Nagpur and Most Rev. Leobard D'Souza, former Archbishop of Nagpur Diocese. I pray for their souls to rest in peace.

I express my heartfelt gratitude to all my family members and friends for their innumerable helps and their constant support by being with me throughout my life.

TABLE OF CONTENT

CHAPTER	TITLE OF THE CHAPTER	PAGE NO.
I	Phenomenological Psychology: An Introduction	01 - 27
II	Philosophical Basis for Phenomenological Psychology	28 - 64
III	Sartre's Contribution to Phenomenological Psychology	65 - 105
IV	Merleau-Ponty's Contribution to Phenomenological Psychology	106 - 140
V	Critique of Phenomenological Psychology	141 - 164
VI	Conclusion	165 - 176
	Bibliography	177 - 189

CHAPTER - I

PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Phenomenological psychology is the study of psychological phenomena in their subjective aspect, regardless of their indebtedness in the objective context of a psycho-physical organism.¹ Phenomenological psychology has emerged as a discipline with the writings of Edmund Husserl in first quarter of twentieth century and consequently established with the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenological psychology is destined to supply the essential insight needed to give meaning and direction to the research presented under the title of 'empirical psychology' as well as plays an important role in philosophy.² In the field of psychology, it was a reaction against the scientific methods of empirical psychology. Empirical psychology concerns itself with concrete real beings and in this connection it points towards the physical. Husserl contended that empirical psychology moved away from the essential features of psychological phenomena. He further considers that psychology should free itself from the theoretical prejudices. He rejected empirical psychology on the account of its naturalism by pointing out orthodox behaviorism.³ Phenomenological psychology has made a critical intervention in both philosophy and psychology. Phenomenological psychology came into force by filling the gap between philosophy and empirical psychology of early twentieth century.⁴

Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced by a person. For Husserl as like Kant and Descartes, knowledge is based on intuition and essence precedes empirical knowledge. The essence of phenomenology is to understand consciousness and the objects towards which it is directed. In other words, the essence of

¹ Herbert Spiegelberg, *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, p.155.

² Joseph J. Kockelmans, *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967, p.5.

³ Joseph J. Kockelmans (ed), *Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation*, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, 1967, pp.424-427.

⁴ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, p.25.

phenomenology is to understand anything that is experienced and try to come up with clarified understanding of anything which is capable of being experienced. According to Husserl, phenomenological philosophy is the better solution to have a unified psychology. Experience is always open to something that is not the experience itself. In psychology, it would mean that we turn to behaviour and the behaviour is also directed towards something that is itself not behaviour, intentionality combines them with something else so as to move towards unification phenomenology with psychological themes.⁵

The method of phenomenological psychology is primarily derived from phenomenology. It is a dialogue with the human being to get human being to disclose oneself to someone in all its manifestation and complexity.⁶ The starting point of phenomenological philosophers is that human experiences manifest a meaningful structure. Thus the aim of phenomenologists is to uncover these structures and rescue them from being buried in the multitude of human experiences. Phenomenologists describe these structures with the help of analytic explication method which is essentially distinguished from the methods of the sciences. In this dialectical method, phenomenologists demonstrate universality and necessity of their description of essences. These basic structures of human being become the foundation of empirical research.⁷ Husserl uses reduction and descriptive approaches to find the essentials. This approach is considered as scientific as it is systematic, methodological and critical. The reduction is to make knowledge as certain as possible. Husserl makes a distinction between naturalistic attitude and phenomenological attitude. According to him, the naturalistic attitude can be erroneous whereas phenomenological attitude is the better and it even helps to understand the naturalistic attitude. In naturalistic attitude, we are aware of the objects but in phenomenological attitude, we are aware of the way in which objects are presented to us. That is to say, the reduction is a kind of attitude where we see the object only in light of this mode of presentation. Thus phenomenological psychology deals with

⁵ Amedeo Griorgi, "Phenomenological Psychology: The Lonely Path of Truth", *Impuls. Tidsskrift for Psykologi*, Vol.2, Oslo, Norway, pp.1-8.

⁶ Dreyer Kruger, *An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981, p.113.

⁷ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, p.331.

what is presented to consciousness but not with their existence because existence limits the content of consciousness. Phenomenological psychology aims to study consciousness in its meaningful structure and function. It is to provide a justification and basis for empirical psychology, as well as a methodology for exploration of consciousness.⁸

The existential phenomenologists reject the transcendental or eidetic reduction. They are mainly interested in the existential orientation of human being toward world. Sartre introduced existential psychoanalysis as his method of understanding human motivation behind the acts. He also uses interpretative and dialectic approach to study existential orientation of human being towards world.⁹ For Merleau-Ponty, the basic method of phenomenological psychology is the method of description. In addition to this, he recommends that other methods and techniques appropriate for the study of man's experience and relation to himself, to others and to the world could be continually sought and developed. According to him, the phenomenological psychology is oriented towards understanding man in all his aspects. Its primary interest lies in human experience and its qualitative exploration. It also studies human behaviour but it is opposed to the exclusive restriction of the subject matter of psychology to behaviour and its control. It rejects any philosophical assumptions concerning the nature of consciousness, except its intentionality. It particularly opposes the empiricists' *tabula rasa* concept of consciousness, the associationistic view, and all reductionist tendencies. It favours and emphasizes the holistic approach to the study of psychological problems. Merleau-Ponty wants to bridge the gap between mind and body dichotomy.¹⁰ In broad, phenomenological psychology is that any psychology which considers personal experience in its subject matter and which accepts and uses phenomenological description explicitly or implicitly can be called phenomenological psychology. It is contrasted with psychology which admits only objective observation of behaviour and excludes phenomenological description in its methodology.¹¹

⁸ Ibid., p.21-24.

⁹ Ibid., p.332.

¹⁰ Henryk Misiak, Virginia Staudt Sexton, *Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Psychologies: A Historical Survey*, New York and London: Grune & Stratton, 1973, pp.40-41.

¹¹ Ibid., p.35.

Phenomenological psychology is not only plays a role of mediation between philosophy and psychology in a significant way but it have also introduced a new approach in understanding human personality in the field of psychology. Phenomenological psychology has got its own importance in the backdrop of major debates in the field of psychology. Phenomenological psychology has enriched the discipline of psychology by pointing out the limitations of Wundt's experimental psychology, Watson's behaviouristic psychology and Gestalt psychology. Phenomenological psychology put forward the necessity of meaningful interaction between philosophy and psychology in understanding human being holistically.¹²

Wilhelm Wundt's experimental psychology made an attempt to free psychology from philosophy. He ridiculed the philosophical analysis of mental processes being speculative in character. He also rejected the emphasis of the anatomical analysis to study the psychological phenomena by physiologists.¹³ John Watson the founder of behaviourism viewed psychology as an objective science of behaviour therefore its method must be empirical ones. He replaced the method of introspection with the scientific method of observation and verification through laboratory experimentation instead philosophers' methods of observation and logic. Behaviourists adopted scientific methodologies to study and draw conclusions about human thought and behaviour.¹⁴ In this way, psychology had moved away from its previous association with philosophy and proceeded to ever closer ties with the methodology of physics. The affinity with the natural sciences became so close at times, it was impossible to see where psychology ends and physiology starts.¹⁵ But at particular point of time, Gestalt psychologists realized that this physiological scientific method has its limitation in application to psychical phenomenon. Physical sciences consider man as a creature produced by and wholly accounted for in terms of surrounding nature.¹⁶ In this connection, man is seen as

¹² Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, David Carr, (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, pp.187-193.

¹³ Arun Kumar Singh, *The Comprehensive History of Psychology*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 1991, p.96.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 215-226.

¹⁵ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, p.6.

¹⁶ Stephan Strasser, *Phenomenology and the Human Sciences*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1963, p.6.

a link in the chain of cosmic evolution, as an organism dependent upon and determined by a biological substratum, whereas in the empirical sciences of man, man is viewed under the aspect of the originator and elaborator of a world in which he lives, works and dwells.¹⁷ It is evident from the discussion that rather borrowing the method of physics, psychology should design its own methods suited to the problems relevant to it. Husserl, the phenomenologist also arrived at this conclusion through his own philosophy. So he envisaged his new psychology called phenomenological psychology.¹⁸ Husserl critically viewed German and Austrian psychology for their uses of the empirical or scientific methods. According to him, the scientific psychology uncovered a great number of facts about human and animal behaviour. However, these facts were understood only within the narrow perspective arising from naive naturalistic point of view. Since psychology is concerned with the understanding of individual and the world of individual, psychology can neither be purely descriptive and nor purely experimental. But both methods must be complementary to each other. Husserl's intention was to bridge empirical psychology with phenomenology by developing a new and special psychological discipline called phenomenological psychology.¹⁹ Sartre and Merleau-Ponty carried further the task of Husserl in their existential phenomenology.

The school of behaviourism is being one of the dominant schools of psychology was using the scientific approach as the most appropriate method in psychology. Though there was dissatisfaction in the camp of psychology about the use of scientific methods nothing much could have been done because the behaviouristic and psychoanalytic schools dominated the entire discipline of empirical psychology. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have tried to show the blunder of psychoanalytic and behaviouristic schools in understanding human being through their analysis of unconscious urges and mere behaviour respectively.²⁰

Sartre is critical of pretention of psychology to be positive science in its approach to experience. According to Sartre, psychology tries to draw upon the resources of

¹⁷ Op. cit., *Phenomenology and the Human Sciences*, p.6.

¹⁸ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, p.14.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp.122-137.

²⁰ Op. cit., *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, pp.23-27.

experience alone. In so far as psychology claims to be a science which could furnish nothing more than a sum of heteroclitic facts and the majority of which have no links between them. But for Sartre, phenomenology is the study of phenomena, not of facts. A phenomenon is that which announces itself to us; its reality is precisely its spontaneous appearance itself must be questioned and described as it appears. It does not further stand for anything else. It does not hide or represent any deeper reality. The whole of man can be found in any particular human attitude.²¹ Therefore we see emotion as the example of human reality. It gathers itself and directs itself emotionally to the world. A phenomenologist, therefore, can question man about his emotions and also can question the emotions concerning man's essence. For man to *ek-sist* means to take one's being upon oneself in some existential mode, in some or other orientation toward the world. But, the empirical psychology of those days following the footsteps of physicist considered a particular psychical situation in such a way as to denude it of all meaning. According to them, a fact is nothing, it is devoid of meaning. They never want to attach any meaning to it. For phenomenologists, on the other hand, each and every human act is essentially meaningful. They study the meaning of the different forms of man's existential orientation towards the world. Emotion has no meaning for traditional psychologists as a fact which is cut off from the meaning giving matrix. But Sartre says that emotion is not a mere accident nor it is an effect of human reality but it is this reality has its own structure, law, meaning and sense. Therefore emotion is an organized form of human existence.²²

According to Sartre, psychology should define experience with much greater accuracy than physical sciences. He uses intentionality as the backbone for his psychology and his psychology is the key to his ontology. In fact, the concept of imaging consciousness as the locus of possibility, negativity and lack emerges as the model for consciousness in general (being-for-itself) in *Being and Nothingness*. In this, he describes

²¹ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, Hazel E. Barnes (trans.), New York: Philosophical Library, 1956, pp. 557-561.

²² Jean-Paul Sartre, *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, Philip Mairet (trans.), London: Methuen, 1971, pp.9-11.

the specific function of consciousness to create a world of unrealities, or 'imagination' and its *noetic* correlative, the imaginary.²³

Merleau-Ponty, another prominent existential phenomenologist has concern for psychology from the perspective of phenomenological psychology. He is critical of scientific analysis in the field of psychology. For Merleau-Ponty, all scientific observations and theories are ultimately based on the direct, immediate, spontaneous experience of everyday life, which phenomenology uncovers. This assumption is vital to phenomenological psychology. Merleau-Ponty views science as:

the whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrives at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawaking the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression.²⁴

For phenomenologists, experience is an 'in-relation-to' phenomenon, and it is defined by qualities of directedness, embodiment, and worldliness, which are evoked by the term 'being-in-the-world'. According to Merleau-Ponty, it is necessary to understand the 'being-in-the-world' of people to have a meaningful understanding of them. For him, this means viewing people as being-in-the-world as a reciprocal relationship with their world and others. He also accepts that people are influenced by their society which provides a common language as well as many behavioural expectations. However, people develop a sense of agency that becomes their centre for choice and responsibility. Moreover, their active choices also influence culture and lead to other alternative courses of action.²⁵ The behaviour is a structure therefore it is necessary to have an understanding of the structural pattern of behaviour for understanding human beings. It is possible with the phenomenological approach which starts its analysis with immediately given

²³ Ibid., pp.46-53.

²⁴ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Colin Smith (trans.), London: Routledge, 2002, p.ix.

²⁵ Ibid., p.173.

experiences and its descriptive nature of analysis. In other words, in Merleau-Ponty's scheme of psychology locate the body subject as crucial means to access the world of perception.²⁶

Merleau-Ponty holds that in understanding people, a therapist or theorist needs to overcome at least two dualisms. First is Cartesian split of body and mind that has been particularly emphasized by academic psychology in their attempts to find the causes of behaviour. The second dualism is the split between the individual and the society, which is more a product of the latter half of the twentieth century as theorist moved from personality toward social constructionism. For Merleau-Ponty, these dualisms attempt to determine that people are simply a product of their culture. Whereas, Merleau-Ponty adopts an approach that appreciates the person's account of his or her reasons for and how the world appears to him or her as well as it leads to appreciate the social context in which he or she is embedded.²⁷

Phenomenological psychology understands personal experiences as phenomena. It argues against the trends of psychology that focus only on objective observation of behaviour by excluding one's personal experiences. The experiencing subject can be considered to be the person or self. The motto of phenomenological psychology is 'going to things themselves'.²⁸ In other words, phenomenological psychology allows the phenomenon to show itself in consciousness. Phenomenological psychology is in tune with phenomenology. Phenomenologists view consciousness as immediately given and its validity is based on the notion of intentionality. It explores human experience in all its facet without any philosophical preconceptions.²⁹

Phenomenological psychology may be considered as a new approach or orientation in psychological exploration rather a school or theoretical systems of psychology such as associationalism, functionalism, psychoanalysis or behaviourism. There is no much difference between phenomenological psychology and empirical

²⁶ Keith Hoeller (ed.), *Merleau-Ponty and Psychology*, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993, pp.3-4.

²⁷ Trevor Butt, *Understanding People*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.viii.

²⁸ Op. cit., *Phenomenology of Perception*, p.ix.

²⁹ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, pp.348-349.

psychology in the object which they study rather the difference is in their manner of approach to the subject matter. In spite of these differences, Husserl views that phenomenological psychology should remain in contact with empirical psychology as a natural empirical science and should be tied to philosophy as an *eidetic, aprioric* science.³⁰

The study focuses on two contemporary French existential philosophers, Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty who have critically intervened into the debates of psychology in general and have enriched the phenomenological psychology in particular. They both view an individual as unique with consciousness and do each and every behavioural activity intentionally. Though Sartre and Merleau-Ponty being existential phenomenologists have the commonality on many accounts but approach the psychological issues differently.

The works of phenomenologists have influenced psychoanalysis, behaviourism, Gestalt psychology, cognitive behaviourism and therapists of different schools. The dialogue between phenomenology and psychology has been taking place but it is still not clear how the two disciplines relate to each other. The part of the problem is that both disciplines have developed complexly with competing perspectives and hence could not be integrated easily. The present study is an attempt to show how these two fields are connected from the contributions of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty by enriching both philosophy and psychology.

Review of Literature

The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl has sowed the seed for phenomenological psychology. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have carried out their phenomenological psychological endeavours in their own unique pattern.

³⁰ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, pp.350-351.

Husserl had formulated phenomenological psychology (rational or eidetic psychology) in his *Ideas-I*.³¹ His *Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences* the third book of *Ideas* has separate chapter dealing on the relations between psychology and phenomenology.³² His last work *Krisis* holds that every possible science even psychology must start from the level of the life-world and his idea of life world adds new dimension to his phenomenological psychology. He also introduced phenomenological-psychological reduction in phenomenological psychology.³³

Joseph Kocklemans' *Husserl's phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study* is a comprehensive text on phenomenological psychology of Husserl. It deals with development of phenomenological psychology in the writings of Husserl. It also tries to show how phenomenological psychology is related to empirical psychology and transcendental philosophy. This work locates Husserl's position in phenomenological psychology. This work further discusses the existential phenomenology of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty and its relationship to phenomenological psychology of Husserl.³⁴ Kocklemans' edited book *Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation*, provides the basic views of Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on phenomenology psychology. This book explains the interconnection between psychology and phenomenology through these readings.³⁵ Aron Gurwitsch summarizes Husserl's views on phenomenological psychology in his article "Edmund Husserl's Conception of Phenomenological Psychology".³⁶ Jacob Golomb goes back to trace even the influences of Brentano to show how the phenomenological psychology has emerged in Husserl's phenomenology.³⁷ Dan Zahavi's *Husserl's Phenomenology* provides the Husserlean frame work of phenomenological psychology and its importance in the field of

³¹ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, W.R. Boyce Gibson (trans.), London: George Allen & Unwin ltd, 1969, pp.11-30.

³² Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl (trans.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980, pp.19-64.

³³ Op. cit., *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, pp.198-268.

³⁴ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, 1967.

³⁵ Op. cit., *Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation*, 1967.

³⁶ Aron Gurwitsch, "Edmund Husserl's Conception of Phenomenological Psychology," *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 19, No. 4, June -1966, pp. 689-727.

³⁷ Jacob Golomb, "Psychology from the Phenomenological Standpoint of Husserl," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 36, No.4, June-1976, pp.451-471.

psychology. This explains the how the concept of experience in phenomenology is much broader than in empiricism, the relationship between phenomenology and metaphysics. Further he elaborates the meaning of the *epoché* and the reduction, and the different perspectives on the *noema*.³⁸

There are some studies to introduce nature and scope of phenomenological psychology in general. Amedeo Giorgi's *Psychology as a Human Science* offered a re-evaluation of psychology from the phenomenological point of view. He turned from his experimental psychological issues to theoretical issues from the value use of phenomenology to scientific psychology.³⁹ Sheree Dukes's article "Phenomenological Methodology in the Human Sciences" suggests that phenomenological methodology differs from traditional methodologies both in purpose and procedure. The task of a phenomenological researcher is to 'see' the logic, or meaning of an experience, for any subject, rather than to discover causal connections or patterns of correlation. The author reviews verification procedures relevant to phenomenological studies and discusses the limitations inherent in phenomenological research.⁴⁰ V. J. McGill in his article "The Bearing of Phenomenology on Psychology" tries to show that psychology presupposes phenomenology because phenomenological principles have wider scope than psychological principles. But phenomenology is a presuppositionless science.⁴¹ In "Phenomenological Trends in European Psychology", Stephan Strasser discusses the place and importance of phenomenology in the evolution of European psychology, a survey of important thinkers and the influence of their views upon psychology.⁴²

Ernesto Spinelli's *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology* explains phenomenological theory and its method. This work studies perception of self, objects and others from phenomenological perspective. It also provides the influences of phenomenology in major schools of psychology. It tries to

³⁸ Dan Zahavi, *Husserl's Phenomenology*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, P.144

³⁹ Amedeo Giorgi, *Psychology as a Human Science*, New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

⁴⁰ Sheree Dukes, "Phenomenological Methodology in the Human Sciences," *Journal of Religion and Health*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Fall -1984, pp. 197-203

⁴¹ V.J.McGill, "The Bearing of Phenomenology on Psychology," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol.7, No.3, March-1947, pp.357-363.

⁴² Stephan Strasser, "Phenomenological Trends in European Psychology," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 18, No.1, September-1957, pp.18-34.

remove the misunderstanding of phenomenological psychology as humanistic psychology by differentiating from the former with the latter.⁴³ Dreyer Kruger's *An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology* tries to provide the image of man and the challenges faced by modern psychology. This work deals with the phenomenological approach to the issues such as perception, memory and unconsciousness. It also provides a detailed study of phenomenology in psychopathology and psychotherapy.⁴⁴

Amedeo Giorgi's "Phenomenology and Experimental Psychology" explains the significance of phenomenological psychology against experimental psychology. He argues that phenomenology is a way of knowing the subject in all respects where the experimental approach necessarily is limited.⁴⁵ The reason is that experimentation within the human sciences under the phenomenological approach aims at the qualitative aspect of experience. It looks for the meaning for the participant of the experimental situation and at the aspects that are manipulated. It should focus on explication of the phenomenal experience instead of its analysis.⁴⁶

Herbert Spiegelberg's *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A historical Introduction* is the first comprehensive work which provides complete historical details of phenomenological views found in the schools of psychology. He further elaborates his work pointing to the psychological issues found in phenomenology.⁴⁷ Henryk Misiak and Virginia Staudt Sexton have also attempted to show the influence of phenomenology in the schools of psychology. *Phenomenological, Existential and Humanistic Psychologies: A Historical Survey* is a detailed work which provides complete understanding of phenomenological psychology, existential psychology and humanistic psychology. They

⁴³ Ernesto Spinelli, *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, Los Angeles: Sage Publications Ltd, 2005.

⁴⁴ Op. cit., *An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, 1979.

⁴⁵ Amedeo Giorgi, "Phenomenology and experimental psychology-I," *Review of Existential Psychology & Psychiatry*, Vol.5, No. 3, 1965, pp. 228-238.

⁴⁶ Amedeo Giorgi, "Phenomenology and experimental psychology-II," *Review of Existential Psychology & Psychiatry*, Vol.6, No.1, 1966, pp. 37-50.

⁴⁷ Op. cit., *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, 1972.

further make the distinction between these schools of psychology which have their philosophical basis in phenomenology.⁴⁸

J. H. Van Den Berg's *The Phenomenological Approach to Psychiatry: An Introduction to Recent Phenomenological Psychopathology* is edited by Marvin Farber. Van den Berg develops the main phenomenological or rather existentialistic categories from the point of view of the interest which they offer to the psychiatrist. He brings out the influence of the phenomenological existentialist orientation upon the thinking of prominent contemporary psychologists and psychopathologists like Binswanger, Straus, Minkowski, Buytendijk, and others. His presentation is dominated by the insistence upon the realities of human existence, as we live with those realities, as they appear to us in immediate experience, 'pre-reflectively', in contradistinction to what is discovered 'on closer inspection', by 'objective' methods of observation which, however fruitful for the physical sciences, have impeded the development of psychology. Throughout Van den Berg's discussion of time and temporality, inspirations due to Heidegger and Sartre are visible and are fully acknowledged.⁴⁹

Aron Gurwitsch's article "The Phenomenological and the Psychological Approach to Consciousness" (1955) tries to show that both phenomenology and psychology are concerned with consciousness in general as well as with specific acts of consciousness like perception, memory, comprehension of meaning, reasoning, etc. It explains the significance of phenomenological approach to consciousness against psychological approach. From the psychological perspective, the act of consciousness appears as mundane events where psychology tries to trace the causal reason beyond this event. But Phenomenology concerns itself with the foundational problems of knowledge and experience. Psychology has developed into a positive science, in a sense, psychology is in logical continuity with, and relies partly upon, the physical and biological sciences. Positive sciences take for granted the objects with which they deal and concern themselves with their exploration and theoretical explanation. But phenomenology poses

⁴⁸ Op. cit., *Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Psychologies: A Historical Survey*, 1973.

⁴⁹ J. H. Van Den Berg, *The Phenomenological Approach to Psychiatry: An Introduction to Recent Phenomenological Psychopathology*, Marvin Farber (ed), New York: Thomas, 1955.

the question of the existence of objects and of the meaning of their existence. Therefore phenomenology aims at ultimate clarification and justification of all knowledge.⁵⁰

Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the existential philosophers contributed to phenomenological psychology through their original writings. Though both of them are inspired by Husserl but explained their positions uniquely.

Sartre has written three books exclusively related to psychological issues, *Imagination: A Psychological Critique* (1936), *The Psychology of Imagination* (1940) and *Sketch for a Theory of Emotions* (1939). Besides these works, Sartre main philosophical work *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* (1943) plays a major role in bringing about his novel view on psychology. He tries to show the inadequacies of a mere empirical psychology in accounting for human existence. *Imagination: A Psychological Critique* (1936) is the first philosophical work of Sartre deals about phenomenology. In this work, he is critical about the psychologists and philosophers on the issue of imagination. He argues imagination does not involve the perception of 'mental images' in any literal sense yet it reveals some of the fundamental capacities of consciousness. Sartre further argues that the 'classical conception' is fundamentally flawed because it begins by conceiving imagination as being like perception and then seeks, in vain, to re-establish the difference between the two. In this he appreciates Husserl's theory of the imagination, signals a new phenomenological way forward in understanding the imagination, despite his view sharing the flaws of earlier approaches.⁵¹

Sartre's work *The Psychology of Imagination* is a systematic analysis of imagination deals about the concept of nothingness and freedom. Sartre argues that imagination is nothing like perception. Perception is our study over time of a particular object with our senses. It is necessarily incomplete. Thus perception involves observation. He maintains that imagination is total or whole. Ultimately he wants to show

⁵⁰ Aron Gurwitsch, "The Phenomenological and the Psychological Approach to Consciousness," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 15, No. 3, March 1955, pp. 303-319.

⁵¹ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Imagination: A Psychological Critique*, Forrest Williams (trans.), Ann Arbor: University of Michigan press, 1962.

that because we can imagine, we are ontologically free. In this he mentions that Husserl remains captive to the idealist principle of immanence i.e. the object of consciousness lies within consciousness.⁵² *The World of Imagination: Sum and Substance* by Eva T.H. Brann has a detailed study of imagination. In this he explains Mikel Dufrenne, Paul Taylor and Edward Casey's criticism against Sartre with reference to imagination. Dufrenne asserts that the imagination is much more than a mere denial of world or negative power. For him, imagination is our power for reforming the real world and bearing its vision within us. Taylor also argues against Sartre that imagination is in fact a source of fresh knowledge and judgment. Imagination provides us with affective knowledge experience of our own emotional states and those of others. Casey criticized Sartre for not elaborating the nature of imaginative act more fully.⁵³

Sartre's *Sketch for a Theory of Emotions* (1939) deals with positive meaning of emotion. He viewed that emotion is not an accidental display of human beings rather it is intentional act. In this he explains the relation between psychology, phenomenology and phenomenological psychology. He tries to show the inadequacies of a mere empirical psychology in accounting for human existence. He holds that the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger as basis of phenomenological psychology of capable of assigning meaning to the facts in the context of human existence.⁵⁴ Sartre's *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* is a continuation of his previous works on the issues of human existence and freedom. This work essentially studies the nature of being as phenomena that presents in consciousness. He sketches his own theory of consciousness, being, phenomenon through the criticism of earlier phenomenologists such as Husserl and Heidegger as well as idealists, rationalist and empiricists. For Sartre, Being is objective, it is what is. Being is in-itself. Existence, on the other hand, has a subjective quality in relation to human reality. Existence refers to the fact that some individual or thing is present in the world. Sartre distinguishes between two types of Being: 'Being-in-itself' (*être-en-soi*) and 'Being-for-itself' (*être-pour-soi*). Being-in-itself is non-conscious Being, the Being of existing things or objects of consciousness.

⁵² Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Psychology of Imagination*, Bernard Frechtman (trans.), London: Methuen, 1972.

⁵³ Eva T.H. Brann, *The World of Imagination: Sum and Substance*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1993, pp.119-138.

⁵⁴ Op. cit., *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, 1971.

Being-for-itself is conscious Being, which is conscious of what it is not. Being-for-itself is conscious of itself. Indeed, consciousness can exist only as engaged in a being conscious of itself. Being-for-itself is consciousness of objects, and can be the object of its own consciousness; i.e. it is conscious that it is conscious of objects. Sartre distinguishes between two types of consciousness: unreflective consciousness, and reflective consciousness. Unreflective consciousness is seen in the pre-reflective cogito of Descartes. Unreflective consciousness is conscious of its consciousness, but it does not attempt to become its own object. Reflective consciousness, on the other hand, is conscious of its lack in relation to being other than itself. Reflective consciousness can also be called moral consciousness, because it reveals values. Values can be determined by the Being-for-itself, in that the Being-for-itself sees what is lacking in relation to itself. Because consciousness can conceive of a lack of Being, Being-for-itself is also the nihilation of Being-in-itself. Being-for-itself brings Nothingness into the world, because Being-for-itself judges other beings by seeing what it is not. Being-for-itself nihilates itself, and becomes its own Nothingness. Nothingness is a state of non-being. Nothingness does not itself have Being, but is sustained by Being. Nothingness is logically subsequent to being. For Sartre, anguish is the discovery that the Self faces Nothingness in the past and the future, that the Self may nihilate itself, because nothing relieves the Self of the responsibility for making choices, and nothing guarantees the validity of the values that are chosen by the Self. Flight from anguish toward reassuring myths is an attitude that Sartre calls 'bad faith'. Through bad faith, we may seek to deny the responsible freedom of Being-for-itself. Bad faith consists in hiding the truth from ourselves. Authenticity is the antithesis of bad faith. Ultimately he argues for authentic being.⁵⁵

Apart from these philosophical works, his literary works too inform his philosophical views by locating it in human life situations. The novel *Nausea* is a story of a troubled life of a young writer in modern times. His novel depicts one's struggle with the realization that he is an entirely free agent in a world devoid of meaning; a world in which he must find his own purpose and then take total responsibility for his choices.

⁵⁵ Op. cit., *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, 1956.

This work gives the insight of Sartre's philosophy of existentialism.⁵⁶ Another novel *The Roads to Freedom* seeks to illustrate the existentialist notion of ultimate freedom through presenting a detailed account of the characters' psychologies as they are forced to make significant decisions in their lives. This novel is a fictional representation of his main philosophical work, *Being and Nothingness*, where one attains ultimate freedom through *nothing*, or more precisely, by being nothing. This novel portrays the Sartre's conception of freedom as the ultimate aim of human existence.⁵⁷

The play *The Flies* is an adaptation of the Electra myth. Sartre incorporates an existential theme into the play. This play suggests Freedom is not the ability to physically do whatever one wants. It is the ability to mentally interpret one's own life for oneself—to define oneself and create one's own values. Even the slave can interpret his or her life in different ways, and in this sense the slave is free. Sartre's idea of freedom specifically requires that the being-for-itself be neither a being-for-others nor a being-in-itself. A being-for-others occurs when human beings accept morals thrust onto them by others. A being-in-itself occurs when human beings do not separate themselves from objects of nature.⁵⁸

Maurice Merleau-Ponty has reinterpreted perception or sensation in new way that has brought to be a well known in psychology than any other phenomenologists. His contribution was the phenomenological recovery of the concept of behaviour from its impoverishment at the hands of narrow behaviourism. For him, behaviour has emerged as a Gestalt or form which embraces both the external and the internal phenomena, consciousness and movement, in inextricable interfusion. Both were aspects of same phenomenon. His two important works are *The Structure of Behavior* (1942) and *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945) which were written in his life time. They deal with psychological issues of perception, body and behaviour. His other posthumous work *The Visible and the Invisible* (1964) mainly deals with his novel interpretation of body. *Primacy of Perception* is another work of Merleau-Ponty which is a collection of his

⁵⁶ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Nausea*, Robert Baldick (trans.), Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965.

⁵⁷ Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Age of Reason*, New Delhi: Penguin books India Pvt. Ltd, 2009.

⁵⁸ Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Flies*, New York, Hamilton Press, 1950.

essays. In these two works, he emphasizes the necessity of psychology to understand human being in addition to philosophy. Merleau-Ponty's *The Structure of Behaviour* projects his views on phenomenological psychology by pointing out the inadequacies of scientific theories such as behaviourism and Gestalt psychology. He aims at showing the essential features of the phenomenon by demonstrating the shortcomings of physically reductive and mentalist views. According to him, behaviour is not a thing but neither it is an idea. In this work he establishes behaviour as structure and that needs to be understood properly in order to understand human beings.⁵⁹

Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* is an important work that deals about the 'primacy of perception'. In this work, he deviates from phenomenological conceptions of Husserl and Heidegger. He holds a position that we first perceive the world, and then we do philosophy. This entails a critique of the Cartesian cogito, resulting in a largely different concept of consciousness. The Cartesian dualism of mind and body is criticized by Merleau-Ponty. He has also questioned Cartesian understanding of our primary way of existing in the world and he has ultimately rejected it in favour of an intersubjective conception or dialectical concept of consciousness. For Merleau-Ponty, perception and body are central to his philosophy. He argues that we perceive the world through our bodies and we are embodied subjects existent in the world. His conception of body undermines the long standing conceptions of consciousness. His stand point with regards to dualism rejects Sartre's position. Sartre makes a distinction between the being-for-itself (subject) and being-in-itself (object). Merleau-Ponty's understanding of body stands between this fundamental distinction between subject and object. He upholds the ambiguous existing of body as both.⁶⁰

The Visible and the Invisible is an unfinished manuscript and working notes of Merleau-Ponty in his last days. This work highlights his own conception mind and body, subject and object, self and other against traditional dualism by critically examining the Kantian, Husserlian, Bergsonian and Sartrean views in this regard. The traditional

⁵⁹ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behaviour*, Aldun L. Fisher (trans.), Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.

⁶⁰ Op. cit., *Phenomenology of Perception*, 1962.

dualism is that mind and body, subject and object, self and other are discrete and separate entities. Merleau-Ponty does not dispute that there is a divergence in our embodied situation that is evident in the difference that exists between touching and being touched, between looking and being looked at, or between the sentient and the sensible. These divergences are considered to be a necessary and constitutive factor in allowing subjectivity to be possible at all. According to Merleau-Ponty, there is an important sense in which such pairs are also associated.⁶¹

There are considerable secondary works reflecting on the writings of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty in general and their phenomenological psychology in particular. Keith Hoeller's edited work *Sartre and Psychology: A Special Issue from the Review of existential Psychology and Psychiatry* is a collection of articles by different authors which brings forth Sartre's influence on phenomenological and existential psychology. In this, Max Charlesworth gives a fine outline of existential psychiatry and discusses the method of Sartre with reference to Freud. Hazel Barnes illustrates different notions of self in Sartre. Sander Lee's "Sartre's Theory of the Emotions" examines an apparent split in Sartre between the emotion and rationality.⁶² Keith Hoeller's another edited work *Merleau-Ponty and Psychology: Studies in existential Psychology and Psychiatry* is a collection of articles by different authors which brings forth Merleau-Ponty's influence on phenomenological and existential psychology. The work deals with a special focus on Merleau-Ponty's understanding on issues such as experience, intersubjectivity, psychoanalysis and phenomenological psychology.⁶³ Jon Stewart's *The Debate between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty* (1998) deals about the similarities and differences between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. He has observed that Merleau-Ponty's writings account for a passive openness to reality and Sartre's account of individual experience as self-shaped and non-passive. He relates to Merleau-Ponty's concern with the body and Sartre's with

⁶¹ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, Alphonso Lingis (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968.

⁶² Keith Hoeller, *Sartre and Psychology: A special Issue from the Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993.

⁶³ Op. cit., *Merleau-Ponty and Psychology*, 1993.

having of experiences.⁶⁴ In 'Freedom', John J. Compton illustrates the primacy of 'being-with' for Merleau-Ponty and the experience of 'being-for' for Sartre.⁶⁵

As any other schools of psychology, phenomenological psychology is also undergone criticism. There are views for and against the field of phenomenological psychology both from philosophy and psychology. The main criticism is that it has brought psychology back to philosophical speculations and theological conjectures. It lacks objective methods and principles. In the absence of such objectivity, it is difficult to accept the basic tenets of the existential science.

Brody and Oppenheim compared phenomenology and methodological behaviorism as bases for psychology and critical about the phenomenological method. It is viewed that the subject matter of pure phenomenological psychology is all of experience. It is the intent of pure phenomenological psychology to study that which is immediately given in experience. The pure phenomenological psychology studies the data of experience by a method which invokes the suspension of implicit and explicit assumptions. They conclude that pure phenomenological psychology cannot be used as a basis for the construction of theories, nor, as we see now, for the purpose of testing any scientific statement and pure phenomenological psychology cannot even be used as a means of describing experience. It is argued that pure phenomenological psychology is not relevant *per se* for scientific psychology.⁶⁶ Amedeo Giorgi criticizes the approach of Brody and Oppenheim and defended the phenomenological method. He argues that Brody and Oppenheim have not made a comparative study of phenomenological psychology and behaviourism with neutral stand point. They have rather implicitly accepted the criteria the methodology of behaviorism in comparing both behaviorism and phenomenological psychology.⁶⁷

⁶⁴Jon Stewart, *The Debate between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998, P.25.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 1998.

⁶⁶ Brody, N. & Oppenheim, P., "Tensions in psychology between the methods of behaviorism and phenomenology," *Psychological Review*, Vol.73, 1966, pp.295-305.

⁶⁷Amedeo Giorgi, "Convergences and Divergences between Phenomenological Psychology and Behaviorism: A Beginning Dialogue," *Behaviorism*, Vol. 3, No. 2, Fall-1975, pp. 200-212.

Forest Hansen in his article, “Critique of the Epistemological Skepticism of Campbell's Phenomenological Behaviourist Psychology”, has analysed Donald Campbell's epistemological issues, he asserts that firm foundations or anchors for knowledge are unavailable and that all knowledge claims go beyond their evidence, are highly presumptive and corrigible. He supports such assertions in two ways: by philosophical arguments and by a causal theory of perception. Both are used in an attempt to persuade us that, no matter how dependable they may be in our experience, conceptual and perceptual judgments cannot be justified as more than highly probable; certain knowledge of the world and of ourselves necessarily and forever remains elusive.⁶⁸ Robert Romanyshyn's work *The Wounded Researcher: Research with Soul in Mind* is integration of phenomenology, hermeneutics and depth psychology which is primarily grounded in a neo-Jungian perspective. While Romanyshyn identifies primarily with neo-Jungian and phenomenological orientations to research, he is not wedded to any particular methodology. In fact, he is critical of Amedeo Giorgi and other phenomenological psychologists who over-identify phenomenology or depth psychology with a particular, circumscribed methodology. Romanyshyn has made a bold and convincing critique of Dilthey's distinction between the natural and human sciences. According to Romanyshyn, the distinction between explanation and understanding relies upon and perpetuates a subject-object dualism which needs to be surpassed in science.⁶⁹

Sartre and Merleau-Ponty contributed to psychology through their approach of existential phenomenological psychology. They have achieved a tremendous amount of development in the field of psychology where it studies the perception, emotion, imagination, memory, forgetting, etc. In psychotherapy, it deals with making a person aware of one's authentic state. Their phenomenological methods are even applied in the field of psychiatry which is supposed to deal with abnormal individual. It is evident that there have been many psychologists who are either influenced or have used some of the phenomenological methods in their psychology.

⁶⁸ Forest Hansen, “Critique of the Epistemological Skepticism of Campbell's Phenomenological Behaviourist Psychology,” *Behaviourism*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall-1979, pp. 65-84.

⁶⁹ Robert Romanyshyn, *The Wounded Researcher: Research with Soul in Mind*, New Orleans: Spring Journal Books, 2007, pp.360.

Bruce Wilshire in *William James and Phenomenology* discusses the significance of phenomenology to psychology. He appreciates phenomenology for its chief value that it raises a challenge to dominant modes of psychology and supplies an alternative mode of thought that keeps open vast reaches of western civilization which are in danger of being sealed off by contemporary science.⁷⁰ Donald Snygg in his article, "The need for a Phenomenological System of Psychology", emphasizes the significance of phenomenology in psychology.⁷¹ *Individual Behaviour: A new frame of reference for psychology* is a joint venture of Snygg and Arthur Combs. It portrays a fully developed new phenomenological approach as 'personal approach'. Snygg expressed that behaviour is completely determined by and pertinent to the phenomenological field of the behaving organism. Therefore, phenomenology should consist primarily in the exploration of the phenomenal field of the individual, including his or her phenomenal self.⁷² Joseph Lyons' *Psychology and the Measure of Man: A Phenomenological Approach* attempts to explain the approach of phenomenological psychology in dealing with clinical problems. It is viewed that with phenomenological psychology, consciousness became a legitimate subject of psychology. The reappearance of the issue of consciousness in current psychology may be interpreted either as a sign of wider acceptance of phenomenology or as a phenomenon of more complex origin, which has naturally helped the acceptance of phenomenology considerably.⁷³ David Seamon's article "The Phenomenological Contribution to Environmental Psychology" considers the value of phenomenology for environmental psychology. It examines the difference between conventional scientific approach and phenomenological approach. The conventional approach sometimes, uncritically accepts theories and concepts which are out of touch with the fabric of environmental behaviour and experience. A phenomenological perspective looks at person-environmental relations afresh and thus helps to revitalize the ontological, epistemological and methodological foundations of environmental psychology. It discusses three substantive themes, such as phenomenology of human experience,

⁷⁰ Bruce Wilshire, *William James and Phenomenology: A Study of The Principles of Psychology*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968

⁷¹ Donald Snygg, "The need for a Phenomenological System of Psychology," *Psychological Review*, Vol. XLVIII, 1941, pp.404-424.

⁷² Alfred E. Kuenzli (ed.), *The Phenomenological Problem*, New York: Harper, 1959, p.12.

⁷³ Joseph Lyons, *Psychology and the Measure of Man: A Phenomenological Approach*, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963, Pp 306.

phenomenology of physical environment and phenomenology of person and world relationship.⁷⁴ August Messer has credited Husserl in his experimental investigation of thinking in *Sensation and Thinking* (1908). Messer was speaking of intention, intentional act and intentionality but he was sceptical about essential intuition. He was not interested in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. In his essay "Husserl's phenomenology in its relation to psychology" which was a response to Husserl's "Philosophy as a rigorous science", has recommended that Wurzburg school needs phenomenological method. According to him, phenomenology of *Logical Investigation* provided liberation from narrow perspective of sensationalism. It was also an instrumental cause for him to describe the higher functions of thinking in psychology. He acknowledges that phenomenology has played an active role in his interpretation of his own findings.⁷⁵

Phenomenological psychology has influenced Gestalt psychology in due course of time. Both Gestalt psychology and phenomenology have attempted to free modern man to fresh reality. Both the disciplines were developing simultaneously. Though Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka and Wolfgang Kohler were never interested in philosophy as such but when they were to face the challenges of behaviourism, they sought the help of philosophy, especially phenomenological method. Kurt Koffka has identified the methods of Gestalt with that of phenomenology in his book *The Principles of Gestalt Psychology*. He called phenomenology as naïve and full of description of direct experience as possible. His battle against behaviourism and introspectionism needed phenomenological method.⁷⁶ Karl Duncker's studies of induced movement, productive thinking, and motivation can be evidence for his knowledge in phenomenology. He even went beyond Husserl in many respects. His treatment of phenomenological pleasure and phenomenology of the object of consciousness was a highlight.⁷⁷ Fritz Heider's work *Psychology of Interpersonal Relation* is influenced by the works of Sheler, Sartre, and

⁷⁴ David Seamon, "The Phenomenological Contribution to Environmental Psychology," *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, Vol.2, Issue.2, June, 1982, pp.119-140.

⁷⁵ Op. cit., *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, p.58.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.62.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p.65.

Merleau-Ponty. He has faithfully described phenomena and he has allowed them to guide the choice of problems and procedures.⁷⁸

In German phase of phenomenology, there was no much relation with Psychoanalysis rather there was contrast between them. But in French phase of phenomenology, both seemed to have more close contact to merge. James R. Barclay finds eight points of agreements between Freud and Brentano but whatever the cases may be the concept of intentionality in Freudian study must have something to do with that of Brentano.⁷⁹ Carl Gustav Jung had no much interest in phenomenology. But at a time he has criticised Freud being at mid air with no phenomenological foundations. For him, psychological phenomenology was to study the unconscious complexes inferred from the manifested symptoms which is not a possible. He used phenomenology for being popular otherwise there is no concrete connection between his psychology and phenomenology to be found. In the last phase of his time he distinguished phenomenology from natural science which was also close to phenomenological attitude.⁸⁰ Paul Federn defined ego psychology in terms of descriptive, phenomenological and metapsychological. He understood phenomenological to be subjectively descriptive in terms of feeling, knowing and apprehending. His phenomenological definition of ego is “felt and known by the individual as a lasting or recurring continuity of the body and mental life in respect of time, space, and causality and is felt and apprehended by him as a unity”.⁸¹

The first phenomenologist took interest in psychoanalysis is Max Scheler, in his book *The Nature of Sympathy* accepted the facts of early childhood sexuality of Freud. Psychoanalysis has been possible major topic for French phenomenologist with exception to Gabriel Marcel⁸². Angelo Louis Hesnard’s attempt in his book *Psychoanalysis of the Human Bond*, is an effort to fill the gabs in psychoanalysis through phenomenology, especially its failure to do justice to the interpersonal relations. Though Freud’s theory of identification plays an important role in these relations but it does not account for what

⁷⁸ Fritz Heider, *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958.

⁷⁹ Op. cit., *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, p.73.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.78.

⁸¹ Ibid., p.87.

⁸² Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, Peter Heath (trans.), New York: Archon Books, 1970.

Hesnard considers the foundation for social acts, the “anonymous intersubjectivity” which he finds in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of social behaviour. He was a chief advocate of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and its application to psychoanalysis. He was interested in Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the close bonds of consciousness with the body and the world. He was trying to present a phenomenological psychoanalysis. He felt that phenomenology can offer an enlarged consciousness to psychoanalysis which can do justice to even unconscious.⁸³ Daniel Lagache’s psychoanalytic theory is a study of structure of the ego, its different types, and their relations among each other, lend themselves to phenomenological interpretation in sense of Husserl’s developed ‘egology’. While Daniel has not stressed this connection, he is aware of phenomenology as a potential aid to his development of Freudian scheme. Thus he appeals to phenomenology as best guardrail.⁸⁴ Antoine Vergote argues that Freud had discovered that the psychic is defined by meaning, and that this meaning is dynamic and historic. Before even knowing it by name, he had thus put the phenomenological method-which consists in letting the phenomena speak as they are in themselves-into action. Antoine particularly applies this method to Freud’s interpretation of dreams, as an attempt to understand the meaning of the manifestation of the unconscious, which is essentially “effective and dynamic intentionality of forces.” This kind of phenomenology goes beyond mere descriptive version of phenomenology. It is more toward Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology than Husserlian descriptive phenomenology. Antoine himself did not identify Freudian approach to that of Husserl.⁸⁵

Carl Rogers’ major book *Client-Centered Therapy* (1951) argues for phenomenology as a main ingredient for the ‘third force’ in psychology. In this work, he was looking for new methods to cope up with the concrete situation of the individual. The reason is that the essential point about the therapeutic process is that the way the client perceives the objects in his phenomenal field, his experiences, his feelings, his self, other

⁸³ Op. cit., *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, p.89.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p.93.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p.96.

persons and his environment which undergoes change in the direction of increased differentiation.⁸⁶

Methodology and Chapter Summary

The present work is classified into six chapters. The present work studies the contributions of two prominent French Existentialist Phenomenologists to phenomenological psychology. As far as the method is concerned, the historical, critical, analytical, comparative and evaluative approaches are followed to study the present problem.

The first chapter is entitled as *Phenomenological Psychology: An Introduction*. It introduces the problem to be studied. It provides a brief account of the significance of the topic and the methodology adopted to study the problem. The review of literature is added to contextualize the problem of study and it would facilitate the present study to be a complete work.

The second chapter is entitled as *Philosophical Basis for Phenomenological Psychology*. This chapter deals about the historical background for the emergence of phenomenological psychology as a discipline. This chapter also portrays a brief account of dominant schools of psychology. This chapter analyses the philosophical systems which shaped phenomenological psychology.

The third chapter is entitled as *Sartre's Contribution to Phenomenological Psychology*. This chapter explains Sartre's views on human being. According to Sartre, first of all, psychology must understand human nature from psychological perspectives rather than accepting the views of scientific or narrow philosophical perspectives. Through understanding of human nature, one can have a better understanding of human behaviour. In this connection, his account freedom, bad faith, authenticity, emotion and imagination are critically analyzed. Finally, this chapter discusses Sartre's new methodology of existential psychoanalysis. For Sartre, existential psychoanalysis enables an individual to trace for meaning for one's action in one's fundamental project. He

⁸⁶ Carl Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951, p.142 & 250.

concludes that every act of human behaviour is a conscious act. It is a voluntary action of an individual and it reflects of the individual's own decisions and choices. Therefore the stimulus response pattern of understanding human behaviour as done in many of the modern psychology is not appropriate.

The fourth chapter is entitled as *Merleau-Ponty's Contribution to Phenomenological Psychology*. This chapter explains how Merleau-Ponty brings back the perception as basis for all knowledge. He makes body-subject as central to perception. He has done away with objective thought which estrange human being from the world. Merleau-Ponty strongly opposes the dichotomies to show there nothing like inner self which directs one's behaviour. Instead one's behaviour is based on the contextual basis and his perception of the being-in-the-world. He maintains that behaviour is always structured but the methods used in psychology are inadequate to study behaviour as it is. Thus he envisaged a systematic phenomenology of perception as an appropriate method of study. For him, perception is man's primordial contact with the world: 'it opens a window onto things,' and as such it should be a starting point for the study of man and the world. He wants to explore man's phenomenal field. This exploration is focused on the body or bodily being and the world as perceived by man.

The fifth chapter is entitled as *Critique of Phenomenological Psychology*. This chapter critically evaluates the approaches of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty with regards to the study of phenomenological psychology and further briefs their influences on psychologists. This chapter also analyses the interventions of the phenomenological approach to other approaches in psychology. This chapter also analyses the criticisms leveled against phenomenological psychology. Finally, this chapter shows that phenomenological psychology can be a unifying force in psychology.

The sixth chapter is entitled as *Conclusion*. This chapter briefs the positions of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty with regards to phenomenological psychology as a discipline and a method in psychology. Finally, this chapter ends by showing the relevance of phenomenological psychology of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty in the present day psychology.

CHAPTER - II

PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Introduction

Phenomenological psychology is an unbiased examination of conscious experience. The primary objective of phenomenological psychology is to analyse our conscious experience of the world, oneself and others. Further, its focus lies in the exploration of all human experience without recourse to implicit or explicit reductionist or associationistic assumptions nor by the exclusive restriction of the subject matter of psychology to behaviour and its control.¹ Phenomenological psychology is rather principally concerned with the application of phenomenological methods to the issues and problems in psychology so that an individual's conscious experience of the world can be more systematically observed and described. Phenomenological psychology is to describe a phenomenon which is free from experimentally based variational biases as much as possible. The conscious acts, such as, perception, imaginary, memory, emotion and so on are analysed with phenomenological oriented investigation. Phenomenological psychology is derived from transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and existential phenomenology of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.² Phenomenological psychology is not an attempt to bring psychology back to philosophy. In other words, phenomenological psychology has emerged as a dialogue between philosophy and psychology which were operating on the different level in the context of human existence. Phenomenological psychology is an orientation towards psychology. It is to apply phenomenological methods into the issues of psychology for better clarification and understanding. But from Husserl's point of view, it is rather interested in bridging the gap between transcendental phenomenology and empirical psychology.³

¹ Henryk Misiak, Virginia Staudt Sexton, *Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Psychologies: A Historical Survey*, New York: Grune & Stratton, 1973, p.41.

² Ernesto Spinelli, *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, 2nd edition, London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2005, pp.32-33.

³ Joseph J. Kocklemans, *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967, p.321.

Psychology as a systematic study of the mind and behaviour had begun in the ancient Greek philosophy. Since then, psychology has been a branch of philosophy till the 1870s. The works of Plato, Aristotle, Scholastic philosophers, empiricists, rationalists and Kant have dealt with psychology. Immanuel Kant declared in his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786) that psychology cannot be made into a 'proper' science because its phenomena cannot be rendered in mathematical form. Johann Herbart has taken clue from Kant's writings and attempted to develop a mathematical basis for a scientific psychology. Although he was unable to empirically realize the terms of his psychological theory, his efforts have led the scientists such as Ernst Weber and Gustav Fechner to attempt to measure the mathematical relationships between the physical magnitudes of external stimuli and the psychological intensities of the resulting sensations.⁴

Wilhelm Wundt's famous book *Principles of Physiological Psychology* was published in 1873-74. The book had strongly pleaded for the establishment of psychology as an independent science.⁵ Wundt is credited for separating psychology from the clutches of philosophy. He is rightly called father of experimental psychology. He had opened first psychological laboratory at Leipzig in 1879. It was a real turning point in the field of psychology.⁶ Husserl's phenomenological psychology was a reaction to Wundt's approach to psychology. For Husserl, phenomenological psychology can be better basis for his transcendental phenomenology. He also envisaged that his phenomenological psychology can be bridge between psychology and phenomenology.⁷ Later, the two French contemporaries, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty carried out Husserl's mission in their own existential manner. As existential phenomenologists, they are interested in understanding the human existence. They envisaged that the application of phenomenological method in psychology is an inevitable tool for better understanding of human beings. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have found lacuna in the methods of

⁴ Arun Kumar Singh, *The Comprehensive History of Psychology*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1991, pp.47-51.

⁵ Ibid., p.117.

⁶ Ibid., pp.94-116.

⁷ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy-First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, F. Kersten (trans.), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1983, pp.41-43.

psychoanalytic and behaviouristic schools. According to them, these schools try to understand individuals not as human being rather as mere mechanic engine. For Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, human being is rather conscious individual with freedom to act. They argue that an individual can be understood through phenomenological method which would be more appropriate way of understanding human existent than that of behaviouristic or psychoanalytic methods. The behaviouristic methods emphasize on external behavioural aspects and deny the subjective aspects of human beings. The psychoanalytic methods give importance to reductionist depth psychology of unconsciousness. Both existential phenomenologists study consciousness and the life world of a person.⁸ They argue that the study of consciousness and the life world of a person would lead to holistic understanding of a person. Wilhelm Dilthey has rightly pointed out that a person cannot be explained away like things but the person needs to be understood. Thus the descriptive method is one of the right methods to understand human person.⁹

Historical Background of Psychology

The study of psychological issues is as old as philosophy. For many centuries, psychology was primarily part of philosophy. Psychology had its place in all great systems of philosophy. For Greeks, psychology was essentially a philosophical endeavour. Psychology was a search to understand life through its ultimate causes. They were interested in the type of body that seems to be able to do things by itself; it gave the impression that there was a special power or being living in it, which made that being to act in a way different from other beings. The living beings moved spontaneously and they also were acted from outside. The things inside the living being were thought to be a spirit or soul. Therefore, they named it 'psychology' which means, 'study of soul'. When Plato and Aristotle had laid foundation for psychology, they envisioned a purely philosophical study of human soul.¹⁰

⁸ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, pp.332-343.

⁹ Ibid., pp.77-79.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp.30-32.

According to Aristotle, psychology must study the life-manifestations of plants animals as well as humans. These life manifestations all originate from the soul. Plants and animals have soul as human beings. The soul forms a substantial unity with the body so that not a single human possibility can be actual except through the cooperation of the body. In other words, the soul is the animating entelechy of the body.¹¹ Even in Aristotle, one can find the traces for empirical psychology. When Aristotle spoke of memory, he based his discussion on immediate experience and arrived at a formulation of some laws of association. It was John Locke who carried further and brought about changes in psychology. John Locke was influenced by Descartes and Hobbes. Hobbes in turn took Bacon for his departure. It can be said that Bacon created methodology for new psychology and Descartes provided scientific, theoretical backbone for this new empirical psychology.¹²

According to Bacon, only science could achieve the greatness of human beings dealing with each other and with nature. According to him, human being would acquire tremendous power over environment with science. He holds that an individual starts with hypothesis of limited generality and moves towards more generally valid hypotheses by means of inductive method. Once these generally valid hypotheses are achieved then an individual goes back to the concrete facts and events and try to interpret and understand them. He strongly argues that human being can approach truth from two fundamentally different directions. Firstly, with the data provided by the sensory apparatus, an individual makes a leap into most general principles (axiomata) and then fills in the gap between the two by means of deductive reasoning. Another possibility is to go from the data of the senses to the axioms by means of a continuous and gradual ascension so that the most general axioms will be reached only in the final phase of the process of reasoning. The first method leads to unproductive 'mental anticipations' while the other method leads to a 'true interpretations of nature'. This resulted in philosophical position called positivism or scientism.¹³

¹¹ Edwin Boring, *A History of Experimental Psychology*, New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2008, pp.158-159.

¹² Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, pp.32-33.

¹³ Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy*, New York: Pocket Books, 1961, pp.119-138.

Descartes had the same intention like Bacon but his approach was different. He wanted to introduce new method of philosophizing based on the methods of mathematics. Through this method, he wanted to reconstruct all of philosophy from bottom. He was deeply convinced that science should be unique and unitary. It should be built up from the very foundation to its ultimate completion by one single man, without presupposing any result reached in the past, by deducing all truths from a few fundamental principles and by presupposing nothing except that which is clear and distinct in itself and as such can be recognized by everybody. In his philosophical physics, he arrived at the conclusion that extension constitutes the essential attribute of the material world. Material substances are but spatial quantities devoid of any active attributes. All changes in the material world are but changes in space by mean of local movements which follow fixed mechanical laws. All of the material world can, thus, be viewed as one gigantic mechanism which can be made completely intelligible once we know the laws governing its movements. He approached living bodies much the same way as he approached the entire material world. Plants and animals, even man's body, are considered to be mechanisms, distinct from inanimate bodies only in terms of complexity. All vital functions of organism can be fully understood, once all the aspects of the movement of its particles are carefully considered. This leads to dualistic concept of man. Man is composed of body and soul. Soul is the simple, immaterial, immortal substance with thinking as its essential attribute. The body possesses extension as its essential attribute and is, as such, not essentially different from other material substances. All the vital functions of the living human body can be explained by means of mechanical causes. There occurs, then, an unbridgeable gap between the body and the soul. A whole series of later philosophical additions and amplifications to these basic notions were not successful in restoring the unity of man for Descartes. What he had split asunder he could no more join together.¹⁴

Descartes achieved the foundation of a positive science of the body but only at the expense of an existential separation between man and his body. Philosophy leaves the study of human body to a positive science but must in this way pay the price of excluding

¹⁴ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, pp.37-38.

the body from human reality. To make it fitting subject for scientific investigation, the body is to be estranged from man himself. After this splitting the human world into these two independent parts, Descartes was at a loss to restore the unity which all of us experience in daily life.¹⁵ On one hand, Descartes' research on human body laid foundation for physiological psychology and reflexology. On the other hand, his studies on consciousness laid foundation for the psychology of consciousness. Boring comments on Descartes' contribution to genesis and development of empirical psychology in this manner:

the mechanistic approach, the dualism of mind and body, their interaction, the brain as the important locus for the mind, the localization of the mind nevertheless the in entire body, and yet the specific localizations within the brain, the innate ideas which led on into the doctrine of nativism.¹⁶

For Aristotle, philosophical psychology studies all forms of life: plants, animal and human beings from the stand point of their vital functions and manifestations. But Descartes restricted his philosophical psychology to the domain of conscious phenomena because of his dualism. The post Cartesian rationalists like Leibnitz, Spinoza and Wolff continued to regard the body and consciousness as wholly separate. Later, under the influence of the empiricists, like Locke, Berkeley and Hume, a positive scientific psychology of consciousness grew out of this movement. So the positive science of the body and philosophical psychology of conscious phenomena existed side by side. This positive science of body turned to be the foundation for biology and physiology. These two sciences gave rise to physiological psychology. This physiological psychology and psychology of consciousness merges in the new discipline of empirical psychology.¹⁷

Though Descartes and Bacon played a role of forerunners, it was Locke and Hume first to build psychology on these new foundations. Yet their psychology cannot be called a truly empirical science because they regarded their psychological work as

¹⁵ Ibid., p.40.

¹⁶ Op. cit., *A History of Experimental Psychology*, p.165.

¹⁷ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, pp.41-42.

properly philosophical. Locke following Aristotelian tradition accepted as true the thought that the soul does not possess innate ideas. All representations and concepts arise necessarily out of our experience alone. At birth, the human soul is like *tabula rasa*, clean blank slate or sheet on which not yet anything is written. However, the soul is born with the capacity to think. All that which accumulates in concepts and ideas over the span of man's life arises out of experience. This experience consists of the sensations or the impressions which reach us from the outside through the senses and the reflections or impressions which the soul receives concerning its own state of being by means of inner experience. Experience both of the external and the internal variety gives man his simple ideas which then in turn become part his higher mental constructs. A special operation of the mind which is thought to be partly passive and partly active has to accomplish the transformation of the simple ideas into the complex ideas. In the construction of complex ideas out of simple ideas different functions cooperate with one another. Especially, this association which plays an important part in this transformation.¹⁸

According to Locke, psychology must take its starting point in reflection; it is its task to investigate how the simple reflections give rise to the higher mental constructs. Its aim is to formulate the laws which govern these transformations. Locke strives for an empirical associationistic psychology which as far as its methods is concerned must orient itself toward physics and chemistry. Yet, this psychology still remains essentially a philosophical psychology since its main function is to delineate and establish the validity of man's knowledge. The problem to which Locke directs himself was not originally conceived by him; for they had engaged the attention of Descartes and others. The novel aspect introduced by Locke is his insistence on solving the problem of knowledge without the aid of metaphysical *a priori*. That is why the psychology which we find in Locke from the very start is standing in an epistemological perspective. It will be evident that here the epistemological problems can be formulated and solved only in an empirical sense.¹⁹

¹⁸ Ibid., pp.43-45.

¹⁹ Ibid., p.45.

According to Husserl, George Berkeley and David Hume hold prime importance in the early development of psychology. Berkeley's approach of perception and perception of space has substantially contributed to the development of psychology. Hume's phenomenalism takes its starting point in certain basic conceptions of Locke's philosophy and in certain sense his work is an attempt to realize Locke's view in a more consistent way. Hume was especially fascinated by the success of physics. Hume begins with an exposition on the origin, the composition and the associative connections of ideas. This point of departure was an agreement with Locke as he writes:

All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds which I shall call impressions and ideas. The difference betwixt these consists in the degree of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind and make their way into our thought or consciousness.²⁰

Hume distinguishes two kinds of basic psychological elements: the first type encompasses all that which makes itself known to us via the external senses; the second type includes all that which somehow reaches our awareness by means of the internal senses. According to him, impressions are simple and complex. The analysis of complex impression reveals the underlying indivisible simple impression. The same is true with ideas. Complex ideas are built up out simple unitary ones. It is further assumed that simple ideas always correspond to simple impression.

He draws a logical conclusion saying that all our simple ideas originate from simple impression. Complex ideas can be developed out of complex impression, although this is not always the case; they can be formed out of simple ideas. Thus sensory impressions are considered to be the most fundamental data of consciousness. In the course of time the philosophical ideas of Locke and Hume bore fruit and formed the basis of a first form of an empirical psychology. Although empirical psychology initially had little independence; its method and terminology had been taken from the physical

²⁰ David Hume, *A Treatise on Human Nature*, L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch (ed.), London: Oxford University Press, 1978, p.1.

sciences and caused psychology itself to become a natural science completely imprisoned in the problematic characteristic of physiology.²¹

Wilhelm Wundt is credited for starting experimental psychology as an independence science in 1870s. He freed psychology from the physiology, biology as well as from the clutches of philosophy. He rejected the philosophical analysis of mental processes as speculative. He also rejected the physiologists attempt to study psychological phenomena because of its emphasis upon anatomical analysis. He was much impressed by Locke's views that all knowledge comes from experience. Therefore he defined psychology as the study of immediate experience. He analyzed the immediate experience or conscious experience into its two primary elements such as sensations and feelings with the inspiration from Mill's concept of mental chemistry. He was impressed by the association of ideas of Alexander Bain and Herbert Spencer. He looked to synthesis the elements of consciousness. He used association as the basic principles of connecting elements of consciousness. Apart from this, he also studied associations in the laboratory. Johann Herbart's doctrine of apperception was also important one which encouraged him to pay more attention to this phenomenon both experimentally and systematically. Though he was convinced that psychological phenomenon cannot be adequately explained on the basis of physiological processes and distinguished psychology from physiology but he holds the view that both should follow the method of physical sciences.²² Husserl disagreed with Wundt for standardizing the method of physical science for understanding psychological issues. Instead Husserl favoured phenomenological method.

Although Wundt has viewed the psychic life of human being as totality, nevertheless the totality can be understood as composite of elementary psychic units. The analysis of human consciousness reveals that there are two distinct elements such as elementary sensations and elementary feelings. All higher conscious elements can be built up out of these fundamental elements. The phenomena as sensations and feelings come to the fore only by means of a process of abstraction. All elements possess quality

²¹ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, p.49.

²² Op. cit., *The Comprehensive History of Psychology*, pp.96-97.

and intensity as common factor which distinguishes one from another. There are number of characteristic that distinguish feelings from sensations. Feelings characteristically form contrasting pairs. There exists a greater variety among the elementary feelings than among elementary sensations. Wundt places feeling in three dimensional continuums along the axis of pleasure-displeasure, stimulation-sedation and tension-relaxation.²³ It is one of the tasks of psychology to explain how a number of combining elements can give rise to the composite higher phenomena of consciousness. These composite phenomena are divided into two main groups, namely, the representations which are parallel to the sensations and the emotions which correspond to the elementary feelings. Within the realm of the representations Wundt distinguishes furthermore, between intensive spatial and temporal representations whereas the principal forms of the emotions are constituted by feeling combinations, affections and the processes of the will. In all these cases Wundt understands by a compound, conscious phenomena one or another composite component of our immediate experience which by means of certain characteristic isolates itself from the content of this experience in such a way that it can be conceived of as a relative unity and indicated by a special name. The division of the composite conscious phenomena follow the elements out of which they supposedly are built up; when the sensations dominates, they are called representations, whereas they are called emotions in case the elementary feelings are predominant. The composite phenomena of consciousness often maintain mutual connections; under the influence of certain synthetic processes, they can appear as simultaneous complexes or they can form progressive chains.²⁴

The next task of psychology is study fundamental principles according to which psychological elements combine with each other. Wundt has viewed of association in cases of the combination of elements in which consciousness itself remains passive. Association can appear in the form of fusion when, for example, two colours or two tones make up a new colour or tone in which the identity; Wundt speaks of complication when elements which belong to the domains of different senses are joined. When consciousness plays an active role in the combining of elements Wundt brings in

²³ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, p.54.

²⁴ Ibid., pp.55-56.

the concept of apperception.²⁵ The higher phenomena of consciousness such as thinking and willing certainly do not depend exclusively on association; instead apperception always plays a role in their constitution. Apperception is a process of the will that governs the course of our psychical processes by consciously putting certain phenomena in the focal point of consciousness and referring others to the perceptive horizon. Thus apperception is the teleological orientation of our attention towards certain psychical contents. His psychology is no longer an interplay of blind mechanical laws; but the higher psychical phenomena are governed and guided by apperception in such a way that these psychical processes develop not in a blind and mechanical but in a teleological way. Wundt's conception of apperception was further especially characterized by the fact that it includes feeling content. Apperception is on that basis placed among the volitional processes. Wundt has placed apperception somewhere in the cortex of the forebrain.²⁶ This has led to the laboratory experimentation of Wundt.

Until Wundt's intervention into psychology, psychology was part of philosophy. The influence of naturalism and other developments of science have seen the emergence of psychology as new discipline. In psychology, the focus of study and method of understanding human reality has changed. In other words, psychology took a new turn as experimental psychology with the influence of Wundt which has later paved way for the behaviouristic and psychoanalytic schools which are the dominant schools of psychology. In the same time, though philosophy also was influenced by scientific developments of modern times, it remained speculative in character. As a result, philosophy and psychology attempts to understand the same human reality from two different distinct manners.

Phenomenological Psychology: Husserl's Intervention

Edmund Husserl was the first philosopher to speak of a new discipline called phenomenological Psychology. He conceived it as a discipline destined to play an important role in the already existing empirical psychology as well as in philosophy.

²⁵ Ibid., pp.56-57.

²⁶ Ibid., pp.57-58

Husserl viewed the German and Austrian psychology as empirical psychology because they used the empirical or scientific methods. This empirical psychology encompasses genetic, social, clinical, industrial psychologies as well as psycho-pathological psychologies. All these disciplines are concerned with the understanding of individual and the world of individual. The scientific methods of psychology uncovered a great number of facts about human and animal behaviour. However, these facts were understood only within the narrow perspective arising from naive naturalistic point of view. So psychology can neither be purely descriptive and nor purely experimental. Rather both methods must be complementary to each other. Husserl's intention was to bridge empirical psychology with phenomenology by developing a new and special psychological discipline. He named his psychology as 'rational psychology' then 'eidetic psychology' and later termed it as 'phenomenological psychology'. The aim of this psychology was to study the structures of consciousness and its functions meaningfully. Such a study would lead towards transcendental phenomenology, also provided a justification and basis for empirical psychology, as well as a methodology for exploration of consciousness.²⁷

Husserl was in view that psychology should free itself from the theoretical prejudices of his time. He too condemned the scientific approach to psychology. Empirical psychology concern itself with concert real beings and points in these concerns to the realm of the psychophysical and physical. He said that these psychologies went away from the essential features of psychological phenomena. The worst of these psychologies was orthodox behaviourism. Husserl's close association with Brentano and Stumpf works made him to feel the importance of phenomenological psychology to fill the gap between philosophy and the best psychology of the time. He also believed that it would help man in crisis. From the point of Husserl, phenomenological psychology is the study of the fundamental types of psychological phenomena in their subjective aspect, regardless of their indebtedness in the objective context of a psychophysical organism.²⁸

²⁷ Ibid., pp.312-318.

²⁸ Theodore De Boer, *The Development of Husserl's Thought*, Theodore Plantinga (trans.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978, pp.123-127.

Husserl was never opposed to psychology as a whole, but only certain types of psychology which he indicated as 'naturalistic' and 'objectivistic'. With these expressions, Husserl refers to psychologies which, in mistaken imitation of the physical sciences, tried to get rid of the essential features of psychological phenomena. The psychology of his time, consisted of a combination of psychophysical (behaviour) and physiological (functions of being) investigations carried out to determine quantitatively and experimentally the relationship between objective stimuli and subjective responses. Though many noted the mistakes only Dilthey clearly saw the fundamental mistakes as naturalism and objectivism but even he could not correct them.²⁹

Husserl holds that phenomenology and psychology are strongly related to each other, because both are concerned with consciousness. But psychology is concerned with empirical consciousness. That is, with consciousness as an empirical being in the real world whereas phenomenology is concerned with pure consciousness but the same kind of relation cannot be attributed to modern psychology. Because modern psychology does not deal with pure analysis and description of the data which immediately manifest themselves in immanent intuition, but they are put aside in favour of certain indirect psychologically relevant facts brought to light by observation and experiment. Such psychology does not see that without an essential analysis of conscious life. Thus these facts are deprived of their real meaning.³⁰ In other words, although it is true that empirical psychology is able to bring to light valuable psychophysical facts and norms, it nevertheless remains deprived of a deeper understanding and a definitive scientific evaluation of these facts so long as it is not founded in a systematic science of conscious life which investigates the psychical as such with the help of immanent reflection. By the very fact, therefore, that experimental psychology considers itself as already methodologically perfect, it is actually unscientific whereas it wishes to penetrate to a real psychological understanding. On the other hand, it is equally unscientific in all those cases where the lack of clarified concepts of the psychical as such leads to an obscure formulation of problems and consequently to merely apparent solutions. The

²⁹ Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenological Psychology: Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, John Scanlon (trans.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967, pp.76-79.

³⁰ Op. cit., *The Development of Husserl's Thought*, pp.128-131.

experimental method is indispensable particularly where there is a question of fixing intersubjective connections of facts. But it does not alter the fact that it presupposes what no experiment can accomplish, namely the analysis of conscious life itself.³¹

For meaningful analysis, one has to question the things themselves and to go back to experience, which alone can give sense and meaning to our words. Experimental psychologists hold that the primary experience lies in the subjects and that an interpretation of this experience presupposes certain self-perceptions of the psychologist which-whatever they may be in any case are not 'introspections'. But there is a fundamental error in this psychology, for it puts analysis realized in empathetic understanding of others' experiences, and analysis based on ones own formally unnoticed experiences, on the same level with analysis characteristic of natural science in the belief that it is an experimental science of the psychical in fundamentally the same way as natural science is the experimental science of the physical in so doing, however, it overlooks the specific character of consciousness and the psychical data.³²

Psychologists believe that they owe all their psychological knowledge to experience. Nevertheless the description of the naïve empirical data, along with an immanent analysis which goes hand in and hand with this description, is effected with the help of psychological concepts whose scientific value will be decisive for all further methodological steps. These concepts, however, remain by the very nature of the experimental method constantly untouched, but nevertheless enter in to the final empirical judgements which claim to be scientific. On the other hand, the scientific value of these concepts was not present from the beginning, nor can it originate from the experience of the subjects or of the psychologists themselves. Logically it can be obtained even from no empirical determination whatsoever. And here is the place for phenomenological, eidetic analysis.

The British Associationists as well as the German experimentalists were convinced implicitly that the method of all empirical sciences, considered in its universal

³¹ Ibid., pp.134-36.

³² Ibid., pp.137-138.

principles, had to be one and the same; therefore, that it ought to be the same in psychology as in the natural sciences. Therefore psychology has suffered from an unacceptable simulation of the physical sciences. In following these lines, it is clear that the typical characteristics of the psychical phenomena must be denied. The true method has to follow that nature of the things to be investigated, not our prejudices and preconceptions.

According to empiricism, all psychological knowledge presupposes essential knowledge of the psychical and since such knowledge cannot be obtained by means of physical procedures, it is evident that only phenomenological analysis can give us a correct solution for the problems mentioned. The fundamental error of modern psychology is that it has not recognized the necessity of a phenomenological method.³³

Even before the Husserl's philosophical investigation, Brentano envisaged to make philosophy a rigorous science. According to him, philosophy consists in description not causal explanation. Philosophy is the description of what is given in direct 'self-evidence'. Husserl has also had the same intention as his master. Brentano attempted to rethink of the nature of psychology as a science. So he proposed a form of descriptive psychology which would concentrate on illuminating the inner self-aware acts of cognition without appealing to causal or genetic explanation. i.e. he was proposing a kind of philosophical psychology or philosophy of mind. In *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, he sets out to do empirical psychology by descriptively identifying the domain of the mental in terms of intentionality. Empirical Psychology is to be descriptive, classificatory science offering taxonomy of mental acts in contrast to Genetic Psychology which studies the material substrate of the psychic acts i.e. the nature of the sense organs, the patterns of the nerves, and so on and it is essentially committed to causal explanation. He was the one who used the phrase 'descriptive psychology or descriptive phenomenology'.³⁴

³³ Joseph J. Kockelmans (ed.), *Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation*, New York: Anchor Books, 1967, pp. 418-449.

³⁴ Franz Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell and L.L. McAlister (trans.), 2nd edition, London: Routledge, 1995, pp.12-14.

According to Brentano, descriptive psychology or descriptive phenomenology is an *a priori* science of the laws of the mental, identifying universal laws on the basis of insight into individual instances. Like Descartes, Brentano also believed in the self-evidence of grasp of inner mental life-inner perception as opposed to the fallible nature of outer perception. Inner perception is quite distinct from introspection. He also makes the distinction of primary and secondary act, primary act is an act itself and secondary act is conscious of the act. A mental act must be at least possible object of inner reflection. Descriptive psychology will provide necessary grounding for genetic psychology and other science like Logic, Aesthetic, Politics, Economics, etc. Descriptive psychology is an exact science like mathematics and independent, prior to genetic psychology.³⁵ But he has said very little about descriptive psychology as foundation for other sciences. And therefore Husserl took up the task of making foundation for other sciences.

According to Brentano, the descriptive psychology is distinguished from ‘genetic psychology’ which was to deal with causal explanations. He never progressed beyond the range descriptive psychology. This psychology mostly explored the general structures as revealed not to ordinary experience but to a kind of idealizing abstraction that clearly went beyond the experience of customary empiricism. Brentano was interested in psychology and he wanted psychology to be a ground for philosophy but the associationism did not do so. Hence he formulated descriptive psychology to fill the gap between psychology and philosophy.³⁶

Husserl carried further his master’s interest through his phenomenological psychology. Phenomenological psychology refers to phenomenology as a method applied to psychological problems or employed at the psychological level of inquiry. Phenomenology psychological is different from philosophical phenomenology or transcendental phenomenology. The transcendental phenomenology is concerned with essence of things and knowledge of ultimate reality. But phenomenological psychology is more restricted to explore the man’s immediate consciousness and experience. Hence it

³⁵ Ibid., pp.17-19.

³⁶ Herbert Spiegelberg, *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, pp.4-5.

may be defined as systematic observation and description of the experience of a conscious individual in a situation.³⁷

Phenomenological Psychology is the study of the fundamental types of psychological phenomena in their subjective aspects only regardless of their imbeddedness in the objective contexts of a psychophysical organism. Empirical Psychology is the descriptive and genetic study of the psychical entities in all their aspects as part and parcel of the psychophysical organism; as such it forms a mere part of the study of man.

According to Husserl, naturalistic psychology imitates physics and goes away from essential features of psychological phenomena. So he introduced phenomenological psychology to supply the essential insights needed to give meaning and direction to the research in empirical psychology. Objectivism gives important for organism. In objectivism the relationship between objective stimuli and subjective response are taken into consideration. But Husserl wanted the attention to be psychic phenomena as they appeared in and of themselves. Through Phenomenological reduction he wanted to bracket the non-psychical entities. Phenomenological psychology first of all should investigate the intentional structure of consciousness because traditional psychology (Empiricists and associationalists) understood consciousness has more aggregate of sense data.³⁸

Phenomenological psychology refers to phenomenology as a method applied to psychological problems or employed at the psychological level of inquiry. Phenomenological Psychology holds that each one is responsible for ones action whereas psychoanalytic holds that unconsciousness is responsible for the action. Phenomenological Psychology is not concern with prediction, control of behaviour instead its main aim is to understand the individual inner life ad experience. It believes that one can learn more about human nature by studying people's perceptions of themselves and their world and by observing their actions. Two people might behave in

³⁷ Op. cit., *Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Psychologies: A Historical Survey*, p.20.

³⁸ Op. cit., *Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation*, p.45.

quite differently in response to the same situation but only by asking them how each interprets the situation we can fully understand their behaviour. According to Phenomenological Psychology, animal behaviour may be predictable under environmental control; human behaviour depends primarily on how individual perceives the world in general and the immediate situation in participation.

In broadest sense, any psychology which considers personal experience in its subject matter, and which accepts and uses phenomenological description, explicitly or implicitly, can be called phenomenological psychology. It is contrasted with psychology which admits only objective observation of behaviour and excludes introspection and phenomenological description in its methodology. In strict sense, phenomenological psychology is the Husserlian psychology which stands apart from empirical psychology and serves as a stepping stone to a more radical form of phenomenology, transcendental phenomenology. Husserl's motto is 'going to the things themselves'. In other words, letting the things themselves show themselves in consciousness. Phenomenological psychology is based on phenomenology for its philosophical justification. Phenomenology is broadly conceived as the study of the data of consciousness as immediately given, whose validity is founded on the notion of intentionality. It consistently applies the phenomenological method, that is, unbiased description of phenomena. It tries to give a faithful exploration of human experience in all its facets without philosophical preconceptions. In this understanding phenomenological psychology is not a school or a theoretical system similar to associationism, Gestalt or psychoanalysis. It is a view point, an approach, an orientation and a methodology in psychological explorations.³⁹

According to Merleau-Ponty, all scientific observations and theories are ultimately based on the direct, immediate, spontaneous experience of everyday life, which phenomenology uncovers. This is the assumption vital to phenomenological psychology. The basic method of phenomenological psychology is description. Its goal is understanding man in all his aspects. Its primary interest lies in human experience and its qualitative exploration. It also studies behaviour but is opposed to the exclusive restriction of the subject matter of psychology to behaviour and its control. It rejects any

³⁹ Ibid., p.33.

philosophical assumptions concerning the nature of consciousness, except its intentionality. It particularly opposes the empiricists' *tabula rasa* concept of consciousness, the associationist view, and all reductionist tendencies. It favours and stresses the holistic approach to the study of psychological problems.⁴⁰

Empirical Psychology as Prologue to Phenomenological Psychology

Modern psychology is a systematic study of human being through various theories and scientific methods. The term 'psychology' is a combination of two Greek words, namely *psyche* and *logos*. The former refers to the 'soul' and the latter means 'study of.' Thus psychology literally means 'study of the soul' but the term soul was misleading due to its religious and metaphysical significance. Hence it was called as 'study of the mind.' This was also not convenient for it being something abstract. So the definition of psychology evolved and now it is called as science of behaviour and cognitive processes. In other words, psychology studies everything that a person and other living organism do, think and feel. It studies observable behaviour, cognitive process, psychological events, social and cultural influences, largely unconscious processes and the complex interaction between all these different factors in order to describe behaviour.⁴¹

Since it was part of philosophy and in many parts of the world the influence of philosophy on psychology was unavoidable. The ideas concerning how to acquire valid knowledge about natural world and ideas concerning the relationship between mind and body were the two important influence of philosophy. Another main influence of philosophy for emerging of modern psychology is the ideas of empiricism that knowledge can be acquired through careful observation and rationalism that knowledge can be gained through logic and careful reasoning. The combinations of these two ideas were the reasons for changes. The principal idea under which modern psychology functions is 'interactionism.' The mental events can influence physical ones and physical ones can influence the mental ones. The prime aim of psychology is to understand, predict and control behaviour. It aims at reducing the intensity of real life problems. It

⁴⁰ Op. cit., *Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Psychologies: A Historical Survey*, pp.40-41.

⁴¹ Robert S. Feldman, *Understanding Psychology*, 6th edition, New York McGraw Hill, 2002, p.4.

also aims at solving social problems. On the whole, psychology helps individuals to understand the behaviour of others and oneself and provide insights into their attitudes and reactions.⁴²

In psychology, we find three major trends or forces. First force is the whole cluster of psychologies that originated in Freud and in psychoanalysis which is a reductive depth psychology of unconscious. Second trend is the behaviouristic school of objectivistic, mechanistic, positivistic trend which denies the subjectivity and recognises only observable behaviour. The third force is humanistic psychology which includes humanistic psychology, existential psychology and phenomenological psychology; they focus on future orientation of human being rather than their past. The third force studies self actualizing experiences.⁴³ Besides these trends, there were early classical schools of psychology namely structuralism and functionalism. Structuralism was founded by Wilhelm Wundt, who opened a psychology laboratory at Leipzig in 1879. This school refers to the images, sensation and feeling which contribute to form experience. It is to study the structure of mind. It used introspection as technique. The major criticism against this school was its method of introspection. Critics held the view that the method of introspection was inadequate because it is rather retrospective.⁴⁴ On other hand, functionalism with its main proponents like William James, James Angell and Harvey Carr was to study the functions of mind and behaviour. But it was also criticised for being too eclectic.⁴⁵

A brief sketch of the dominant schools of psychology would help in understanding phenomenological psychology as it emerged in reaction them and maintains constant dialogue with them. The main schools of psychology are behaviourism, psychoanalysis, Gestalt psychology, existential psychology and humanistic psychology. Behaviourism developed as opposition to structuralism and functionalism. The school originated with John Watson. He rejected mind as the subject matter of

⁴² Ibid., p.5.

⁴³ Jeffrey J. Kripal, *Esalen: America and the Religion of No Religion*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007, p.137.

⁴⁴ Op. cit., *The Comprehensive History of Psychology*, pp.122-132.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp.158-180.

psychology and insisted that psychology should restrict to the study of behaviour alone. The emphasis is on objective psychology that is the reason for calling it an 'empirical behaviourism.' It is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. It has disregarded the introspection as method and study of consciousness as non-scientific. So the subject matter of study is behaviour. So it defined psychology as science of behaviour and not conscious experience. It is an objective science in which observation, conditioning, testing and verbal report are the methods. Its emphasis were on principles of conditioned response, learned behaviour and animal behaviour as Watson held the view that there is no different between human behaviour and animal behaviour. So it was to deal with the observable responses to environmental stimuli that can be measured either directly or indirectly by using the instruments. Hence the general criticism to be faced was that all responses are not observable and it missed the richness of human nature of thoughts and feelings. Phenomenological psychology opposes the objectivistic methods of behaviourism and rejection of subjectivity.⁴⁶

Gestalt psychology as a school was founded by Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, Wolfgang Kohler in about 1912 in Germany. They accept that psychology is study of both behaviour and consciousness. The mental experience depends on the pattering and organization of elements. They emphasise on the study of whole, which is different from the sum of parts. According to them, behaviour cannot be studied in parts but must be viewed a whole. Parts make the whole but the whole is more important than the parts. They held the view that experience cannot be broken down into separate elements. So the experience of whole is important based on which the total experience is evaluated. Gestalt psychologists laid their basis on perception, and believe that perception is a copy of objects or a 'mental image' of what has been perceived and thinking is a mechanical combination of those images. They were interested in perception and how it influences thinking and problem solving. Perceptions were more than sum of their parts and they saw the perception as whole which gives meaning to parts. They accepted the method of introspection and experimentation. The definition of Gestalt could be as the study of both the immediate phenomenal experience which covers psychological functions like

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp.218-232.

perception, memory, thinking, learning, etc. as well as behaviour of organism. They differ from Wundtian psychophysical parallelism which means one to one relation between mental events and physical events whereas Gestalt psychophysiological parallelism means one to one relation between perceived or mental field and brain field. Another field is called physical or geographical which may not correspond to perceived field hence there is illusory perception. The general criticism levelled against Gestalt is that there is a possibility of responses being biased, prejudiced, subjective, not consistent and not always reliable and valid. Thus exercising Gestalt psychology required rigorous training and practice. Though phenomenological psychology is critical about the emphasis of causality in Gestalt psychology, phenomenological psychology was rather close to Gestalt principles in its endeavour.⁴⁷

Sigmund Freud founded the school called psychoanalysis in Austria about the same time of behaviourism evolving in America. He being a psychiatrist and his engagement with neurotic patients, he developed a theory of behaviour and mind which he said that much of what one does and thinks result from the urges or drives which seek expression in behaviour and thought. A crucial point is that these urges and drives are hidden from awareness of the individual and they are unconscious. The socially forbidden, personally unacceptable and painful desires, impulses, urges and wishes of the individual are being pushed away into the depths of the unconscious portions of the mind from the conscious layers, through the process of 'repression'. However these repressed impulses are active and try to occupy the conscious mind, at least in the disguised manner. These are expressed in many ways like that of dreams, slips of pen or tongue, unconscious mannerisms and symptoms of neurotic illness. According to Freud, these expressions are due to unconscious impulses which are sexual in nature. The belief is that unconscious sexual and aggressive impulses were more influential than conscious thoughts in determining human behaviour. Phenomenological psychology has just reversed view with regards to behaviour. According to Psychoanalysis, the nature of unconscious material may be made conscious and that helps to remember them with the accompanying affective components of the original experiences, which would help the

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp.299-320.

individual to recover. This is called 'free association' and 'dream interpretation'. The critics say that Freudian psychoanalysis perceives human nature essentially negative. That is so clear in the view like individuals are driven by the same basic instincts as animal (primarily sex and aggressive) and are continually struggling against a society that stresses control of these impulses. He was also pessimistic of people living together peacefully which are just against the humanitarian view point of people.⁴⁸

Existential psychology has rejected the mechanistic view of the Freudian psychology and instead tries to view people as engaged in definite search for meaning. It deals with person as such an individual who exists as a being-in-the-world. The basic aim of the existential psychology is to understand a person in his total existential reality. It takes special interest in those problems which are unique personal life with various types of perceptions. It further emphasizes that a man is also unique from all other species. He is a special creature with some endowments not found in other animals. It is basically concern with a person's consciousness, his moods, emotions, feelings, thinking as well as various experiences as they are related to the existence in the environment of the people. It always aims at understanding human nature as a whole. Some of the common elements emphasized are human values, meaning of life, man-to-man relationship, suffering, anxiety, conflict and death. It states that since a person has freedom to choose, he is also responsible for his own existence. What he is and he will be, is the sole responsibility of the person himself. Thus the existential psychologists have rejected any kinds of external determinism. The major concerns of the existential psychologists have been areas like personality, psychotherapy and counselling. The existential psychology adhere the phenomenological methods.⁴⁹

Humanistic psychology is a recent school, which emerged in 1980's and is related to Gestalt psychology and cognitive in favour. Humanistic psychology views people as basically free to determine our own behaviour. According to them, freedom is a source of both pride and great responsibility. They suggest that persons are engaged in quest to discover personal identities and meaning to their lives. Humanistic psychology focuses

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp.325-345.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp.348-354.

on consciousness and self awareness hence the approach is also known as phenomenological approach as emphasizing on subjective experience. It is concern with individuals own perception and interpretation of events. It seeks to understand events or phenomena, as they are experienced by the individual and to do so without imposing any preconception or theoretical ideas.⁵⁰

Some phenomenological theories are called humanistic, because they emphasize those qualities that distinguish people from animals, primarily their free will and their drive towards self actualization. So an individual's main motivational force is due to a tendency towards growth and self actualization. Humanistic psychology holds that each one has a basic need to develop our potential to fullness and progress beyond where one stands. Humanistic psychology emphasizes on the importance of personal growth and development, in these processes there can be external obstacles interfere and interrupted the growth. In such cases, humanistic psychology holds that there is possibility of many psychological disorders. Humanistic psychologists also admit that their observation methods have been less scientific and vague and difficult to test due to their subjectivity but argue that subjective experience remains vital to the understanding of human nature.⁵¹

Philosophical Basis of Phenomenological Psychology

Phenomenological psychology has emerged as a reaction against the usage of empirical methods for understanding human beings. Phenomenological psychology has its philosophical basis in phenomenology. Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced by a person. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object. An experience is directed toward an object by virtue of its content or meaning together with appropriate enabling conditions. The central theme is intentionality of consciousness. Phenomenology is one of the most influential philosophical movements of twentieth century. Though phenomenologists have a common point of departure, they do not project toward the same destination. The proponents of phenomenology have

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 363-372.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp.374-379.

propelled it in many distinct directions, with the result that today it means different things to different people. The leading exponents of this movement are Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Paul Ricoeur.

Basically, phenomenology studies the structure of various types of experience ranging from perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, and volition to bodily awareness, embodied action, and social activity, including linguistic activity. The nature of phenomenology makes it close to the field of psychology and later paved way for the genesis of phenomenological psychology. The structure of these forms of experience typically involves what Husserl called 'intentionality', that is, the directedness of experience toward things in the world, the property of consciousness that it is a consciousness of or about something. According to classical Husserlian phenomenology, our experience is directed toward represents or 'intends' things only *through* particular concepts, thoughts, ideas, images, etc. These make up the meaning or content of a given experience, and are distinct from the things they present or mean.⁵²

Though in 1900-1901, Edmund Husserl declared phenomenology as a new way of doing philosophy, but Johann Heinrich Lambert, in his 'Neues Organon' (1764), had already applied it to that part of his theory of knowledge which distinguishes truth from illusion and error. Kant used the term to deal with things in their manner of appearing to us. Herder, Fichte and Hegel were also used the term in 18th century. Ernst Mach used the term in "general physical phenomenology" to describe our experience of physics as a basis for a more general physical theory. Husserl accepted Mach as forerunner of phenomenology. Husserl assigned the meaning to phenomenology as the science of phenomena, which is, of objects as they are experienced or present themselves to consciousness. According to Heidegger, phenomenon means to bring to light, to place in brightness, to show itself in itself, the totality of what lies before us in the light of day.⁵³ Thus, the maxim of phenomenology is 'to the things themselves', means a turning from concepts and theories toward the directly presented in its subjective fullness. Husserl's

⁵² Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: A Introduction to Phenomenology*, Dorion Cairns (trans.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, p.75.

⁵³ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writing*, D. Krell (ed.), New York: Harper and Row, 1977, pp.74-75.

idea was subjective openness and radical approach to science. He employed phenomenology in discovering of knowledge, in theories and in applications of human sciences. According to him, the phenomenon which appears provides the impetus for experience and for generating new knowledge. Phenomena are the building blocks of human science and the basis for all knowledge. Accordingly, in the phenomenological tradition, phenomenology is given a much wider range, addressing the meaning things have in our experience, notably, the significance of objects, events, tools, the flow of time, the self, and others, as these things arise and are experienced in our 'life-world'.⁵⁴

It was Hegel who provided a well defined meaning to phenomenology. According to Hegel, phenomenology referred to knowledge as it appear to consciousness, the science of describing what one perceives and senses, and knows in one's immediate awareness and experience. The process leads us to an unfolding of phenomenal consciousness through science and philosophy 'towards the absolute knowledge of the absolute.'⁵⁵ For Husserl as like Kant and Descartes, knowledge is based on intuition and the essence precedes empirical knowledge. Although the doubt of Descartes was transformed into the *epoche* of Husserl, both philosophers recognized the crucial value of returning to the self to discover the nature and meaning of the things as they appear and in their essence. Husserl asserts that:

Ultimately, all genuine, and, in particular, all scientific knowledge rests on inner evidence: as far as such evidence extends, the concept of knowledge extends also.⁵⁶

For Husserl, any phenomenon represents a suitable starting point for an investigation. What is given in our perception of a thing is its appearance, yet this is not an empty illusion. It serves as the essential beginning of a science that seeks valid

⁵⁴ Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, David Carr (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p.131.

⁵⁵ Op. cit., *Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation*, p.24.

⁵⁶ Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, J.N. Findlay (trans.), Vol.I, New York: Humanities Press, 1970, p.61.

determinations that are open to anyone to verify.⁵⁷ Husserl was influenced by Descartes' view of perception of the reality of an object. According to Descartes, perception of the reality of an object is dependent on a subject. Husserl was interested in discovering the meanings and essences in knowledge. According to Husserl, there is a sharp contrast exists between facts and essences, between real and non-real. In other words, essence provides knowledge of the essential nature of the real and knowledge of the essential nature of non-real (irreal).⁵⁸

It is a great challenge to describe of 'things in themselves', in other words, entering into consciousness and understanding phenomenon in its meaning and essences in the light of intuition and self-reflection. For Husserl, the object that appears in consciousness mingles in object in nature so that a meaning is created, and knowledge is extended. Thus a relationship exists between what exists in conscious awareness and what exists in the world. What appears in consciousness is an absolute reality while what appears in the world is a product of learning. He does not claim that transcendental phenomenology is the only approach to knowledge of human experience, but he rather emphasizes that it is a science of pure possibilities carried out with systematic concreteness and that it precedes and makes possible the empirical sciences, the sciences of actualities.⁵⁹

Phenomenology is first of all a method of knowledge because it begins with 'things themselves'. Phenomenology tries to eliminate everything step by step that represents a prejudgment, setting aside presuppositions, and reaching a transcendental state of freshness and openness, a readiness to see in an unfettered way, not threatened by the natural world or by knowledge based on non-reflected everyday experience.⁶⁰

The central issue in phenomenological philosophy is its view of the relationship between the experiencing subject and the experienced world. Phenomenology rejects a

⁵⁷ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, W.R. Boyce Gibson (trans.), London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1931, p.129.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.45.

⁵⁹ Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: A Introduction to Phenomenology*, Dorion Cairns (trans.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, p.72.

⁶⁰ Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: A Introduction to Phenomenology*, Dorion Cairns (trans.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, p.73.

Cartesian rationalism. Descartes holds that the mind is only problematically related to an external world. Empirical psychology was influenced by Cartesian dichotomy. Phenomenological psychology takes its roots from phenomenology argues that the essential relationship between subjectivity and world must be reflected upon in a fresh and unprejudiced way. Critical of the empiricist and rationalistic biases of earlier philosophy, phenomenology calls for a radical form of self-reflection on the part of the phenomenologist as a means of accurately describing all dimensions of the world as experienced, as well as the mental structures of the experiencing subject. The proper theme of phenomenology is the world as it is lived, not abstractly theorized about. Virtually, all adherents of the phenomenological tradition emphasize the intentional nature of consciousness.⁶¹

Martin Heidegger wanted to uncover the categories of human existence for a fundamental ontology. He found that neither Husserl's transcendental reduction nor his phenomenology of essence was equal to the task. So he rejected Husserl's formulation of phenomenology as a form of idealism. Heidegger developed a new hermeneutic phenomenology to interpret the ontological meanings of such human conditions as *being-in-the-world*, anxiety, care, etc. Heidegger chooses to speak of *Dasein*, his term for human temporal and historical existence, instead of Husserl's transcendental reduction and the 'transcendental subjectivity' it aims to disclose. *Dasein's* structure of *being-in-the-world* is the focus of Heidegger's phenomenology and embodies his view of the intentional structure of consciousness and the essential bond between the experiencing subject and the world. Heidegger focuses upon the centrality of the everyday world of practical tasks and instrumentality. Essential structures involved with *being-in-the-world*, such as temporality, spatiality, being with others, death, care and authenticity, are recognised as structures underlying the possibility of certain human experiences and are presented as being discoverable by a process of phenomenological description. The role of descriptive elucidation, of letting such features of human existence 'show themselves' to phenomenological analysis, continues one of phenomenology's enduring concerns. In

⁶¹ Herbert Spiegelberg, *Doing Phenomenology: Essays on and in Phenomenology*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975, pp.10-12.

his later works, his methods had changed though he was still charming the essential help of 'phenomenological seeing'.⁶²

Heidegger had charges against psychology, anthropology and biology as they neglected ontological foundations. According to him, psychology fails to explore the mode of being which are basic for psychological phenomena. Hence Heidegger's contribution to psychology and psychiatry is only an accidental outcome of his phenomenology. His most conspicuous interpretation of psychological phenomena occurred in the context of his characterization of *Dasein* as being-in-the-world. Analyses of situations, especially in the form of moods were introduced as the most revealing clues to the modes of being of *Dasein*. In this context, he also explored fear. He also paid special attention in the way in which everyday *Dasein* can 'fall away' discussing curiosity, for instance man's flight from his being. He also analyzed anxiety as distinguished from fear as no define object being present. Even the topics like conscience and its call are psychological though he would not agree. For him, Human being is *ek-sistence*, in other words, standing out into Being. His explanation lies deeper than those discussed in psychology. His analyses of the mode of being man cannot be carried out without taking into the account of his entire existence. Hence his ontological insights are inextricably connected with ontic insights about man, including his psychological structure. It is the highly original themes of this wider ontic analysis that the real inspirations of Heidegger's phenomenology for psychology and psychiatry. His discussion of Being, *Dasein*, world, time and death placed man and his psyche before the vast cosmic background that psychology had never before considered it in this manner. So man has to be studied in relation to these comprehensive setting. According to Heidegger, it is necessary to study human being as how he or she relates himself or herself to Being? What is his or her world and his or her place in it? How does he or she experience time? His horizon against which man's psyche stands out in depth. So man is to be study as not only related to other being but also to Being itself and its fundamental

⁶² Christopher Macann, *Four Phenomenological Philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty*, London: Routledge, 1993, pp.57-60.

characteristics. Hence Heidegger has certainly revolutionized psychology and psychiatry.⁶³

Phenomenology underwent further changes as it entered French Philosophy as phenomenological existentialism. Jean-Paul Sartre critically carried further Husserl's position. For Sartre, Husserl's phenomenology is an effective method for his descriptive exploration of the imagination and the emotions. Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* transforms Husserl's phenomenological idealism into an ontological realism. For Sartre, external objects are not constituted by the acts of a Husserlian transcendental subject but they are just what they are. In other words, he calls them 'beings-in-themselves'. However, consciousness 'being-for-itself' is or exists just as its relationship to such objects. The intentional nature of consciousness requires that the being-for-itself always be related to one dimension or another of the being-in-itself. For Sartre, it is a relationship of negativity. In other words, the being-for-itself is always not the being-in-itself. Sartre's ontology of the 'nothingness' of the being-for-itself generates a radical form of freedom for intentional consciousness and is one of the most celebrated features of Sartre's existentialism. Sartre tries to understand the relationship between being-in-itself and being-for-itself. In this connection, he explores the essential structures as the experience of others, self-deception, the world, my body, my past and my future. In his philosophy, the central question revolves around the meaning of man's existence. For Sartre, man's and world's existence have no meaning. There is no reason that a man and world should exist. Thus he introduces his atheistic philosophy. According to Sartre, man is most inexplicable among the beings in the world because of his consciousness. According to him, man is best characterised as freedom and capability of choice. This freedom is not an attributes rather man is freedom and therefore he has to choose and decide all the time. Man is what he decides to make himself; his mode of existence is his choice. He cannot escape his freedom; if he does so then he is gripped by nausea, anxiety, forlornness and despair. For him, man is a unified whole, man expresses his choice in every aspect of behaviour, so an analysis of his behaviour acts should reveal what is his original choice. Existential psychoanalysis is a method which reveals man's original

⁶³ Herbert Spiegelberg, *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, pp.18-21

choice. Once this choice is revealed to patients, the patients will recognise it. The patient may however, deceive himself. He may be as Sartre calls it of 'bad faith.'⁶⁴

Maurice Merleau-Ponty's goal was to understand the relation between consciousness and nature. He was aiming a position between naïve realism, with its causal account of behaviour and a critics or idealist solution which derives behaviour exclusively for consciousness. The answer as Merleau-Ponty envisaged, it was to be found by means of a systematic phenomenology of perception in which the new concepts of form, structure and meaning have their primary foundation. His understanding of Phenomenon is as the intimate relation between the objects and the subject and the presents of solid structures in both which distinguish phenomena from mere appearances. The study of phenomena is phenomenology. An inventory of consciousness has a milieu i.e. a medium for the appearance of the world. According to him, phenomenology can be practiced and recognized as a mode of thought or as a style, it exists as a movement before having arrived at a full philosophical consciousness.⁶⁵ It is in ourselves that we shall find the unity and true sense of phenomenology. Phenomenology is accessible only to a phenomenological method. His understanding of going back to things themselves means primarily a protest against science, as understood in the sense of objective study of the things and of their external causal relation in for our of a return to life world (world of lived experience), but Merleau-Ponty refused to trace back this life world to its roots in the subject. Hence he declares truth does not dwell only in the inner of man, or rather there is no such thing as an inner man: man is within the world; it is in the world that he recognizes himself. According to Husserl, phenomenological reduction brackets the belief in the reality of the natural world. This permits us to discover the spontaneous surge of the life world. But for Merleau-Ponty, it does so by loosening our habitual ties with the world. For Husserl, eidetic reduction is the way from existence to essence whereas for Merleau-Ponty it is the means rather than end. For Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology attempts to catch the facts in their uniqueness prior to all linguistic formulation. Eidetic reduction indirectly helps in this attempt by letting the world stand

⁶⁴ Op. cit., *Four Phenomenological Philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty*, pp.110-116.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p.117.

out against the back ground of the essences. It embodies the resolution to make the world appear as it is before reducing it to subject states or thoughts this reversal of phenomenology shows the shift from study of essence to existence by existentialists. Intentionality is a fundamental structure of consciousness for Husserl whereas for Merleau-Ponty, main function of intentionality is to reveal the world as ready-made and already there. Intentionality is not only applied to our conscious acts but under lays our entire relation to the world and our comportment towards others. Husserl's clear objective was to find the ultimate foundation for all knowledge in pure subjectivity. But Merleau-Ponty shifted the centre of gravity in phenomenology. It denounced by implication that appeal to subjectivity and attempted to combine the subjective with the objective approach through something called bipolar phenomenology.⁶⁶

Merleau-Ponty's main targets of criticism of modern psychology were atomism, introspectionism and reductionism. He states in the first sentence of *The Structure of Behaviour* that is "to understand the relations between consciousness and nature"⁶⁷ as his aim. According to him, nature is causally related whereas consciousness is not subject to causality. He came to this conclusion through his study of various forms of behaviours, including consciousness which he approached from a behaviouristic viewpoint – that is, also a specific form of behaviour. According to him, behaviour is always structured but the methods used in psychology are inadequate to study it as behaviour. So he saw a systematic phenomenology of perception as an appropriate method of study. He held a view that human behaviour consists of three levels: the physical, the vital (biological), and the human (psychic). Each possesses its own dynamic form. The highest and most specifically human is the third level, which is however, is dependent in its emergence on the integration of the two lower levels. He avoids both Lockean and Cartesian extremes of conception of man's mental life, by upholding that mind is neither reducible to physical reality nor entirely cut off from it.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp.159-163.

⁶⁷ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behaviour*, Aldun L. Fisher (trans.), Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, p.3.

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp.23-68.

In *Phenomenology of Perception*, his main purpose was not the systematic analysis of perception for the sake, but the derivation of a firm basis for his philosophical synthesis. He chose perception to be the philosophical foundation because he wanted to understand essential feature of man, which is in his opinion the dialectic that is dynamic relationship and interchange between consciousness and reality. This dialectic is achieved and reflected in the perceptual process. To him, perception is man's primordial contact with the world: "It opens a window onto things," and as such it should be a starting point for the study of man and the world. After concise exposition of his views on phenomenology, he moves to reveal the "mystery of the world and of reason." So first he tries to remove the "traditional prejudices" that stands as an obstacle in the way of fruitful phenomenological exploration. These prejudices are elementistic and associationalist views of consciousness. The next task is to explore man's phenomenal field. The first component of this exploration is focused on the body or bodily being, and second component on the world as perceived by man.⁶⁹

Merleau-Ponty shows that how the physiological and psychological account of body as inadequate. And he considers body as various aspect of being, that body as image, body in terms of space, body as moving, body as sexual being and finally body as expressing itself in gestures and speech. In these discussions he makes extensive use of psychopathology and neurology to illustrate or support his statements. In the second part, he deals with perception, analyzes a variety of aspect of the perceptual process. In third part, he deals with "Being-for-itself and Being-in-the-world," which is speculative and closely related to his philosophical theme. One of the concepts stressed by him is *Lebenswelt*, which is founded in Husserl's unpublished manuscripts. The terms has been variously translated most frequently now as "Life-world" and sometimes as "world of everyday life" or "world of lived experiences" and so on. But in general it refers to world as experienced or world as perceived subjectively by an individual person.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Colin Smith (trans.), New York: Humanities Press, 1962, pp.63-74.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.78-93.

In phenomenology, Husserl and Heidegger were trying to explain how the worries could have arisen but not the rational proof for the existence of external world. They have rejected representationalist account of knowledge (copy of what exist outside mind-Locke) because our experience is directly engaging with the world. The account of knowledge must be faithful to the experiential evidence. Phenomenology should pay attention to actual experience (which is the nature consciousness) not as is pictured by common sense or philosophical tradition. Therefore experiences in consciousness are not like objects in a box. Experience has the experienced being. Phenomenology must carefully describe things as appeared to consciousness i.e. a problem, event or thing approached must be approached by taking the account of how it appeared to the consciousness. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty understand Phenomenology as a means of going beyond narrow empiricist psychological assumption about human existence. Both want to broaden the scope of philosophy to everything and to capture life as it is lived. For Sartre, phenomenology helps to delineate one's own affective emotional and imaginative life. It is not a set of static objective studies such as one finds in psychology, but it is to be understood in the way it is lived meaningfully. Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty did not accept the reduction of Husserl for it is going back to the neo-Kantian idealism from which phenomenology struggles to free philosophy.⁷¹

Phenomenology studies the essential structure of consciousness as experienced by the first person point of views. It describes phenomenon as consciously experienced. It is to be foundation for absolutely valid knowledge of things through a rigorously critical systematic investigation. It tries to make philosophy as presuppositionless science i.e. without theories about the causal explanation. The philosophical position of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty is existential phenomenology. Hence their starting point is human existence as 'being-in-the-world.' Human is always with other human beings and thing, so human being constantly having meaningful relation with others and the world. The existential phenomenology of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty unlike the transcendental phenomenology

⁷¹ Op. cit., *Four Phenomenological Philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty*, pp.79-97.

insists that the observer cannot be separated from the world because an individual is 'being-in-the-world.' They use a method of description to understand human existence.⁷²

Sartre is interested in search for meaning of human existence than the world. The Sartrean man is the most inexplicable among beings in the world because of his consciousness. He deviates from Husserlian methodology by moving from the most abstract to the highly concrete phenomenon for his conception of self. So his ontology starts with the two types of reality 'Being-in-itself' (*etre-en-soi*) and 'Being-for-itself' (*etre-pour-soi*) as non-consciousness and consciousness respectively. These two realities have mutually exclusive character but the human entity combines them together. Husserl understands consciousness as human capacity to assign meaning that arises from the transcendental ego but Sartre holds that consciousness is bodily consciousness. He says that 'being-for-itself' is not what it is and it is what it is not. His standpoint is that there is a gap or lack or break in consciousness. Hence he introduces the term 'Bad Faith' as unavoidable predicament of human existence. Human being as conscious individual transcends one's facticity. In other words, an individual is always 'in situation,' but the precise mixture of transcendence and facticity that forms any situation remains indeterminable at least while one is engaged in it. Sartre holds that one is always 'more' than one's situation which is the ontological foundation of freedom. So he categorically states that human being is 'condemned' to be free.⁷³

Merleau-Ponty even moves further than Sartre, he is interested in understanding the relationship between consciousness and nature. So he developed a radical re-description of embodied experience with his studies of perception. He criticises the empiricism and intellectualism for depriving the philosophical tradition to have suitable understood of phenomenon. He says that knowledge is always derivative in relation to the more practical exigencies of the body's exposure to the world. It embodies the resolution to make the world appear as it is before reducing it to subjective states or thoughts. He refused to trace back the 'life world' to its roots in the subject. For him, truth does not dwell only in the

⁷² Ibid., pp.121-128.

⁷³ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, Hazel E. Barnes (trans.), New York: Philosophical Library, 1956, pp. 213-232.

inner of man, or rather there is no such thing as an inner man. An individual is within the world; it is in the world that an individual recognizes oneself. This reversal of phenomenology shows the shift from study of essence to existence by existentialists.⁷⁴

The philosophical ideas of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have implication for phenomenological psychology. Phenomenological psychology studies the fundamental psychological phenomena in their subjective aspect regardless of their indebtedness in the objective context of a psychophysical organism. Husserl was the first proposed phenomenological psychology. Husserl rejected empirical psychology for its naturalistic tendency and argues that psychology should free from the theoretical prejudices. He envisaged new discipline of phenomenological psychology which would fill the gap between philosophy and psychology of his time. Husserl was convinced that psychology was an important discipline and he should contribute something to it and it would also contribute to phenomenology. His views regarding this underwent substantial evolution; he admonished those who did not keep up with the progress. He called those days German and Austrian psychology as empirical and positive science. He was critical of empirical psychology. He intended to bridge empirical psychology with phenomenology by developing a new and special psychological discipline which he called at first *rational psychology* and *eidetic psychology* and later termed it as *phenomenological psychology*. His lectures courses of 1925 and 1928 were published in 1962 as *phenomenologische psychologie* by W.Biemel as posthumous and other works of same nature.⁷⁵

The philosophical ideas of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have further facilitated in establishing the phenomenological psychology as a distinctive school in psychology. Phenomenological psychology is not concern with the prediction and control; instead their emphasis is on understanding the individual's inner life and experiences. It believes that animal behaviour may be predictable under the environmental control; human behaviour depends primarily on how the individual perceives the world in general and immediate situation in particular. It also believes that each individual is responsible for his actions; no one acts on forces outside our control, the individual is capable of

⁷⁴ Op. cit., *Phenomenology of Perception*, pp.212-236.

⁷⁵ Op. cit., *Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Psychologies: A Historical Survey*, p.12.

controlling one's own destiny. The issue here is one of determinism versus free will. It holds that there is possibility of knowing more about human nature by studying people's perceptions of themselves and their world and by observing their actions. Two individuals might behave quite differently in response to the same situation only by asking them how each interprets the situation one can understand their behaviour.⁷⁶

Phenomenology as a philosophy has paved way for phenomenological psychology. It has made a significant difference in the fields of psychology and psychiatry by replacing the restrictive methodologies of a narrow positivism and naturalism; it has made room for new phenomena and new interpretations. Phenomenology has helped in reforming the psychology of perception, emotions and will. It is such a specialized enterprise that studies the self and social psychology. In psychiatry and counselling, it has made room for much wider and deeper understanding of pathological phenomena and has helped to open the way for new therapies.⁷⁷ According to phenomenological psychologists, psychology cannot be merely a collection of correlated facts. But it must also concern with discovering the genuine meaning which is found in all forms of our orientation towards the world.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Op. cit., *Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Psychologies: A Historical Survey*, pp.25-26.

⁷⁷ Op. cit., *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, p.xlii.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 1973, p.13.

CHAPTER - III

SARTRE'S CONTRIBUTION TO PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Introduction

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) was one of the most influential French Philosophers of twentieth century. He is known for his existential phenomenology. He is a major thinker of existentialism. For Sartre, 'existence precedes essence'. This slogan sums the existentialism. In other words, *that* we are is prior to *what* we are. He is identified with the atheistic existentialism and humanism. He was a political activist and an epitome of what he himself called an 'engaged' or 'committed thinker'. He has opposed the complacency, sham and hypocrisy of contemporary western society. Apart from his contribution to philosophy, he is also popular through his literary writings. Sartre's emphasis is on human existence rather looking for the essence of human being. He is critical about theories of human nature and objective knowledge derived out of human nature. Sartre believes that *man is nothing else but what he makes of himself*. This is treated as the first principle of existentialism.¹ He argues that man is responsible for what he is and to make the full responsibility of his existence rest on him. And when we say that a man is responsible for himself, it means he is responsible for his own individuality but also responsible for all others. Sartre developed an ontological account of what it is to be human with the phenomenological methods. The main features of this ontology are the groundlessness and radical freedom which characterize the human condition. For him, man is a subject not an object. He believes that meaning of life is constantly being created but not discovered. For Sartre, there are no readymade and objective norms to guide our lives and to give them meaning. There are only our personal commitments. For him, values are given neither in God's commandments nor (as in Mill) in the empirical nor (as in Kant) in the a priori nature of man. Sartre wants to make a totally new start. Man has no nature or if you prefer man's nature is his freedom that is his open-

¹ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, Hazel E. Barnes (trans.), New York: Philosophical Library, 1956, p36.

endedness.² For Sartre, there are no norms of conduct other than our truthfulness and consistency. He maintains that values and norms are created by our own choices.

While studying at the French Institute in Berlin he encountered phenomenology in 1933 and wrote *The Transcendence of the Ego*. His phenomenological investigation into the imagination was published in 1936 and his *Theory of Emotions* two years later. Sartre wrote his existentialist magnum opus *Being and Nothingness* during the Second World War and published in 1943. His *Existentialism and Humanism* was published in 1946. Sartre also had an abundant literary output with such novels as *Nausea*, *The Age of Reason* and plays like *Intimacy (The wall)*, *The Flies* and *No Exit*. In 1960, after three years working on it, Sartre published the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. In the Fifties and Sixties, Sartre was involved in promoting Marxist ideas. In 1964, he turned down the Nobel Prize for literature as his opposition to capitalism. His *The Family Idiot* was published in 1971. In 1977, he claimed no longer to be a Marxist, but his political activity continued until his death in 1980.

Sartre's *The Family Idiot* is a logical outgrowth of his search for a method to understand human beings. According to him, it is not only enough to philosophize about human beings for understanding human beings rather one must find a method of studying human existence. Therefore Sartre's psychological analysis directly follows from his existential approach and his attempt to find an appropriate method for studying people. Sartre's existential phenomenology highlights the significance of existential predicaments of human beings. Freedom being the centre to his philosophy, he tries to understand human predicaments from the perspective of human being is freedom. He further touches the psychological aspects of human existence through his elucidation of emotion in general and anguish, shame, despair and forlornness in particular. He further tries to redeem imagination from the impoverishment in the hands of psychologists and philosophers. He emphasizes that the human behaviour is conscious and willful act. Human behaviour is volunteer action of an individual. It is the replica of the individual's own decisions and choices. He came a conclusion that stimulus response pattern of

² George C Kerner (ed.), *Three Philosophical Moralists: Mill, Kant and Sartre: An Introduction to Ethics*, New York: Oxford University press, 1990, p.145.

understanding human behaviour as done in many of the modern psychology is not appropriate.³

Though Sartre's writings are primarily philosophical in nature, but had significant implications for psychology. In fact, he approached the problems of psychology from his philosophical perspective. His phenomenological psychology has reoriented the modern psychology. Sartre finds that human science is not given due importance, even psychology is considered to be nothing more than mere study of human behaviour. But to have a comprehensive understanding of behaviour, it is necessary to analyse the interaction between agent and world, subject and situation, and on the one side of the subject further distinction has to be made between merely bodily reactions, behaviour properly speaking and the states of consciousness that accompany them. Sartre points out in tune with Husserl that the traditional psychology dealt with the psychic state as though it simply existed as such, without signifying anything but the virtue of phenomenology is to realize that all human phenomena are significant.⁴

Sartre's phenomenological psychology holds that human being as a unified whole expresses one's choice in every aspect of one's behavioural act. The analysis of one's behavioural acts should reveal what is one's original choice. This chapter deals about Sartre's contribution to phenomenological psychology and its importance in the field of psychology. Sartre maintains a position that every act of human behaviour is a conscious act. It is a voluntary action of an individual and a reflection of the individual's own decisions and choices. Therefore he argues that the stimulus response pattern of understanding human behaviour as done by many thinkers of the modern psychology is not appropriate.

Sartre's phenomenological understanding of human behaviour explained by the concepts of emotion and imagination. He elaborates further by explaining the human existence in a situation against freedom and responsibility of the individual. In this connection, Sartre explains anguish, despair and shame and Bad Faith and argues for

³ Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Family Idiot: Gustave Flaubert, 1821–1857*, Volumes 1–5, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp.ix-x.

⁴ Peter Caws, *Sartre*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979, pp.37-38.

authentic human existence. Further he explains that freedom makes a person to authentic. Freedom is a unique quest which lies in working out the demands of one's inner self and impressing one's genuine or authentic self. Freedom means facing conflicting choices, making decisions and accepting them. Sartre maintains that to be authentic is to embrace our existence as an open-ended field of multiple possibilities of self-identity from which we choose.

Sartre's Understanding of Human Existence

Sartre's understanding of human existence is based on his existential philosophy. According to existentialists, man first exists and then seeks to acquire an 'essence' for himself. This is what Sartre means "*existence precedes essence*". Sartre came up with a novel conception of human and new outlook by making human existence as the real frame of reference. His existential phenomenology is a study of the basic structures of human experience. The human individual will not be anything unless and until one will be what one makes of one self. He also shared the same idea as Heidegger that traditional metaphysics was impoverished by leaving out the full range of our experiences of the 'world' around us. So he wanted to focus more on human situations, the concerns of human living, emotions, values, etc. He holds that every truth and every action implies a human setting and a human subjectivity.⁵ According to Sartre, human being is the foundation of all thought and action. He holds that human first of all exists, encounters oneself, surges up in the world and consequently defines the self. The emphasis of the existentialists on personal existence and subjectivity has led to new dimensions of human's freedom and responsibility.

According to the existentialist thinkers determinism, whether genetic, social or environmental, does not offer adequate explanation of human's inner potentialities and capabilities. Existentialists hold that each human being is unique and reveal one's inner potentialities and creative skills only because of one's freedom. First of all, human exists in the world and with the utmost freedom, he or she creates himself or herself through each and every actions. A person is the maker of himself or herself. Human being is the

⁵ Op. cit., *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, p.10.

project which possesses subjective life and apart from this projection of self, nothing exists. And therefore each one has to complete the project in and through one's freedom. Hence there comes responsibility for whatever one does and, in this way, the whole responsibility of one's action falls on one's own shoulders. As Sartre states in *Being and Nothingness*, "man is being condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders; he is responsible for the world and for himself as a way of being."⁶

In Sartre's understanding of human experience, consciousness of individual plays a vital role. Sartre holds that consciousness cannot exist merely by itself. Consciousness always involves some object. In other words, consciousness is always is the consciousness of something. To be conscious of something is to be aware of being conscious of something. In this sense, the human consciousness can never become its own object. The object of consciousness is what it is; wholly there, totally given, without any separation from itself. Each human experience has the dual aspect: on the one side there is consciousness and on the other side an object. Without the object no experience can be materialized. At the same time, the nature of consciousness is different from the object. The consciousness is unstable. It is always fleeting. It has no permanency. It is fluid, non-self-identical and dynamic in character. Consciousness is not itself a something. It is not complete and self-contained the way that being-in-itself is, we are always conscious of something else. We are conscious of a certain fact, of a certain emotion, of a certain object, of a certain desire, of a certain value, etc. It is through constant choices we direct our consciousness. We also define and determine the nature of our consciousness. Consciousness is a mere possibility whereas matter is an actuality. For Sartre, consciousness has no 'essence in itself and it is inheritable 'nothing', 'lack of being'. 'Being-for-itself' is embodied human consciousness. Sartre differentiates being-for-itself from being-in-itself. Being-in-itself is viewed as solid, self-identical, passive and inert. However, both are mutually exclusive in character yet human beings combine them together.⁷ Sartre holds that man is most inexplicable among the beings in the world because of his consciousness. The human mind just finds itself in a certain situation, that is, it finds itself existing. But *what* the human mind is 'is of its own choosing'. The mind

⁶ Ibid., p.553.

⁷ Ibid., pp.79-83.

is consciousness, but consciousness is 'nothingness', a space or void for other things to enter. Sartre is further critical about the human nature and human essence as such. He argues that the nature human is essence is created by one's own existence.

According to Sartre human beings are what one makes of oneself. Human being is always surrounded by a 'situation'. He holds that there is only one being whose existence comes before its essence and that being is 'human'. Human is indefinable, because to begin with human is nothing. According to Sartre, there is no human nature. Sartre's phenomenology of human nature replaces traditional philosophical arguments. The traditional philosophers from Plato to Kant had taught that essence preceded our existence. In other words, it means we are predetermined to be what we are by some 'innate' or 'a priori' principle such as God, Nature or Reason. Sartre explains human subjectivity from atheistic point of view. He made human beings totally responsible for their acts.

According to Sartre, freedom is the very essence of human being. Freedom is not a mode but it is the existence. Freedom is extension of the notion of consciousness. Freedom makes a person to be authentic. He talks of freedom in the context where human being condemned being free.

Sartre's Phenomenological Psychology

Sartre developed his scheme of phenomenological psychology based on his philosophy of human subjectivity. In exploring this scheme, he is critical about the traditional theories of psychology in understanding human personality and his / her behaviour. His approach of phenomenological psychology has explained through the concepts of emotion and imagination. He provides a new meaning to these concepts against traditional theories of psychology. According to Sartre, emotional consciousness is primarily consciousness of the world.⁸ He further emphasises that emotion is an organized form of human existence. In other words, it is an organized system of means towards an end. Sartre upholds that

⁸ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, Philip Mairet (trans.), London: Methuen, 1971, p.56.

emotions are certain way of apprehending the world.⁹ Emotion is behaviour or a kind of conduct which refers to our position in a world as a whole. It has its own teleological structure and it is not simply a meaningless by product of our normal rational level. Sartre views that emotions are strategies one employs to avoid action, to avoid responsibility, to 'flee from freedom.' Emotions are strategies for avoiding facing up to oneself and one's situation which has become the prototype for the notion of 'Bad Faith.'¹⁰

The predicament of human being is based on one's own imagination. Imagination is a condition for what it is to be human and how human should live. The philosophers have been concerned with imagination as whether one can or cannot easily detach oneself from the concrete world of facts and experience. For them, imagination is mainly a faculty for producing mental images. This image is given the status of a thing. It is the copy of the original or it is lesser version of it. The classical theorists held the view that imagination and sensation are two species of the same genus, but among them, the latter is more vivid and immediate.

According to Sartre, 'every image is an image of something.' The image is in fact a vehicle of intentionality. It is a mediated relation between consciousness and its object. The image is not the thing, nor is it in any way thing like rather it refers to the thing or stands for it in an experience that is structurally similar to but ontologically distinct from the experience of the thing itself. Sartre holds that there is no thing as an image in imagination. The first difference between perception and imagination is not the presence or absence of image but a different way of referring to the intentional object of our consciousness. There is no difference in imaged object or perceived object but the difference is on the side of the imaging act. The image is a constructive element of consciousness; it is one of the ways in which consciousness 'intends' the thing. He says that it posits its object to be either as non-existent or as absent or as elsewhere. In other words, imaging consciousness posits its object as nothingness as imaginative.¹¹

⁹ Ibid., p.57.

¹⁰ Ibid., p.3.

¹¹ Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Psychology of Imagination*, Bernard Frechtman (trans.), New York: Washington Square Press, 1966, p.13.

In course of developing his theory of phenomenological psychology, Sartre is critical about other prominent theories of psychology. Especially, Sartre is dissatisfied with the methods applied by empirical psychology in understanding human existence. Empirical psychology defines human beings based on their desire. According to Sartre, empirical psychology by defining human beings based on their desire commits the error of remaining the victim of illusion of substance and also the error of considering psychological research as terminated as soon as the investigator has reached the concrete ensemble of empirical desires. Thus man would be defined by bundle of derives or tendencies which empirical observation could establish.¹² He is also critical about psychoanalytic theory of Freud in understanding human behavior and proposes his own theory of existential psychoanalysis. The purpose of Freudian psychoanalysis is to determine the unconscious desire behind the behaviour. Whereas the purpose of Sartre's existential psychoanalysis is to determine the *original choice* that stimulates the behavior.¹³ Sartre's reaction against Freud can be viewed as reaction against 'essentialism' or 'universalism'. Sartre emphasizes that it is through our consciousness and imagination that we are able to make of ourselves what we are not; this is our human freedom and it is a choice.¹⁴

Sartre's Conception of Emotion

Sartre's exploration of emotion in phenomenological manner reveals that they are significant factor in determining an individual's personality. He explained his theory of emotion in *Sketch for a Theory of The Emotions*. In this work, he formulated his own theory by critically evaluating other theories of emotion.

Emotion plays an important role in defining the human existence. Emotion motivates one's own moral behaviour. Emotion affects the basic processes of perception and influence the way humans conceive and interpret the world around him or her. Emotions shape the human personality. Emotions are central issues of human survival and adaptation. The subject of emotion is studied from a wide range of views.

¹² Op. cit., *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, p.557.

¹³ Ibid., p.570.

¹⁴ Op. cit., *Sartre*, p.48.

Behaviourally oriented neuroscientists study the neurophysiology and neuroanatomy of emotions and the relations between neural processes and the expression and experience of emotion. Social psychologists and cultural anthropologists study similarities and differences among cultures by the way emotions are expressed and conceptualized. Novelists, playwrights, and poets are interested in emotions as the motivations and defining features of fictional characters and as vehicles for communicating the meaning and significance of events. Philosophers are interested in the role of emotions in rationality, thought, character development and values. Psychologists have found a comprehensive definition of emotion; their general agreement is that the emotions are entailed to varying in degrees due to awareness of one's environment or situation, bodily reactions, and approach or withdrawal behaviour.¹⁵

For psychologists, emotions are “feelings that generally have both physiological and cognitive elements and that influence behaviour.”¹⁶ Psychologists have proposed different theories of emotion based on their understanding of human existence. James-Lange’s theory, Canon-Bard’s theory and Schachter-Singer theory are prominent theories of emotion. James-Lange theory firmly links mental states to physiological processes: it holds that an emotion is a perception of phenomena within the body. For example, when a person sees a frightening sight, the body immediately responds in certain ways. In other words, this theory proposes that we experience emotions as a result of physiological changes that produce specific sensations. In turn these sensations are interpreted by the brain as particular kinds of emotional experiences.¹⁷ According to Cannon-Bard theory, both physiological arousal and the emotional experience are produced simultaneously by the same nerve impulse.¹⁸ Schachter-Singer theory maintains that the emotion that is experienced is due to our interpretation of an arousal or stirred up bodily state.¹⁹ There are other theories like cognitive appraisal theory of emotion of Richard-Lazarus and descriptive theory of Robert Plutchik. The cognitive appraisal theory holds that felt emotion results from appraisal or evaluation of information about the environmental and

¹⁵ Robert S. Feldman, *Understanding Psychology*, New York : McGraw-Hill, 2002, pp.303-304.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.303.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.306.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.306-307.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.307-308.

the state of the body. The descriptive theory maintains that the primary emotions are derived from evolutionary process and therefore have adaptive value. They can be arranged in orderly way to bring out relationships, similarities and differences among them.²⁰

The common point which all these theories express is that emotion is mere physiological reaction to the stimuli. Sartre criticizes William James, Pierre Janet, Tamara Dembo and psychoanalytic theory of emotion for not taking consciousness into consideration in explaining emotion. Classical theories of James, Janet and Dembo hold that emotions are nothing but the mechanical projections of physiological events into consciousness. For Sartre, emotion is an organized system of means towards an end. He agrees with psychoanalysts' introduction of the idea of 'purposiveness' into the interpretation of the emotions. However, in subscribing to the conception of the subconscious they continue to combine it with them mechanistic constructs which Sartre considered incompatible with the idea of functional purpose. Sartre's aim was to remodel the hypothesis of the unconscious with the conception of prereflective consciousness in such a way that he could account even for the irrationality of our emotional life.²¹ He further refutes various psychoanalytic theories for their emphasis on unconscious aspect as driving force to measure human behaviour. He proposes his own phenomenological theory of emotion, in which his focus is on the way emotions alter our experience of the surrounding world. He is more concerned with the significance of the emotions than the essence of it. For him, emotions are 'a certain way of apprehending the world.'²² Emotion is behaviour in the sense of a kind of conduct which refers to our position in the world as a whole. It has a teleological structure and is not simply a meaningless by-product of our normal rational life. Sartre argues that we are responsible for everything we do and everything we are and it includes our emotions. He views that emotions are strategies one employs to avoid action, to avoid responsibility, to 'flee from freedom.' He also holds

²⁰ Ibid., pp.273-278.

²¹ Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982, p.519.

²² Op. cit., *Sketch for a Theory of The Emotions*, p.57.

that emotions are strategies for avoiding facing up to oneself and one's situation which has become the prototype for the notion of 'Bad Faith.'²³

William James' theory of emotion is known as theory of peripheric holds that emotion is the consciousness of physiological changes. For James, there are two phenomena in emotion, they are physiological phenomena and psychological phenomena or 'state of consciousness'. For him, the psychological phenomena or state of consciousness is nothing but the consciousness of physiological manifestations. James states, "we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble."²⁴ According to James, the sadness is caused by the tears, is the state of physiological disturbance. In other words, emotional experience is a reaction to bodily events occurring as a result of an external situation.²⁵ Sartre criticizes James for his inadequacy in distinguishing one emotion from another and its failure to account for plain facts, such as the subtler emotions, passive enjoyment and it fails to show that organic reactions suffice to render an account of distinct psychic states. As Sartre argues that the critics have examined the state of consciousness, emotion and the accompanying physiological manifestations. It has not been found that the former is the projection by the latter. So there is something else. Sartre says:

Something else; for, in effect, and even if the emotion objectively perceived presented itself as a physiological disorder, as a fact of consciousness it is neither disorder nor chaos pure and simple, it has a meaning, it signifies something.²⁶

It is clear that emotion is a not only a pure quality and it also gives a certain relation between our psychic being and the world; and this relation or awareness of it is not a

²³ Op. cit., *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, p.342.

²⁴ William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, New York: Cosimo, Inc. 2007, p.72.

²⁵ Op. cit., *Understanding Psychology*, p.306.

²⁶ Op. cit., *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, p.34.

chaotic relationship between the self and the universe. It is an organized and describable structure.²⁷

Another psychologist, Janet holds that emotion is a twofold kind of behaviour, consisting both of mental and physical phenomena. He defined emotion as the behaviour of defeat.²⁸ Janet holds that when faced with difficult situation a subject has to respond with 'superior behaviour' that is appropriate to that situation, but the subject has to face the heat of psychological tension. Alternatively, the subject may be seen to respond with inferior behaviour that avoids or diminishes the difficulty of the situation with the behaviour of less appropriate to the situation. In this way, the subject lowers the psychological tension. Sartre comments:

When the task is too difficult and we cannot maintain the better behaviour appropriate to it, the psychic energy that has been released expends itself along another path; we adopt an inferior behaviour which necessitates a lesser psychological tension.²⁹

Janet believes that when an individual face the difficulty the 'setback' behaviour will be automatically replaced by the 'superior behaviour'. It would mean that the instating emotion is a matter of reflex, and makes the subject a passive sufferer of emotion. Janet's theory of emotion viewed as a kind of degradation or an inferior form behaviour that arises from a setback, that is, an obstacle that prevents or frustrates the achievement of a goal. Though Sartre adopts Janet's notion of emotion as arising in the face of a 'setback' but he is strongly critical of Janet's evaluation of emotion as an automatic mechanism. However, Sartre believes that Janet misses significance of his own insight that emotion is 'setback' behaviour. By denying any role in emotion to an evaluating consciousness, for which behaviour can be superior or inferior, the idea of

²⁷ Ibid., p.34.

²⁸ Ibid., p.37.

²⁹ Ibid., p.35.

emotional behaviour as setback behaviour becomes incomprehensible.³⁰ Sartre claims that Janet's theory of emotion lacks an account of the finality, that is, the goal oriented nature of emotion. He criticizes Janet for his illegitimate introduction of the concept of finality or purposiveness. According to Sartre, Janet has not introduced consciousness or awareness of any kind hence there is no logic in introducing purposiveness. The mental element which Janet speaks of is as in the peripheric theory so it does not come close to consciousness. While for Janet emotional behaviour is a disorder that arises automatically when superior behaviour becomes difficult whereas for Sartre, emotional behaviour is not a disorder at all. It is an organised system of means aiming at an end.³¹

Sartre critically evaluates Dembo's theory of emotion and discusses the limitations of this theory. According to Dembo, anger is the alternative way out of difficulty when all other ways are blocked. Anger is the restoration of frustration. It is the same with all emotions. It is essentially inferior way out or a means towards an end. In the moment of frustration, we become less critical of ourselves and use the means which we should have rejected. Sartre feels that this model is perfect but still insufficient for there could be no change from one (superior) form of behaviour to another (inferior) form of behaviour without consciousness. The emotional behaviour theory is perfect but in its purity and perfection we can see its insufficiency. Consciousness alone by its synthetic activity can break up and reconstitute forms without ceasing. It alone can render an account of the finality of emotion.³² Dembo also shows the emotion aims to transform the aspect of the world. It serves to weaken the barriers between the real and the unreal, to destroy the differentiated structure that the problem has imposed upon to the self arises, the psychology of form fail to provide an adequate answer. So it is clear that we must have recourse to the consciousness. Sartre has shown that the physiological theory of James with its insufficiency has led us to Janet's theory of behaviour, then the latter to the theory of functional emotion in the form-psychology, and this leads us to the consciousness. But this is supposed to be the starting point. So Sartre holds that emotion

³⁰ Thomas Martin, *Oppression and the Human Condition: An Introduction to Sartrean Existentialism*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002, p.68.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.69.

³² *Op. cit.*, *Sketch for a Theory of The Emotions*, pp.3-4.

can be described only in cognitive terms or in terms of consciousness. Thus James, Janet and Dembo have moved away in their conclusion of emotion.³³

Psychoanalytic theory is another prominent theory that deals about emotion and its role in human behaviour. As per the psychoanalytic theory, anger or fear are means employed by unconscious urges to achieve symbolic satisfaction, to break out of a state of unbearable tension.³⁴ Sartre attempts to substitute his own theory of emotion instead of Freudian psychoanalytic theory or theory of unconsciousness. Sartre holds that any explanation of thought or dream or feeling must be sought within consciousness. Consciousness is not a thing, it is directed towards something, and it always means something. So an emotion which is part of my life means something by being directed towards some object of its own. Sartre attacked Freudians for overlooking the intentionality of mental events, and holding a view that there can be an inductively determined causal relation between dream and some external object, the connection is not know because it is made through subconsciousness. So the causal explanation of mental phenomena is not tenable.³⁵ Sartre argues that emotion must be understood meaningfully with consciousness. It is consciousness which makes itself conscious, moved by the inner need for an inner signification. Sartre says:

a theory of consciousness which attributes meaningful character to the emotive facts must look for that meaning in the consciousness itself.³⁶

Sartre proposes his own theory of emotion after evaluating all these theories of emotion. He explains his theory from a phenomenological point of view. Sartre maintains that emotion is a certain way of apprehending the world. Emotion has to be understood with its signification. This signification leads to analysis the finality of emotion because this finality is inherent in its structure. This finality can be grasped concretely by the objective examination of emotional behaviour. Simple consideration of the facts brings

³³ Ibid., pp.47-48.

³⁴ Ibid., p.49.

³⁵ Ibid., p.54.

³⁶ Ibid., p.55.

us to an empirical intuition of the finalist meaning of emotion.³⁷ He argues that emotions are conscious acts. They are result of frustration and constitute a 'degraded form of consciousness' an act of bad faith that tries to tamper with the world beyond one's reach. As Sartre explains the subject who seeks the solution of a practical problem is outside in the world; he perceives the world every moment through his acts. If he fails in his attempts, he gets irritated; his very irritation is still a way in which the world appears to him. Phenomenological theory suggests that the affected subject and the affective object are bound in an indissoluble synthesis. In this backdrop, Sartre argues in favour of the authentic existence that faces the world is not only has to purify it but has to eliminate the emotions completely.³⁸

Emotion is a transformation of the world. The reason Sartre states:

When the paths before us becomes too difficult, or when we cannot see our way, we can no longer put up with such exacting and difficult world. All ways are barred and nevertheless we must act.³⁹

In other words, when there is no other way to act we force ourselves to act in particular pattern. So we try to change the world, that is, to live as if the connection between things and their potentialities were not ruled by deterministic processes, but by magic. The emotive behaviour is not on the same plane as the other behaviours; it is not *effective*. Its end is not really to act upon the object as such through the agency of particular means. It seeks by itself to confer upon the object, and without modifying it in its actual structure, another quality, a lesser existence, or a lesser presence or a greater existence, etc. In short, in emotion it is the body which, directed by consciousness, changes its relations with the world in order that the world may change its qualities.⁴⁰

Sartre holds that emotion is like any other mental acts, are directed towards an object. It is impossible to discuss emotion without both the subject and the object. The

³⁷ Ibid., p.48.

³⁸ Op. cit., *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, pp.520-521.

³⁹ Op. cit., *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, p.63.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.65.

emotion is a specific manner of apprehending the world. According to phenomenological doctrine this manner of apprehending can be described in abstraction from its object, but it would not be a complete account. So to have a complete account of emotion, the conjunction of subject and object, the 'indissoluble synthesis' is needed. We see the world in certain manner, as demanding something from us. but there are obstacles in fulfilling the demands so we pretend to be get what we need by magic instead of the proper, natural means, although it is goal directed, is not actually something upon which, at the time, we are in position to reflect. It is not the object of consciousness. It is part of consciousness in the sense we have discussed; that is, it is an apprehending of the world, accompanied by the knowledge that we are apprehending the world in a certain way. The new apprehending of the world produces new behaviour, but ineffectual and would-be-magical behaviour. That is to say we aim to change the world, but if we cannot then we change ourselves. In extreme cases we may even faint, thus magically annihilating the world for ourselves by seeing our connection with it for the time being.⁴¹

Sartre states that the theory of emotion is both a priori and empirical. His theory starts from a concept of man as a being in the world with certain potentialities; but it has recourse to experience and observation. This is said to be partly descriptive and partly metaphysical. It is to show that he is not only concern with description or to define emotion, but to show that human beings are of such a kind that they must adopt the characteristics behaviour which is he ascribes to them. But it is not possible to propound a theory of human nature without taking into account the fact that human beings necessarily have some sort of cognitive relation to the world. The central doctrine of existentialism is that men are nothing except what they choose to become, their essence consist in what they choose to do. But it also consists in what they choose to know, under what aspect they choose to see the world. Emotion arises when they choose to see the world in a particular way, namely magical. It is an essential part of human nature to be capable of this.

In the words of Sartre:

⁴¹ Ibid., p.11.

“Emotion may be called sudden fall of consciousness into magic; or, if you will, emotion arises when the world of the utilizable vanishes abruptly and the world of magic appears in its place.”⁴²

According to Sartre, emotion is not an accident, it is a mode of our conscious existence, one of the way in which consciousness understands its Being-in-the-World. Emotion is seen as a structure of consciousness. It is not a pure, ineffable quality rather it has meaning, it signifies something in individual’s psychic life. Sartre’s theory of emotion was an experiment of a phenomenological psychology. It is also a refutation of psychological theories which propose that emotion is a lawless disorder, possesses a signification of its own and that cannot be understood in itself without comprehension of this signification. For Sartre, emotion signifies the totality of the relation of the human reality of the world.⁴³

Sartre holds that emotions have meaning in the sense that they constitute purposive behaviour. In particular, they are not simply passive states but “spontaneous degradations of consciousness”, as such they are basically insincere and in ‘bad faith’. Through the emotions consciousness tries to reach its objective ‘magically’ in running away from reality. The liberation from such an attitude presupposes a ‘purifying reflection’ which is related to phenomenological reduction and which will reveal the bad faith of the emotions. It is clear that Sartre’s interest in the emotions is connected with his concern for freedom, in opposition to the theories which make man a slave of his emotions and acquit him of all responsibility for them.⁴⁴

Sartre’s Phenomenology of Imagination

On the other side, Sartre explains human existence from the concept of imagination. Like emotion, he treats imagination also a conscious and intentional act of the individual. Imagination often figures prominently in debates about possibility, in that what is

⁴² Ibid., p.12.

⁴³ Ibid., pp.92-93.

⁴⁴ Op. cit., *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, p.488.

imaginable is often taken to be coextensive with what is possible. Sartre gives much more attention to the problem of imagination both philosophical and psychological point of view.

The imagination is a classical problem of both in literature and philosophy and the standard doctrine of imaginary was the degraded form of the real. Hence Sartre attacked the traditional understanding of imagination. He tries to approach the problem of imagination from the point of view of consciousness. In the classical philosophical as well as in psychological theory, the image is given the status of a thing, an image is the copy of the original or it is lesser version of it. They held the view that imagination and sensation are two species of the same genus, but among them, the latter is more vivid and immediate. Unlike the sensation, the image is like an idea produced in perception in Spinoza's stand point. In case of Leibniz, the image stands to the idea as opacity to clarity. The common view to be found in empiricism and rationalism is that the image serves as a representation of the object in the absence of immediate perception. But the difference between them lies in empiricists' belief and rationalist denial that thought itself consists in images. To Locke and associationists, the 'ideas' are just images in this sense and for Hume, ideas are 'weak perception.' Taine reassembles the parts by 'simple recomposition' with his synthetic method. Ribot brought in a creative imagination as a reaction to Taine, his psychology of synthesis improved Taine's simple recomposition by introducing evolutionary and functional considerations make no difference to their basic conception. Bergson's philosophical revolution leaves the image in the same unsatisfactory state.⁴⁵

In this context, Sartre noticed that the Wurzburg psychologists escape from this confusion and landed with Cartesian position. That is thought is independent of imagery, that latter in fact gets in the way. According to them, thought requires no intermediary in order to appear to itself that "thinking and to know that one is thinking are all one."⁴⁶ But Binet fell into contradiction by concluding that thought must be unconscious, image are

⁴⁵ Op. cit., *Sartre*, p.33.

⁴⁶ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Imagination: A Psychological Critique*, Forrest Williams (trans.), Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962, p.67.

required again in order to bring it into consciousness. Hume was the one openly came up saying that by making images inert destroys the spontaneity of any thought that depends on them. But no one was willing to accept it. But again Alain who negated image by saying it as false perception and therefore it cannot play the role in thought. Sartre is clear that these kind of critical solutions will not change anything unless the starting point changes that is image is in consciousness.⁴⁷

Sartre has written two books on imagination, *L'Imagination* largely critical survey of the preceding philosophical and psychological theories of the imagination, where Sartre tries to show the superiority of Husserl's new approach in the *Ideas* and shortcomings in preceding philosophy and psychology. He also points out Husserl's incompleteness. Husserl makes distinction between perception and imagination, neither of them can be reduced to the other. Husserl's insight into the internal structure of the imagination is a remarkable, where the immanent imagining act and the transcendent imagined object are distinguished but these were over looked by the "immanentism" of the traditional theories.⁴⁸

The second book is *The Psychology of Imagination*, where he tries to bring out his own positive phenomenology of imagination. Sartre starts with the description of imagination. So he introduces the method of proceeding, first to produce images then reflect upon them and describe them. He states that all new studies of the images should begin with describing the image and drawing conclusions regarding its nature. It is like passing from certainty to probability. Hence he recommends the prime duty of psychologist is to formulate concepts of the knowledge that is immediate and certain.⁴⁹

In *Imagination: A Psychological Critique*, Sartre establishes, first, the indubitable psychic reality of the image and second, the impossibility of accounting for it as a sensible content of consciousness.⁵⁰ The solution to the problem of the image lies in a rethinking of the nature of consciousness itself. If we take images as the reflection of

⁴⁷ Op. cit., *Sartre*, pp.33-34.

⁴⁸ Op. cit., *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, p.517.

⁴⁹ Op. cit., *The Psychology of Imagination*, p.4.

⁵⁰ Op. cit., *Sartre*, p.34.

thought and word for meaning, then what is that under lie these words and images that give substance to thought and meaning. But there is nothing under lies under the words, behind the images. Consciousness is the only deserve to be called spontaneous because it exist itself by itself and for itself. Consciousness thus appears for Sartre as a presuppositionless, absolute given, to which the image appears and it appears, not in the first instance as a thing, but precisely as an appearance. But then things also appear in the first instance as appearances. The location of the problem shifts, therefore, from the content of consciousness to its object.⁵¹

Sartre brings in a dictum as Husserl that ‘every image is an image of something’ as every consciousness is consciousness of something. The image is in fact a vehicle for intentionality, in a mediated relation between a consciousness and its object as opposed to the immediate relation which is the grasping of the object in perception. The image is not the thing, nor is it in any way thing-like-rather it refers to the thing or stands for it in an experience that is structurally similar to but ontologically distinct from, the experience of the thing itself. The image is a constructive element of consciousness; it is one of the ways in which consciousness ‘intends’ the thing.⁵²

Sartre provides new meaning to the concept of imagination. He treats imagination is a conscious and spontaneous act. He further holds that imagination is different from perception. He viewed that perception is a passive conscious act whereas imagination is an active conscious act. we depend on observation, but in case of imagination quasi observation.

a. Imagination as Absence of Image

Sartre makes clear that we had wrong understanding of image. He indentified errors on our reflection on image. The first is to think that the image is in consciousness and the second is that the object of the image is in the image. Sartre calls these errors as the illusion, where he draws a distinction between impressions and ideas:

⁵¹ Op. cit., *Sartre*, p.34.

⁵² Ibid., pp.34-35.

“Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions... by ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning...”⁵³

According to Hume, these ideas are images, he further adds, our actual ideas of chair has but an extraneous relation to an existing chair. But it is not the chair of the external world, the chair we just perceived. He holds that the idea of chair and the chair as an idea are one and the same thing. To have an idea of chair is to have a chair in consciousness. Therefore what is true of the object is also true of the idea. Psychologists and philosophers are of the same view. It is also common sense to think that when we say that ‘we have an image’ of Peter, it is understood that certain picture of Peter is in our consciousness. Sartre says:

“If we accept the illusion of immanence, we are necessarily led to construct the world of the mind out of objects entirely like those of the external world, but which simply obey different laws.”⁵⁴

Sartre argues that one has to get rid of the illusion of immanence and see what reflection teaches us. “When I perceive a chair it is absurd to say that chair is in my perception since my perception is a certain consciousness and the chair is the object of that consciousness.”⁵⁵ But the image of chair cannot enter into consciousness. That is an image of chair cannot be a chair. The chair always remains outside of consciousness. In case of my perception or in image the object are identical but the mode of relatedness to consciousness in perception whereas in image it is not so. The object is not in consciousness; not even as an image. The image is a relation of consciousness to the object; in other words, it means a certain manner in which the object makes its appearance to consciousness or a certain way in which consciousness presents an object to itself. The image is an imaginative consciousness. It is a relationship.⁵⁶ Hence Sartre

⁵³ Op. cit., *The Psychology of Imagination*, p.5.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p.6.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.6.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp.6-7.

holds that there is no thing as an image in imagination. The first difference between perception and imagination is not the presence or absence of image but a different way of referring to the intentional object of our consciousness. There is no essential difference in imaged object and perceived object but the difference is on the side of the imaging act.⁵⁷

b. The Phenomenon of Quasi Observation

To know about consciousness, we start examining image in its relationship to the concept and the percept. An object can be known in perception, conception and imagination. In perception, an object is observed and that object enters ones perception in its completeness though one can see it from one side at a time. Since one does not perceive all sides at same time, one side at a time the object is said to appear only in a series of profiles, of projections. Though the object one can see it or touch it, it always seen in certain fashion which includes and excludes at one and the same an infinity of other point of views. The object is synthesis of all the appearances. Therefore the perception of an object is thus a phenomenon of infinity of aspects. On the other hand, one think of an object as a concrete concept with its all possible in one stroke. This does not mean that one's idea does not need to complete itself by an infinite progression. But one can think of the concrete essence in a single act of consciousness. This is the difference between thought and perception. This is the reason why one can never perceive a thought nor think a perception. These two phenomena are radically distinct; the first one is knowledge which is conscious of itself and which places itself at the centre of the object; the other is a synthetic unity of a multiplicity of appearances, which slowly serves its apprenticeship.⁵⁸

In perception, knowledge forms itself slowly; in the image the knowledge is immediate. The image teaches nothing: it is organized exactly like the objects which do produce knowledge, but it is complete at the very moment of its appearance whereas in perception, everything has an infinite number of relationships as well as the infinite number of relationships between the elements of the thing which constitute the very

⁵⁷ Op. cit., *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, p.518.

⁵⁸ Op. cit., *The Psychology of Imagination*, pp.8-9.

essence of a thing; whereas the elements of image have no relationship with the rest of the world. While among themselves they have two or three relationships. The objects of world of images can in no way exist in the world of perception.⁵⁹

The second difference between imagination and perception concerns the way in which we look at their objects. In case of perception, we depend on observation, but in case of imagination quasi observation. While in the case of perception continued observation can bring up constantly new items, no such enrichment can result from the corresponding observation of the imagined object. It remains as rich or poor as our original imagination was.⁶⁰

c. The Object as Nothingness

All consciousness is consciousness of something. Non-reflective consciousness envisions heterogeneous objects for consciousness: for example, the imaginative consciousness of tree envisions a tree, that is, a body which is by nature external to consciousness; consciousness raises out of itself transcends itself. The imaginative consciousness is conscious by itself otherwise it would lead to contradiction. The transcendental consciousness of tree as an image posits the tree. But it posits it as an image, that is, in a manner which is not that of the perceptual consciousness.⁶¹

Every consciousness posits its object, but each does so in its own way, perception, for instance posits objects in four ways, as non-existent, or as absent, or as existing elsewhere or not posits its object as existing. This positional of absence or non-existence can occur only on the level of quasi-observation.⁶² Hence the third difference is that there is a lack in imaginative act in comparison to perceptive act.⁶³

d. Spontaneity

⁵⁹ Ibid., p.10.

⁶⁰ Op. cit., *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, p.518.

⁶¹ Op. cit., *The Psychology of Imagination*, pp.13-14.

⁶² Ibid., p.15.

⁶³ Op. cit., *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, p.518.

A perceptual consciousness appears to itself as being passive whereas an imaginative consciousness presents itself to itself as an imaginative consciousness, that is, as a spontaneity which produces and holds on to the object as an image. This consciousness appears to itself as being creative, but without positing that what it has created is an object. It is due to this vagueness, it is like a wave among waves. It feels itself to be a consciousness through and through and one with the other consciousness which have preceded it and with which it is synthetically united.⁶⁴

So through reflection, we can bring about the certain things regarding image like its static nature. Image is not a condition, a solid and opaque residue, but a consciousness. But most psychologists believe that image is one element in an instantaneous synthesis, and each consciousness include or can include one or more images. So the role of image is said to find a place in a present consciousness of thought process where variety of objects found. In this sense, they argue that thought is supported by images. But the image is a consciousness which is *sui generis*, so it is in no way form a part of a large consciousness. Image is not contained in consciousness in addition to the thought, signs, feelings and sensations.

“The image consciousness is a synthetic form which appears like a certain moment of a temporal synthesis and organizes itself with other forms of consciousness which precedes and follows it, to make one continuous whole.”⁶⁵

The imaginative consciousness can be called representative in the sense it goes out in search of its object in the realm of perception and it sees the sensible element and they constitute this realm. The difference between this and perception is spontaneous and creativity, which is not found in perception. Perception is passive of consciousness. The flesh of the object is not the same in an image and in a perception.

⁶⁴ Op. cit., p.17.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p.18.

e. Consciousness and Imagination

Sartre refers to the French psychologists of his time and points out that they have understood images like a type of existence strictly like that of things. They are copy of sensation which may differ in degree, in cohesion, in meaning from primary sensations, but which belongs, as do sensations, to the intra-mundane existence. The image is as real as any other existence. The problem is with regard to its relationship to other existence.⁶⁶

Sartre tries to show that what must be the nature of a consciousness in order that it is able to successively posit real objects and imagined objects; since the existence of object of the image and object of perception are different. In perception, we perceive the beginnings and the endings of the hidden as being real. In this sense, to perceive this or that real datum is to perceive it on the foundation of total reality as a whole. So this reality is co-present as an essential condition of the existence of the reality actually perceived. But in imaginative act, the act of reality is reverse. If we want to imagine the hidden thing, we direct our attention on them and isolate them, we grasp them as absent, and they appear to us as empty data. So the imaginative act is constituting, isolating and annihilating.⁶⁷

Though recollection in many respect close to the image and at point we use the examples from memory to clarify the nature of the image, the problem of both are radically different. And, there is an essential different between the theme of recollection and that of the image. The recall of the past is not the imagining of the past but recalling of the past incident. We do not posit it as given-in-its-absence, but as given-now-as-in-the-past. The recall is real but past. It exists past, which is one mode of real existence among others. When we want to apprehend it, we direct our consciousness towards that past object where it is. But if we imagine an object, we grasp it which is not at all given to us or which is given to us as being beyond reach. So we grasp nothing that is we posit nothingness. All real existence occurs with present, past and future structures. The future is real if it is connected to the ground of the present or it can be on contrary by isolating it

⁶⁶ Ibid., p.234.

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp.235-36.

and positing it for itself but by cutting it off from all reality and by annihilating it, by presenting it as nothingness.⁶⁸

To imagine of consciousness, it must have the possibility of positing a hypothesis of unreality. It does not mean cease to be consciousness of something. Consciousness should be able to form and posit objects possessing a certain trait of nothingness in relation to the whole of reality. The imaginary object can be posited as non-existent or as absent or as existing elsewhere or not posited as existing. The negative act is the constructive of the image.⁶⁹

To posit an image is to construct an object, that is to deny real from it. The totality of real, so long as it is grasped by consciousness as a synthetic situation for that consciousness, is the world. Consciousness to imagine the two pre-requisites are consciousness must be able to posit the world in its synthetic totality and it must be able to posit the imagined objects as being out of reach of this synthetic totality that is to posit the world as nothing in relation to the image. So now it is clear that the creation of the imaginary would be completely impossible to a consciousness whose nature is in-the-midst-of-the-world.⁷⁰

If we assume a consciousness to be in midst of the world as one existence among others we must conceive it hypothetically as completely subjected to the action of a variety of realities without its being able to avoid the details of these realities by an intuition which would embrace their totality. Therefore this consciousness can contain only real modifications aroused by real actions and all imagination would be excluded from it. If a consciousness to be able imagine it must be able to escape from the world by its very nature. Thus the thesis of unreality has yielded us the possibility of negation as its condition. Now the negation has revealed itself to us as being the reverse of the very freedom of consciousness. Here one need to take into account that act of positing the world as a synthetic totality and the act of taking perceptive from the world are both one and the same. Thus posit the world as a world or to negate it is one and the same thing.

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp.236-238.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p.238.

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp.239-40.

So to be able to imagine, it is enough that consciousness be able to surpass the real in constituting it as a world, since the negating of the real always implied by its constituting in the world. This surpassing cannot be brought about by any means whatever, and freedom of consciousness must not be confused with the arbitrary. For an image is not purely and simply the world-negated, it is always the world negated from certain point of view, namely, the one that permits the positing of the absence or the non-existence of the object presented as an image.⁷¹

The essential prerequisite that enables consciousness to imagine is that it be 'situated in the world' or more briefly, that it 'be-in-the-world'. It is the situation-in-the-world is grasped as a concrete and individual reality of consciousness, which is motivation for the construction of any unreal object whatever and the nature of that unreal object is circumscribed by this motivation. Thus the situation of the consciousness does not need to appear as a pure and abstract condition of possibility for all imagination but as the concrete and exact motivation for the appearance of a certain particular imagination.⁷²

Sartre is set out to show consciousness as *irrealisante* in *The Psychology of Imagination* which is not easily translatable in English, it means 'making unreal. He calls image as 'the certain' because according to him if something is given in reflection is certain although any explanatory hypothesis about it can only be probable. This certainty of reflection delivers to us is a series of propositions: that image is a consciousness in the revised sense; that it is incapable of giving new information; that it is positional but in certain specified ways; that it is spontaneous; and that it is never part of a more inclusive consciousness but it is *sui generis*. For Sartre, the modes in which the image is positional or *thetic* are important. He holds that it posits its object either as non-existent or as absent or as elsewhere, the last two cases being distinguished presumably by the emphasis in the one case on the here where the subject is not, in the other on the not-here where it is. In all three cases the operative modality is negation. In this the image is differs from the concept, we may have the concept of our absent friend in his present

⁷¹ Ibid., pp.240-41.

⁷² Ibid., pp.241-42.

circumstances, and this may be wholly positive, but it is of the very nature of image not to touch him or see him, a way he has of not being at such a distance, in such a position. In other words the imaging consciousness posits its object as a nothingness as imaginative.⁷³

For Sartre, people also relate to the things in the world and their situation through imagination. In Sartre's theory an image makes present that which is absent whether it is something that exists elsewhere or even something that is non-existent. Through these images people relate to the world in an open way because these images relate to the world from a problem solving, rational point of view. Even if people withdraw from the world in order to imagine, their images lean on reality and make sense of it in terms of that which their present situation lacks. Therefore imagination is also an authentic manner of existing in relation to the world.

Bad Faith as Self Denial

The philosophy of existentialism is primarily concern with Human existence. Sartre as existentialist gives important to freedom and responsibility. According to him, man is free. He emphasizes on absolute freedom. In other words, human being is condemned to be free that is human being is vested with inescapable freedom. He also equally gives important to responsibility. According to him, man is free to act and he is responsible for his act. In this context, he introduces the notions like 'bad faith' and 'authenticity'. Bad faith is "a lie to oneself within the unity a single consciousness. Through bad faith a person seeks to escape the responsible freedom of Being-for-itself. Bad faith rests on a vacillation between transcendence and facticity which refuses to recognize either one for what it really is or to synthesize them."⁷⁴ For Sigmund Freud, the lived deception is resort to protect oneself from the unpleasant truth which a person represses. Sartre emphasizes on moral and metaphysical implications. The Freudian account requires a substantial self that exists prior to and independently of its formation by experience, because it can be acted upon experience. For Sartre, being-for-itself is responsible for its

⁷³ Op. cit., *Sartre*, pp.41-43.

⁷⁴ Op. cit., *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, p.628.

acts. Being-for-itself knows itself and knows all there is to know about itself and if it fails to acknowledge something about itself or acts out of character with itself. This is something being-for-itself knowingly deceives itself. This is in terms of Sartre is called as 'bad faith'. Sartre points out that bad faith is a form of faith, not just cynical deception practiced by the self on itself but a genuine belief that it entertains about itself. In some sense, it can be said that being-for-itself know that this belief is a mistake. But being-for-itself maintains this self deception. Bad faith is not a lie. A lie is to lie to other to convince them but bad faith is a lie to oneself.⁷⁵ Sartre argues: "if I lie to myself I know not only that I am lying but also that I am lied to, and I must therefore be in good faith to the extent that I acknowledge my own bad faith."⁷⁶

Sartre considers being as for-itself and in-itself. The horrifying reality is that human being is a transcendent being, devoid of any stability that prompts human being to attempt to approximate some degree of constancy, thereby negating his transcendent nature. Thus exists the phenomenon of 'bad faith' i.e. *mauvaise foi*. Sartre calls bad faith that "consciousness instead of directing its negation outward turns it toward itself."⁷⁷ Consciousness is characterized by *transcendence* in such that it is directed towards what is not itself. Bad faith is project of flight from being towards non-being and from non-being towards being. It is a negation of the *transcendence* of one's being. Indeed, Sartre holds that the goal of bad faith is to put oneself out of reach; in other words, it is an escape.

It is necessary to understand that 'bad faith' is not essentially the same as falsehood. While Sartre affirms that both lie and bad faith are negative attitudes. In both cases, there exist acts of lying, deceit and distortion of truth; it does not mean both are the same act. Instead, he asserts that there exists a basic difference between them. He defines a liar as "a cynical consciousness, affirming truth within himself, denying it in his words, and denying the negation as such."⁷⁸ This definition is to be understood as; the negation that exists in a lie is directed towards a transcendent 'other', and not to one's

⁷⁵ Op. cit., *Sartre*, pp. 75-76.

⁷⁶ Op. cit., *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, p.49.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p.48.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p.48.

consciousness itself as in the case of bad faith. It thus affirms fourfold aspects of existence: of myself, of the other, of myself in relation to the 'other' and of the 'other' in relation to myself. In first, the duality of the deceiver and the deceived in a lie is rooted in a distinction of subjectivities. This characteristic of lying in general makes facile the act of hiding the truth from the 'other'. Second, the liar possesses the truth in its totality in so far as he is able to hide it from the 'other'. Sartre then concludes that he is willing to grant that bad faith is a lie to oneself, with the prerequisite of a distinction between lying to oneself and lying in general. Thus he emphasizes the fact that lying in general is not necessarily the same as bad faith.

To term in Sartre's word:

Thus the lie does not put into play the inner structure of present consciousness; all the negations which constitute it bear on objects which by this fact are removed from consciousness. The lie then does not require special ontological foundation, and the explanation which the existence of negation in general requires are valid without change in the case of deceit.⁷⁹

Sartre Further states:

In bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth. Thus the duality of the deceiver and the deceived does not exist here. Bad faith on the contrary implies in essence the unity of a single consciousness.⁸⁰

Sartre holds that there is a difference between bad faith and insincerity. Sincerity presupposes an ideal, which cannot be affirmed by the Sartrean notion of absolute freedom. Sartre asserts that man is abandoned in this world with no set of extrinsic, objective criteria imposed upon him. The ideal of sincerity consists in one having to be

⁷⁹ Ibid., p.48.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.49.

for oneself only what one is for others. According to Sartre, the essential structure of sincerity and bad faith are not altogether different. The goal of sincerity is:

to bring me to confess to myself what I am in order that I may finally coincide with my being; in a word, to cause myself to be, in the mode of the in-itself, what I am in the mode of 'not being what I am.'⁸¹

He further elaborates the goal of bad faith is to cause oneself to be what one is through the mode of 'not being what one is' or it makes one to be not what one in the mode of being what one is. Both sincerity and bad faith are attempts to flee from one's being. It may be true that the person who pursues sincerity as a goal is in bad faith. Furthermore, the notion of sincerity is integral to the possibility of the phenomenon of bad faith. The condition of the possibility for bad faith is that human reality, in its most immediate being, in the infrastructure of the pre-reflective cogito, must be what it is not and not be what it is.⁸²

Finally, bad faith is not a state one undergoes, nor a malady infected on one's consciousness. Since bad faith involves a single consciousness, there is nothing outside consciousness which makes possible the phenomenon of bad faith. Bad faith is integral to the very structure of consciousness. The need to construct a semblance of duality between the deceiver and the deceived in view of its absence depends solely on one's consciousness. Consciousness is intentional, bad faith is likewise intentional. However, the intentionality of this phenomenon is directed reflectively and inwardly, and this makes bad faith a special phenomenon. "Bad faith involves a conscious decision to be in bad faith; it decides and wills what it is; it is 'conscious of its own structure.'⁸³ Moreover, Sartre traced the possibility of bad faith to the human tendency of fleeing from that which threatens its very own project towards self-fulfillment.

⁸¹ Ibid., pp.65-66.

⁸² Ibid., pp.66-67.

⁸³ Ibid., p.68.

Authenticity as Existential Virtue

The affirmation of the inevitability of the possibility of bad faith leads Sartre to explore his moral notion of 'authenticity'. Sartre discusses authenticity in relation to freedom. Sartre brings in this concept of authenticity from his atheistic existentialism. For Sartre, authenticity is the genuine existence which is conceived as free. For Sartre, authenticity is not facing death like Heidegger; rather it is facing the meaningless ground of its own transcendence.⁸⁴ According to Sartre freedom makes a person to be authentic. Authenticity has the etymological root in Greek term *auto-heutes*, which means 'to make' or 'create oneself'. To be authentic is to embrace our existence as an open-ended field of multiple possibilities of self-identify from which we choose. Consequently authenticity demands that we negate or transcend our 'objective' essence in order to invent new role to play, new personae to identify with, and new masks to express our numerous projects. Sartre holds that to choose freely one needs to be oneself and open to the possible experimental in a given circumstances.⁸⁵

The existentialists are not interested in the happiness of a human being's life, the goodness of his or her disposition rather they are concerned over the authenticity of human existence.⁸⁶ The precedence of existence over essence ultimately resolves in the negation of human nature. This same negation endows human being with the freedom to make oneself. Human being is nothing else but what he or she makes of oneself. Human being is nothing else than the totality of his or her free actions. However, we cannot conceive of freedom without responsibility. Responsibility is always proportionate to freedom. Sartre freedom provides extreme absolute freedom and he also emphasizes equal amount of responsibility. Man is being condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world in his shoulders. One is not only responsible for his own acts; he is responsible for all men. As Sartre views, "I am creating an image of man of my own choosing. In choosing myself, I choose man."⁸⁷ The responsibility towards oneself and others gives raise to anguish, forlornness and despair in our existence. We always feel

⁸⁴ Marjorie Grene, "Authenticity: An Existential Virtue," *Ethics*, Vol.62, No.4, July 1952, p.266.

⁸⁵ <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticity_\(philosophy\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticity_(philosophy))>

⁸⁶ Op.cit., "Authenticity: An Existential Virtue," p.266.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p.324.

responsible for anything that happens in the world. But there is a tendency to attempt to avoid this sense of responsibility. This paves way for Sartre's discussion of the notion of 'bad faith' or 'inauthenticity'. A lack of authenticity is considered in existentialism as 'bad faith'.⁸⁸

Sartre initially discussed the notion of authenticity through the phenomenological ontological treatment of the concept of bad faith. Sartre's notions of bad faith and authenticity are derived primarily from his initial discussion of consciousness; thus it is necessary to explore the connection that exists between the concepts of consciousness and bad faith. Sartre's notion of bad faith necessarily follows his ontological conception of consciousness. Sartre defines consciousness as "a being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of its being." On the one hand, the given definition explicates self-awareness on the part of consciousness. As Sartre states in *The Transcendence of the Ego*, "consciousness is aware of itself insofar as it is consciousness of a transcendent object." On the other hand, such a definition restricts the concept of consciousness to a perpetual attempt to a *nihilation* of being, more specifically, of one's being.

Consciousness is a 'not', and its transcendent character makes it an enduring negation of being. Consciousness is dynamic and any attempt to view it as a static entity is itself a negation of the very definition of consciousness. There is a relationship between consciousness and authenticity. Sartre's characterization of consciousness as free spontaneity reflectively positing its own transcendent objects, as active rather than reactive, as neither caused by nor causing external objects and as transparent to itself, is exposed to the attributes of authenticity such as spontaneity, lucidity, activity, reflectiveness, self-sufficiency and originality. However, before providing positive descriptions of authenticity, it would best serve to recourse first to provide negative descriptions of this concept through a discussion of what bad faith is not, after tracing the phenomenon of bad faith to consciousness.

⁸⁸ <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticity_\(philosophy\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticity_(philosophy))>

Authenticity is supposed to be a self-recovery of being which was previously corrupted.⁸⁹ It is to be kept in mind that the nature of consciousness itself is favourable to bad faith. Indeed, bad faith is rooted in the very consciousness of man. Sartrean authenticity may be radically described as the affirmation of human reality of its lucidity, spontaneity and freedom. It is when man confronts the dreadful truth of his existence and starts to live with it that he begins to live an authentic life. Authentic living supposes the transcendence over the naturally negative tendency of consciousness of being what it is not, and not being what it is. The authenticity requires radical conversion from the project of being-god to a project based on freedom.⁹⁰

Inescapable Existential States of Emotion

In order to be free and authentic beings, human beings must learn to live with these existential states of emotion such as anguish, despair, forlornness and shame. According to Sartre, these are reflective emotions. They are all intrinsic parts of one's experiences.⁹¹ It is possible to mask one's anguish and to 'flee from it'. In other words, Sartre argues that one can purposefully push anguish out of one's consciousness. It is not avoiding choice, not avoiding anguish. But rather avoiding one's freedom. According to Sartre, one cannot avoid free choice. Either one accepts freedom and makes choices with the absurdity of each choice in mind or one tries to pretend that one is not totally free to choose and to live an 'authentic life'. He further argues that one can even pretend as there is no choice. Sartre categorically states that one cannot help being in the situation one is. He says if one blames it on environment or genetics is to live in 'bad faith'.⁹²

Anguish is the awareness of our own freedom. One is aware of oneself as being freely choosing being. As authentic being, one cannot deny one's own freedom. Every choice is equally arbitrary and equally absurd.⁹³ Forlornness is closely related to anguish. Forlornness is an awareness of being left on one's own, of having been abandoned; it is

⁸⁹ Op. cit., *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, p.70.

⁹⁰ David Detmer, *Sartre Explained: from Bad Faith to Authenticity*, Evanston: Carus Publishing Company, 2008, p.138

⁹¹ Op. cit., *Three Philosophical Moralists: Mill, Kant and Sartre: An Introduction to Ethics*, pp.168-169.

⁹² Op. cit., *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, p.532.

⁹³ Op. cit., *Sartre Explained: from Bad Faith to Authenticity*, p.213.

the experience of utter loneliness. Man experiences 'the death of God' as abandonment. Without God, human freedom is experienced as an intolerable burden that man is condemned to be free. If God is dead, then, there can be no objective standards of life. There is no basis for making excuses for oneself and there is no escaping from one's freedom. An individual is rather responsible. Man or woman is 'thrown' into this situation. He or she is forced to define him or herself without the sets of fixed standards.⁹⁴ Despair is a consequence of anguish and forlornness. Despair is the realization that one cannot ultimately count on anyone or anything outside of one's own will and one's own field of action. Despair is the giving up of all hope in standards and realities outside of those which we ourselves define and create through our own concrete lives and actions. It is acceptance of one's full and awful responsibility for one's choices and actions, for one's own life and for one's world. In other words, despair is the awareness that one cannot control the actions of others. Even though one feels as if one is choosing for all people; one is aware that others are free and independent; one can never be sure of one's actions. With others, one has only probabilities never certainties. One must concern oneself primarily with one's own possibilities. Shame is the awareness of being objects of experience by others. 'The other' as part of our subjective experience, we experience others. These emotions play an important in making the human personality.⁹⁵

Sartre's Existential Psychoanalysis

Sartre was familiar with the psychoanalysis of his time. Sartre views that his theory of consciousness has certain obvious implications for psychotherapy. Sartre critically analyses Freudian psychoanalytic theory. He criticizes Freudian psychoanalysis for its methodology. The purpose of Freudian psychoanalysis is to determine the unconscious desire as causes for the human behaviour. Sartre agrees with the general objective of penetrating below the surface of our manifest behaviour. Besides, he believes that human behaviour is filled with symbolic meanings which if properly interpreted would reveal deeper purposive forces at work than are accessible without 'analyses. But he rejected psychoanalytic school's conception of the unconscious as something essential opaque and

⁹⁴ Ibid., p.214.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p.535.

impenetrable to consciousness and their introduction of id, ego and superego. He also rejects the subconscious mechanism as repressions and sublimation. Sartre emphasizes that the interpretative hypotheses of psychoanalysis can be verified directly rather than indirectly. Thus he proposed an account of existential psychoanalysis through which the underlying meaning of behaviour can be manifested by consciousness.⁹⁶

For Sartre, the purpose of existential psychoanalysis is to determine the original choice that stimulates the human behaviour. Sartre's reaction against Freud can be viewed as reaction against 'essentialism' or 'universalism'. One of the main themes of Sartre's version of existentialism is to reverse the traditional ordering of general to particular, and to exalt the individual.

The *principle* of this psychoanalysis is that man is a totality and not a collection. Consequently he expresses himself as a whole in even his most insignificant and his most superficial behaviour.⁹⁷

Sartre states the goal of existential psychoanalysis is to interpret the empirical behaviour pattern of man in order to make it explicit. For Sartre, the point of departure is experience. Existential psychoanalysis recognizes nothing before the original upsurge of human freedom. Existential psychoanalysis rejects the hypothesis of the unconscious.⁹⁸

Existential psychoanalysis is the one of central ideas of *Being and Nothingness*. It is through our consciousness and imagination that we are able to make of ourselves what we are not; this is our human freedom and it is a choice. For Sartre, freedom is precisely the being which makes itself a lack of being.⁹⁹ However, this freedom takes place in the world as a being-in-the-world. Therefore the purpose of existential psychoanalysis is to determine the original choice.¹⁰⁰ Sartre further argues:

⁹⁶ Op. cit., *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, p.513.

⁹⁷ Op. cit., *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, p.568.

⁹⁸ Ibid., pp.568-570.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p.567.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p.570.

Since what the method seeks is a *choice of being* at the same time as a *being*, it must reduce particular behaviour patterns to fundamental relations ... of being – which are expressed in this behaviour. It is then guided from the start toward a comprehension of being and must not assign itself any other goal than to discover being and the mode of being the being confronting this being.¹⁰¹

The illustration Sartre uses is the question of why Flaubert became a writer. In studying Flaubert, he seeks to show how a choice was made, in spite of Flaubert's thrownness and so called predisposition. So he makes clear that desire alone cannot explain everything; neither it can have an appeal to environment. Sartre has tried to illustrate this traditional mistake by many *biographies* written from a psychological viewpoint. He quotes from a biography of Flaubert:

A critic, for example, wishing to explain the 'psychology' of Flaubert, will write that he appeared in his early youth to know as his normal state, a continual exaltation resulting from the twofold feeling of his grandiose ambition and his invincible power... The effervescence of his young blood was *then* turned into literary passion as happens about the eighteenth year in precocious souls who find in the energy of style or the intensities of fiction some way of escaping from the need of violent action or of intense feeling, which torments them.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p.274.

¹⁰² Ibid., p.558.

Sartre views that there are two problems in the above passage. It reduces Flaubert to the intersection of general principles. It misses all the uniqueness of Flaubert. There is an effort to reduce the complex personality of an adolescent to a few basic desires, as the chemist reduces compound bodies to merely a combination of simple bodies. Here the psychological analysis proceeds from the postulate that an individual fact is produced by the intersection of abstract universal laws. It simply fails to explain what make the individuality. The reason given as the intense feeling which made Flaubert a writer is not an explanation for the 'calling' of Flaubert. Therefore, one may show thousands of circumstances which may not be the explanation. The empirical psychology also rejects the pure individual who has been banished from the pure subjectivity of Flaubert into the external circumstance of his life. The empirical psychology emphasizes that Flaubert had the intense feeling for writing from his early childhood even before he faced the crisis of adolescence. Sartre argues that we cannot exhaust the individual by generalities in this way.¹⁰³ Sartre rather calls for the individual's 'original project'. This 'original project' is what the individual is fundamentally trying to make of himself. The original project is Sartre's answer to Freud's notion of a complex. Sartre thinks classical Freudian analysis is not entirely in agreement with itself. The clinical practice is fine. Sartre has no quarrel with Freudian practice. Freud, after all, could actually cure people, and there's no denying that. But Sartre is critical of the Freudian theory. Sartre views that the Freudian theory does not really fit his own practice.¹⁰⁴

Freudians hold that they are trying to bring the deep-seated complexness which is responsible for the patient's behaviour into consciousness. It helps the patient to understand his or her behaviour and deal with it. Sartre argues that whatever there is in the patient's mind is already conscious, even if only non-positionally. For Sartre, there is no unconscious in the Freudian sense. In other words, there is nothing unconscious about consciousness. Sartre further argues that the patient might even know what the particular fact which is involved and he or she may even know what is going on in the 'unconscious'. The patient might very well know this in the sense that he is already conscious of it in a positional way, that he has made whatever it is an object of

¹⁰³ Ibid., p.559.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p.559.

consciousness, reflected on it. For Sartre, any act of consciousness can be reflected on. According to him, there is nothing which cannot be reflected upon. He argues that we certainly do not need an analyst to help us to understand this. For Sartre, the original project is the ultimate project that is the transcendent meaning of all the patient's acts, the original plan that amounts to what the person is trying to make of himself. He advocates existential psychoanalysis as a method to make a person understand his original project.¹⁰⁵ For Sartre, an individual's original project is his or her willful choice. Thus an individual is responsible for his or her acts and behaviour.

Freedom as Absolute Freedom

Sartre's philosophy is rooted in freedom. The paradigm shift of 'existence precedes essence' in existential philosophy has deeply influenced the thinking of Sartre. This revolutionary change led Sartre to come up with a new conception of human being with freedom to act. The rejection of determinism of any kind over human existence has led to the absolute freedom. Sartre upholds for this absolute inescapable freedom. He terms it as 'man is condemned to be free'. The emphasis of absolute freedom makes man responsible for his or her action. According to the existentialist thinkers determinism, whether genetic, social or environmental, does not offer adequate explanation of human's inner potentialities and capabilities. But the modern psychologists would differ in this respect because for them genetic, social or environmental situation plays a vital role in human. Whereas existentialists hold that each human persons are unique and reveal one's inner potentialities and creative skills only because of one's freedom. First of all human exists in the world and with the utmost freedom, he or she creates himself or herself through each and every actions. A person is the maker of himself or herself. Human being is the project which possesses subjective life and apart from this projection of self, nothing exists. And therefore each one has to complete the project in and through one's freedom. Hence there comes responsibility for whatever one does and, in this way, the whole responsibility of one's action falls on one's own shoulders. As Sartre states in *Being and Nothingness*, "man is being condemned to be free carries the weight of the

¹⁰⁵ Henryk Misiak, Virginia Staudt Sexton, *Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Psychologies: A Historical Survey*, New York: Grune & Stratton, 1973, p.38.

whole world on his shoulders; he is responsible for the world and for himself as a way of being.”¹⁰⁶ Human beings have considerable freedom within one’s own being in case one wills to express it. Freedom is a unique quest which lies in working out the demands of one’s inner self and impressing one’s genuine or authentic self. Freedom means facing conflicting choices, making decisions and accepting them.

According to him, freedom is the very essence of human being.¹⁰⁷ He also makes a distinction between historical or political and philosophical freedom. According to Sartre, the historical or political freedom consists in being successful in what one does. Freedom is to be able to obtain what one wishes. That is a capacity to achieve a goal is historical or political freedom. Sartre is not interested in this kind of freedom. For Sartre, freedom is capacity to choose a goal. In this kind of freedom success is not essential an issue at all. Sartre calls this as autonomy of choice. He holds that freedom is an exile.¹⁰⁸ We are responsible for our choice. For Sartre holds that consciousness is freedom.¹⁰⁹

Sartre has elaborated a detailed theory of freedom. According to him, Human beings are what one makes of one self. He approaches the problem totally from the atheistic view point by denying the existence of God. Human beings are completely free to do whatever they like as though there is no God to stop them. He holds that there is only one being whose existence comes before its essence and that being is ‘human’. Human is indefinable, because to begin with human is nothing. For Sartre, Freedom is precisely nothingness which is made-to-be at the heart of human and which forces human reality to make itself instead of to be for human reality, to be is to choose oneself; nothing comes to it either from outside or from within which it can receive or accept. Thus, freedom is not a being; it is the being of human therefore it is one nothingness of being. Human is not free but human is freedom. Freedom is not a mode but it is the existence.¹¹⁰

Sartre does not wish to deny that we exercise our freedom, but we choose our freedom within limits. He is the first to acknowledge that our existence is always situated

¹⁰⁶ Op. cit., *Being and Nothingness*, p.553.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p.25.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p.508.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p.29.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., pp.567-568.

in concrete historical contexts. One does not choose to be born, nor does one choose one's physical or biological condition, nor what economic class or political state or national culture one is born into. But one does choose how to exist within the limitation of these circumstances. Human being is what one makes of oneself, in spite of the conditioning, influences of one's factual circumstances. Human being is free because he or she defines what he or she is and how he or she is by a series of free choices.¹¹¹

Sartre's central theme of freedom is the basis for each and every act of human being. For Sartre, freedom is exercised in emotion and imagination. These two are the basic human activities. In this way, he makes human being solely responsible for each and every act. In spite of inescapable bad faith, he emphasizes that human being should live authentic life. This authentic life is possible through exercise of freedom.

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp.484-485.

CHAPTER - IV

MERLEAU-PONTY'S CONTRIBUTION TO PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Introduction

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) was a leading phenomenological existential philosopher. He had a profound influence on French philosophy and social theory. He used a psychological theory to explain his philosophical position. He re-interpreted Husserl's phenomenology into existential phenomenology through his radical description of the perceptual experiences of embodied human existence. His existential phenomenology tries to provide an account of perceptual experience. In doing so, he critically uses the theories of psychology and psychiatry.¹ He acquired a central position in French philosophy for his expanded and vividly elaborated views on human body. Merleau-Ponty proposed that there is no division between 'body' and 'mind'. He challenged the traditional dualist distinctions between mind and body; spirit and matter; man and things. He developed a philosophy that tried to unite these traditionally separated realms of existence in one conceptual whole.

Merleau-Ponty defines phenomenology as the study of essences, including the essence of perception and of consciousness. For him, the study of essence is a means to real end of phenomenology. He qualifies phenomenology as a philosophy that seeks to put these essences back into existence and to understand human beings and their world solely on the basis of their facticity. According to him, phenomenology tries to give a direct description of our experience as it is without taking account of its psychological origin and the causal explanations which the scientists, historians or the sociologists may be able to provide. In other words, phenomenology is concerned with providing a direct description of human experience. Perception is the background of experience which guides every conscious action. The world is a phenomenal field for perception. One cannot separate oneself from one's perceptions of the world. He further holds that

¹Keith Hoeller (ed.), *Merleau-Ponty and Psychology*, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993, p.137.

phenomenology is a method of describing the nature of our perceptual contact with the world. Merleau-Ponty has effectively abandoned the idea of phenomenology as a rigorous science, in favour of pure description of our 'being-in-the-world' ²

Merleau-Ponty differs from Sartre and Heidegger in his emphasis on perception. According to him, perception is the basis of all knowledge and the body is the basis of perception. Gestalt psychology forms the framework for his exploration of perception. He holds perception to be the key to the interplay between human beings and the world. He acknowledges that the concept of the Gestalt is central to the understanding of perception. For Merleau-Ponty, perception is a dialectical relationship between the world and human beings. Through perception the world appears to individual and at the same time that which reveals to individual that he or she is in the world. He emphasizes the body to an extent that surpasses the Gestaltists; one perceives with one's body, the body is the way through which one enters the world.³ He agrees with Gestalt theory that we always perceive the world as a figure against a background. Thus it is impossible to determine which direction one's perception will move. As the ambiguous figures, the Gestalt switches, one's relationship to the world is equally ambiguous and open. There is always room for multiple interpretations; the world is fundamentally open to human beings and human beings are open to the world. As an individual enters a field of meaning, he or she has the possibility to reinterpret or redefine the meaning given at each given instant, both in the world and in oneself. For Merleau-Ponty, we are condemned to meaning.⁴

In *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty explicitly speaks of phenomenological psychology. His phenomenological psychology keeps the body a central force in the perceptual field and experience of human. Experience whether individual or collective, is essentially temporal. It has a direction from the past, through the present to the future. One's action in the present springs from what one had been in the past and helps to shape one's future. This along with one's embodiment inevitably

² Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Colin Smith (trans.), London: Routledge, 2002, pp.vii-viii.

³ Ibid., p.239.

⁴ Ibid., p.xxii.

sets limits to one's freedom. According to Merleau-Ponty, human behaviour has to be viewed in the context of lived experience. He rejected the view that phenomenological psychology is nothing more than introspective psychology. For him, introspective psychology rests on intuition whereas phenomenological psychology receives its foundations from transcendental phenomenology.⁵ According to him, the phenomenal field is not just intuited but explained in its constitution. For him, meaning always originates on a level where the body functions as subject. This meaning is never totally transparent. Thus a transcendental phenomenological reflection must begin by an examination of perception and this examination must include psychological considerations in which our perceptual experiences have already been interpreted.⁶ Merleau-Ponty also criticizes eidetic psychology of Husserl. For Merleau-Ponty eidetic psychology is returning back to method of introspection which was rejected by modern schools of psychology in their way to make psychology as science.⁷

For Merleau-Ponty, psychology as a science of man aims towards understanding of man. It must begin with experience and its exploration. He considers that the dominant schools of modern psychology are atomistic, objectivistic and reductionistic. Behaviourism rejected introspection, emphasized on objective methods, quantification, rigorous experimentation and abandonment of consciousness as subject of psychology. Merleau-Ponty aims to understand the relations between consciousness and nature. According to him, nature is causally related whereas consciousness is not subject to causality. For him, behaviour is always structured but the methods used in psychology are inadequate to study it as behaviour. So he envisaged a systematic phenomenology of perception as an appropriate method of study. For him, perception is man's primordial contact with the world: "it opens a window onto things."⁸ Therefore, for Merleau-Ponty study of perception should be a starting point for the study of man and the world. He wants to explore man's phenomenal field. This exploration is focused on the body or bodily being and the world as perceived by man and woman.

⁵ Op. cit., *Merleau-Ponty and Psychology*, p.137.

⁶ Ibid., p.139.

⁷ Joseph J. Kockelmans, *Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Edmund and Its Interpretation*, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, p, 485.

⁸ Op. cit., *Phenomenology of Perception*, pp. 62.

Merleau-Ponty's central concern is to prompt human beings to recognize that objective thought fundamentally distorts the phenomena of one's lived experience. According to him, the objective thought estranges human beings from their own selves, the world in which they live and other people with whom they interact. According to him, such thinking is not confined to single discipline or to a particular philosophical tradition. On the contrary it is common to science, social science and humanities. He seeks to re-establish our roots in corporeality and the perceptual world, while awakening human beings to an appreciation of the inherent ambiguity of our lived experience.⁹

Primacy of Perception

Perception is mode through which Merleau-Ponty intended to understand the human relation with world. He upholds everyone related to the world in different manner. It is due to the manner each one perceives of the world. Thus one's perception plays vital role in shaping his behaviour. For Merleau-Ponty, the study of perceptual experience of each individual helps in understanding individual's behaviour in better manner. He starts his phenomenological way of exploring perception without any preconception. He abandons the sharp distinction of sensation and perception which was found in psychology from the time of Locke. According to traditional psychologists, sensation is a fundamental building-block of perception. They held the view that perception is sum of sensations. For Merleau-Ponty perception is much more than mere bundle of sensation. He further rejects empiricists' consideration of perception as the causal result of physiological processes provoked by extra-organismic processes and the Intellectualistic psychologists' standpoint of perception as an incipient science. For Merleau-Ponty, the study of perception is to know the way we relate to the world, it is finally interpreted as an existential act by which we commit ourselves to a certain interpretation of the 'sense' of experience as it presents itself to us. He emphasizes the dynamic and active character of perceptual activity, the intentional nature of all perceptual experience, and the idea that all perceptual experience is structural. Though he is not interested in the systematic analysis of perception for the sake of perception but he chooses perception to be the

⁹ Monika M. Langer, *Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and Commentary*, London: Macmillan Press, 1989, p.149

philosophical foundation to understand essential feature of man. He views the relation between consciousness and reality is dynamic and dialectical that reflects in the perceptual process.¹⁰ Through perceptual process, Merleau-Ponty wants to explore man's phenomenal field. This exploration is primarily focused on the body or bodily being and secondly on the world as perceived by man. He tries to show that how the physiological and psychological account of body is inadequate.¹¹

According to Merleau-Ponty, the study of perception is a primary act in understanding human beings. His main purpose was not the systematic analysis of perception for the sake, but the derivation of a firm basis for his philosophical synthesis. Perception constitutes the ground level for all knowledge. He also emphasises that the study of perception should precede all other studies such as cultural world and especially the science. His study of perception was a strategy for exploring human experience of the world prior to all scientific interpretation. He has chosen perception to be the philosophical foundation because he wanted to understand essential feature of man, which is in his opinion the dialectic that is dynamic relationship and interchange between consciousness and reality. This dialectic is achieved and reflected in the perceptual process. For him, perception is human privilege to access to the world.¹² For him, perception is man's primordial contact with the world: "it opens a window on to things,"¹³ and as such it should be a starting point for the study of man and the world.¹⁴ In other words, a phenomenological approach to perception requires an individual to start describing perception as he or she actually experiences it without any theoretical prejudices.¹⁵

¹⁰ Ibid., pp.3-5.

¹¹ Ibid., pp.56-66.

¹² Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978, pp. 559-561.

¹³ Op. cit., *Phenomenology of Perception*, p.62.

¹⁴ Henryk Misiak, Virginia Staudt Sexton, *Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Psychologies: A Historical Survey*, New York: Grune & Stratton, 1973, p.33.

¹⁵ Eric Matthews, *The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty*, Buckinghamshire: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2002, p.8.

Merleau-Ponty states his objective of phenomenology as:

To return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always *speaks*, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the country-side in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is.¹⁶

In other words, 'return to things themselves' means a turning from concepts and theories toward the directly presented in its subjective fullness.¹⁷ Merleau-Ponty also emphasised the dynamic and active character of perceptual activity, the intentional nature of all perceptual experience, and the idea that all perceptual experience is structural.¹⁸ In this way, he rejected the prejudices of classical approach to perception.

According to Merleau-Ponty, the classical analyses of perception have missed the phenomenon of perception. He views both empiricism and intellectualism¹⁹ have approached perception from the objectifying viewpoint of science. From this point of view, perception is seen as the effect of the causal activity of external, independently existing object or rather their determinate qualities on our sense organs, nervous systems and brain or mind. According to him, science is essentially concerned with explaining in terms of causal generalizations how perception can take place for any subject whatsoever, and that seems to require some such general analysis. However, phenomenology of perception would set aside all questions about how we causally explain perception as an objective physiological phenomenon and start from our own subjective experience of

¹⁶ Op. cit., *Phenomenology of Perception*, pp.ix-x.

¹⁷ Herbert Spiegelberg, *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, p.i.

¹⁸ Op. cit., *Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Psychologies: A Historical Survey*, p.57.

¹⁹ Here empiricism and intellectualism are used in broadest sense, which includes philosophical and psychological schools. Empiricism includes: empiricists, behaviourists and experimentalists. Intellectualism includes: rationalists, Kant, Husserl and Gestalt psychologists.

being perceivers. It would describe the experience of our perception of world. In other words, perception would express how we relate to the world.²⁰ He states that human perception of a thing takes place in a background only. He rejects an isolated datum of perception as inconceivable.²¹

Merleau-Ponty further argues that classical studies have attempted to understand perception by adopting an analytical approach which has led to the notion of sensation as fundamental building block of perception. Hence they understand perception as summation of sensations. Merleau-Ponty proposes to examine the structure of actual perception rather than analysing the sensation which may cause things to appear in certain way to the subject, all the more, sensations are not part of the essential qualities of the object. He criticises the empiricist reduction of the natural world to a sum of stimuli and qualities. Ultimately, empiricism distorts experience, makes the cultural world illusion and falsifies natural world.²² According to empiricism, the objective world as given must impinge causally on the perceiver. Empiricism further argues that the sense organs are stimulated in such a way as to receive and transmit data which are somehow decoded by the brain so as to reproduce a picture or image of the original external stimulus. Merleau-Ponty has indicated that the world is not mere spectacle spread out before a disembodied mind as empiricism understand but rather the world is an 'ambiguous domain' in which incarnate subjects are situated. It is in this domain that perceptual experience can be rediscovered.²³

Merleau-Ponty argues that both traditional empiricism and intellectualism are inadequate to describe the phenomenology of perception. Empiricism maintains that experience is the primary source of knowledge, and that knowledge is derived from sensory perceptions. Intellectualism maintains that reason is the primary source of knowledge, and that knowledge does not depend on sensory perceptions. Merleau-Ponty says that traditional Empiricism does not explain how the nature of consciousness

²⁰ Eric Matthews, *The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty*, Buckinghamshire: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2002, p.47.

²¹ Op. cit., *Phenomenology of Perception*, pp.3-4.

²² Op. cit., *Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and Commentary*, pp.3-9.

²³ Ibid., p.10.

determines our perceptions, while intellectualism does not explain how the nature of our perceptions determines consciousness.²⁴

According to Merleau-Ponty, perception is not purely sensation, nor is it purely interpretation. Perception is not a science of the world, not even an act, a deliberate taking up of a position; it is a background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by them.²⁵ Perception may be structured by associative forces, and may be focused by attention. Attention itself does not create any perceptions, but may be directed toward any aspect of a perceptual field. Attention can enable conscious perceptions to be structured by reflecting upon them. Consciousness is a process that includes sensing as well as reasoning.

For Merleau-Ponty, perceptual objects have an inner horizon in consciousness and an outer horizon in the external world. The object-horizon structure enables the individual to distinguish perceptual objects from each other. All objects reflect each other in time and space. Psychological and physiological aspects of perception may overlap and influence each other. The spatiality of the human body, or the 'human body,' is an example of how both psychological and physiological factors may influence perception. Perception is a system of meanings by which a phenomenal object is recognized. The intentions of the person who perceives an object are reflected in the field to which the phenomenal object belongs. Merleau-Ponty argues that consciousness is not merely a representative function or a power of signification. Consciousness is a projective activity, which develops sensory data beyond their own specific significance and uses them for the expression of spontaneous action.²⁶

For Merleau-Ponty, a phenomenological description of perceptual experience will reveal "that vital communication with the world which makes it present a familiar setting for our life."²⁷ In other words, the world of objects is not something apart from the perceiving human body. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes on the inseparability of human body

²⁴ A. Phillips Griffiths, *Contemporary French Philosophy*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp.127-128.

²⁵ Op. cit., *Phenomenology of Perception*, p.xi.

²⁶ Ibid., p.343.

²⁷ Ibid., p.61.

and the world. According to Merleau-Ponty, perception is not *imposition*, whether of an objective *datum* on a passive subject or a subjective structure on an external object, but rather, perception is pre-reflective communication between the perceived world and the perceiving human body. His phenomenological description of perception emphasizes the phenomenal body's primordial anchorage in bond with the pre-objective world. In other words, the perceiver is simultaneously part of the perceived world and sufficiently apart from it for dialogue between them to arise.²⁸

Merleau-Ponty reinterpreted perception in new way that has brought to be a well known in psychology than any other phenomenologists. His phenomenology of perception is more of philosophical than psychological. Perception was to serve as ground level to his philosophy. His 'return to the phenomena' is a way out of the old psychological deadlock of perception and sensation. This led to the consideration of the phenomenal field in which the body and the world as perceived are to be explored and described. The study of perception is to know the way we relate to the world, it was finally interpreted as an existential act by which we commit ourselves to a certain interpretation of the 'sense' of experience as it presents itself to us.²⁹

Life-World as Human Situatedness

The concept of life-world is commonly used to refer to the total experience of human being in his / her living context. However, the concept did not begin with Merleau-Ponty as such; it was already employed and popularized by Husserl in his writings, particularly in his *Crisis*.³⁰ Husserl uses this term to replace the natural world, and this is further reinforced by the perception of its (life-world's) historicity and inter-subjectivity. According to Husserl, first of all, that life-world is perceptual, not conceived as a world of objects of determinate qualities, but as what is perceived indeterminately relating to a subject. Secondly, life-world may also be seen as a totality of all other worlds. Thirdly, life world is considered as horizon within which all other worlds are constituted. It is not

²⁸ Op. cit., *Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and Commentary*, p.158.

²⁹ Op. cit., *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, pp.25-27.

³⁰ Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy: Philosophy as Rigorous Science and Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man*, Quintin Lauer (trans.), New York: Harper & Row Publishers, pp.76-77.

world besides other worlds; rather it is a condition for the possibility of them in so far as they are given in it. This life world is not constituted, but given.

Husserl's conception of the life-world is explored further by Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty has opened up various layers of understanding of the life world in his work *Phenomenology of Perception*. According to Merleau-Ponty, the world that the human actually perceive is not like the 'objective world'. Instead, it has objects whose properties are not fully determinate or specifiable, but inherently non-determinate and even ambiguous. There is no causal determination between these objects but there are relationships between meanings and the reciprocal expressions. They are not uniquely located in a single spatial framework, but varyingly situated in relation to human agent's specific field of action. And Merleau-Ponty calls this as 'lived-through-world, or the 'lived-world'.

The nature of the world is not determinate as the empiricists would explain nor is it clear and distinct as the idealists would have have it. In fact, the nature of the lived world is non-determinate and ambiguous, says Merleau-Ponty. In order to reinforce his claim, he often invokes two main contrasts between determinate and non-determinate character of object in the objectivist's universe and the lived world respectively, and between the externally and internally of the relationships which obtain within them. That the nature of objects is not determinate is clear from our experience of the world. For example, one's visual field can never be precisely specified. There is always an imprecise area at the perimeter where various items are at best only indistinctly perceived. There occurs here an indeterminate vision, a vision of something or other. More significant reason for the indeterminacy of objects for Merleau-Ponty is from the character of their properties. As against the objective thoughts claims of providing a complete description of objects, Merleau-Ponty says that the objects, we encounter in the lived world are rich and complex that they defy a finite enumeration of their properties. Merleau-Ponty also rejects the objectivist's view that we can provide a clear cut affirmative or negative answer to the question whether an object possesses a particular property or not. Instead, he holds that objects neither has nor does not have a particular property. He also opines

that descriptive terms used in objective thought regarding objects are not always precise in their meaning; for him, they are 'open ended'.

Drawing upon the above objections raised by Merleau-Ponty, we can say that non-determinacy is primarily a characteristic of what is actually experienced in the world. However, he admits the fact that we need to use language to articulate our experience of the world, but this, once again, is an imprecise exercise as the former is only a representation of the later. However, the focus of attention for Merleau-Ponty is on the nature of the lived world itself and not on language *per se*. As for instance, he describes a situation of a relationship between two individuals which can be interpreted in many ways. It could be just a human friendship, it could also so be for a common purpose, it could be for exploiting the other, and so on. Therefore, there seems to be a co-existence of many layers of meanings in a relationship. So the non-determinate character of object can be extended to human level where multiple meanings co-exist.

The second contrast, Merleau-Ponty draws is between the externality of relationships in the universe and the internality of those in the lived world. A relationship is external, if the related items can be identified without reference to one another, conversely, items are internally related if they cannot thus be independently identified. For example, for an objectivist the relationship obtained between the various properties of an object cannot be identified, as there is an internal relationship between them. Thus by denying that relationship in the lived world is external, Merleau-Ponty is denying that they are causal or functional. The internal relationships obtained in the lived world for him are 'meaningful' or 'expressive' in nature. Merleau-Ponty claims:

In our ordinary experience we find a meaningful relationship between the gesture, the smile, and the tone of a speaker... this reciprocal relationship of expression which presents the human body as the outward manifestation of a certain manner of being-in-the-world.³¹

³¹ Op. cit., *Phenomenology of Perception*, p.64.

What is meaningful expression, say in this case a smile, can be robbed of its significance by the causal explanations of empiricism. Even if this psychological explanation is substituted by psychological one it is still treated as external relationship and thereby misrepresents the meaningful. The contrast between the objective thought and the lived world are well expressed by Merleau-Ponty in the following passage:

The notion of universe, that is to say a completed and explicit totality, in which the relationships are those of reciprocal determination, exceeds that of a world or an open and indefinite multiplicity of relationship which are reciprocal implication.³²

The point that Merleau-Ponty wants to derive is that there is another way of describing the world other than those governed by both empiricism and idealism and this the phenomenological way which firmly recognizes and faithfully expresses the basic ambiguity of the lived world.

The life-world is the ultimate foundation on which both natural as well as human science is built. But under the overbearing presence of Galilean science and its method what came to be established is only the measured abstractions leaving out the foundation all together. Thus, by hiding the pre-abstractive evidence of the life-world, the naturalistic attitude brings to perfection the passage from concreteness to measured abstraction. In contrast to this, Merleau-Ponty holds that the laws of knowledge find their justifying reason in the disclosure of the pre-conceptual experience of the life world. In life-world 'to be,' 'to think' and 'to judge' are intertwined *chaismsus* of primordial interactions. It is here where sense is produced. What Merleau-Ponty does in his phenomenology is to examine the life-world in a non-transcendental way by paying attention to the problem of being. This way leads him directly to the theme of lived body as the subject in a world where there are other embodied subjects.

³² Ibid., p.82.

Human Body as Subject

According to Merleau-Ponty, the body subject interacts with the world through its habits and not through the intellectual powers. In other words, Merleau-Ponty's concept of the human body is 'habitual body' which consists in a kind of non-cognitive, pre-conceptual 'motor intentionality.'³³ It enables the human being as a whole to function effectively. Habit is not a function of reflective thought, nor is it transparently accessible to reflection in pure consciousness, rather it manifests itself in the perceptual body as such: "it is the body that 'understands' in the acquisition of habit."³⁴ For it is not just that our fingers are only rarely ever in such an awkward inverted position, it is rather that they cannot get themselves there by their own effort: "The synthesis of the object here is thus effected through the synthesis of one's own body."³⁵ Our perception of objects is structured by our body and by what it senses that it can and cannot do. Our primitive understanding of bodies is therefore rooted in our bodily understanding of ourselves: "I can understand the function of the living body only by enacting it myself, and only insofar as I am a body."³⁶ The bodies of others, too, are intelligible to an individual not by an analogy that an individual entertains in thought, but through one's own spontaneous bodily skills. An individual experiences one's own body as an open system of an infinite number of equivalent positions in the orientation of the other. Merleau-Ponty views: "what we have called the body image is precisely this system of equivalences, this immediately given invariant whereby the different motor tasks are instantaneously transposable."³⁷ In copying someone's gestures, one does not need to think about one's orientations in space, since one's body adjusts itself to the other, and to the situation at large, as part of the perceptual background conditions that first make it possible for individual to think about things explicitly at all. The human body is the crux or reference point that establishes a stable perceptual background against which we perceive and respond to changes and movements in my environment, and thereby opens us onto a world of other selves. As Merleau-Ponty would say later, it is the hinge of the *for itself* and the *for the other*.

³³ Ibid., p.127.

³⁴ Ibid., p.167.

³⁵ Ibid., p.238.

³⁶ Ibid., p.87.

³⁷ Ibid., p.163.

The concept of the human body also sheds light on phantom limb phenomena and related pathologies. For such, syndromes are neither simply false beliefs nor meaningless sensations, rather they point up distortions in the subject's sense of orientation and bodily possibility: "the awareness of the amputated arm as present, or of the disabled arm as absent, is not on the order of 'I think that ...'."³⁸ Moreover, the tendency of such conditions to dissipate or correct themselves with the passage of time suggests a kind of recalibration of a long-term with a short-term sense of bodily position and capacity: "our body comprises, as it were, two distinct layers, that of the habitual body and that of the body at this moment."³⁹ If we have ever stood up and tried to walk on leg that has 'fallen asleep' for lack of circulation, we know the sense of disturbance in our ordinary awareness of where our leg is and what it can do. The human body, then, is the bundle of skills and capacities that constitute the body's precognitive familiarity with itself and the world it inhabits.

According to Merleau-Ponty, the body is not a product but a condition of cognition, for only by being embodied we become subjects in the world and we are conscious of our bodies *via* the world. He further argues that just as we are conscious of the world through the medium of our bodies. Our bodies are not a mere container or instrument of our agencies rather it comprises stable organs and pre-established circuits that function according to their own logic, as it were, below the threshold of conscious intention. We respond to and anticipate familiar situations as typical instances or 'stereotypes.' The human body is therefore "neither the mere copy nor even the global awareness of the existing parts of the body. Rather, it is 'dynamic,' that is to say our body appears to us as an attitude with a view to a certain actual or possible task.

³⁸ Ibid., p.94.

³⁹ Ibid., p.95.

Merleau-Ponty further argues:

If I stand in front of my desk and lean on it with both hands, only my hands are stressed and the whole of my body trails behind them like the tail of a comet.⁴⁰

It is a practical background familiarity with the world itself that informs our intentional familiarity with our bodies:

I know where my pipe is with absolute certainty, and *thereby* I know where my hand is and where my body is.⁴¹

For Merleau-Ponty, the body simply is my point of view on the world. The body is not an object of which we have an internal image or internal representation rather it is polarized by its tasks, because it *exists toward* them, because it gathers itself up to reach its goal therefore body is said to be in the world.⁴²

The body is a permanent structure of perception. Merleau-Ponty insists that all the senses are spatial, if they are to give us access to some form or other of being, if, that is, they are senses at all.⁴³ Perception is holistic and the body's background self-awareness is one of its permanent horizons:

External perception and the perception of one's own body vary in conjunction because they are the two facets of one and the same act.⁴⁴

Consequently, every external perception is immediately synonymous with a certain perception of our bodies, just as every perception of our bodies are made explicit in the language of external perception. Unlike pure transcendental consciousness, as Husserl conceives it, the body is not a transparent object rather it is an expressive unity

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.114.

⁴¹ Ibid., p.115.

⁴² Ibid., p.115.

⁴³ Ibid., p.252

⁴⁴ Ibid., p.237.

that we can learn to know only by actively taking it up. In other words, the theory of the body schema is implicitly a theory of perception.⁴⁵ For Merleau-Ponty, the body is not a kind of quasi-objective thing with which we identify. For Merleau-Ponty, the body is a primitive constituent of perceptual awareness as such, which in turn forms the permanent background of intentionality at large. The intentional constitution of the body is not the product of a cognitive process. Rather, the body in its perceptual capacity just *is*. For Merleau-Ponty, then, strictly speaking, we do not *have* bodies, rather we are our body. In other words, we are in the world through our body, and insofar as we perceive the world with our body. In effect, the body is a natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception.⁴⁶

Merleau-Ponty makes a distinction between the 'lived body' and the 'objective body.' The lived body is the one that we experience from the 'inside' whereas the objective body is a thing that we can locate in space as we do with objects. The lived body is a synergic system of habitual, sensory and motor skills and power with which certain features of the perceived world are strictly correlative.

The bodily skills or powers are both specific and general. The skill one acquires through the performance of one task will help him to repeat not only the same task but also a wide range of similar tasks. (For instance, if one learns the basics of music through the constant practice of the musical notes then he will be able to use not just one system of music but even others as well with a relative ease.) Similarly, the objects apprehended not just as separate individuals but as members of species which would evoke similar bodily response which fits in with certain pattern of skillful activity. The body subject or embodied body therefore, is the natural acquirer and generalizer of habitual and motor-sensory skills. Through the active projection of these bodily skills does one experience the world at its most fundamental level. Therefore, there cannot be an adequate understanding of either the body-subject or the object in isolation from each other; they are correlated. In other words, the subject is ensemble of habitual skills which actively involve him in the world and the structure of the world is the function of the subject's

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp.237-239.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.239.

being 'at home' in it. This way of understanding human body is central to Merleau-Ponty phenomenology. The lived body is not an object but an ontological subject of the world. There is, therefore, a correlation between body-subject and the structure of perceived world. Thus, an individual's behaviour is based on his or her mode of understanding the perceived world.

Human Behaviour as Structure

Merleau-Ponty aims to analyze behaviour from the perspective of phenomenological psychological approach. He holds that behaviour cannot be equated with pure physiological movements that might be explained with the theory of causality. He was opposing the mechanistic conception of behaviour. He was arguing for the structure or form of behaviour.⁴⁷ Like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty also argues that the human power to become conscious of one's situation implies that human behaviour is not mechanically determined. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty's conception of human being as being-in-the-world implies that there is no absolute freedom.⁴⁸ His development of human being is more consistent than Sartre's understanding of human being. Merleau-Ponty was a critique of scientific psychology which was based on the philosophical conception 'dualism'. He was never completely opposed the 'scientific psychology' as such rather he was opposed the dualistic conception which holds that 'the mental' and the physiological realities are two different orders of reality that are external to each other and causally connected. He identifies two types of 'objective thinking' to which his phenomenology is opposed: empiricism and intellectualism. According to him, both empiricism and intellectualism adhere to 'natural tendency'. In other words, both make a strict and rigid distinction between nature and consciousness, the physical and mental and to look for causal relationships between them. Empiricism in particular, attempts to explain phenomena, both external objects and internal states of consciousness or mental acts, in

⁴⁷ Op. cit., *The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty*, p.5.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.21.

terms of sensory qualities or sensory experiences and causal relationships between them. Intellectualism as such, it relates perception to *a priori* forms and categories.⁴⁹

Merleau-Ponty's *The Structure of Behaviour* attempts to show the absurdity or inadequacy of answer to the problem of our behaviour by laboratory psychology. In *Phenomenology of Perception*, he also criticises the intellectual psychologists such as rationalists. The distinction between these two works is the type of description.⁵⁰ Merleau-Ponty rejects a philosophy that discovers relations in phenomena which are intrinsic to thought. For him, life is reducible neither to arrangements of things nor to patterns of thought. This is true generally of biological life and more true of human life. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that he aims at a positive treatment, not merely a dual attack. He wants to do more than demonstrate the shortcomings of the physically reductive and mentalist views. His aim is to show “the essential features of the phenomenon, the paradox which is constitutive of it: behavior is not a thing, but neither is it an idea.”⁵¹ Thus, the formula ‘not thing and not idea’ is more than a dual denial. The formula is constitutive of behavior; it tells what behavior is. According to him:

Human behaviour is neither a series of blind reactions to external ‘stimuli,’ nor the projection of acts which are motivated by the pure ideas of a disembodied, worldless mind. It is neither exclusively subjective nor exclusively objective, but a dialectical interchange between man and the world, which cannot be adequately expressed in traditional causal terms.⁵²

For Merleau-Ponty, behaviour is a circular dialectic in which the independent beings of the life field, already selected by the structure of the human body, exert a selective operation on this body’s acts. He further goes on to say:

⁴⁹ Op. cit., *Contemporary French Philosophy*, pp.127-128.

⁵⁰ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behaviour*, Alden T. Fisher (trans.), Boston: Beacon Press, 1963, p.xxv.

⁵¹ Ibid., p.127.

⁵² Ibid., p.xiv.

It is out of this dialectical interchange that human meanings emerge. These meanings are neither passively assimilated from an external, cosmic order that is already fixed and established, as the realists have imagined, nor constructed *de novo* by creative mind.⁵³

Merleau-Ponty begins by discussing reflex reaction. He wants to show that even these primitive reactions are not explainable as arrangements of anatomical parts. For instance, conditioning cannot be explained in terms of the cerebral cortex, since such conditioning occurs also in invertebrates. “. . . reactions are not linked to any particular anatomical device . . .”⁵⁴ They cannot be defined simply as locatable parts. Thus Merleau-Ponty was critical of empiricist account of behaviour of John B. Watson and Ivan Pavlov which was a subsequent opening for his notion of behaviour in describing perception. He rejected behavioursitic account of simple and conditioned reflexes. According to him, simple reflex behaviour is an action of defined physical or chemical agent on a locally defined receptor which evokes a defined response by means of a definite pathway. This would mean that the response to be located at the point of contact and the stimulus and response to be distinct. But the research of Gestalt psychology and K. Goldstein had shown that it is not so. A response can also be a stimulus. The response is to a stimulus is a form of behaviour.⁵⁵ Pavlov’s conditioned response was introduced to account for complex responses. Such as salivating by a dog, is not in response to the sight of food, but to the sound of a bell. For Pavlov, this is a matter of learning by repetition i.e. food has been followed by the sound of bell, so the dog has been conditioned to learn this attitude. According to Pavlov, this occurs because a particular part of brain is affected. But the researches which had done by Gestalt psychologists, Koehler, Koffka and others like K. Goldstein show that Pavlov was wrong. According to them, learning is not achieved by repetition but by apprehending analogies. Learning is not localized in any particular part of the brain. It is a general aptitude which may be exercised in certain

⁵³ Ibid., p.xv.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p.61.

⁵⁵ Op. cit., *Contemporary French Philosophy*, p.128.

part of the brain but it affects behaviour as a whole because it interferes with the organization of behaviour, the differentiation and articulation of perception and activity.⁵⁶

Merleau-Ponty shows through illustration:

the dung beetle, after the amputation of one or several of its phalanges, is capable of continuing its walk immediately. But the movements of the stump which remains, and those of the whole body, are not a simple perseveration of those of normal walking; they represent a new mode of locomotion, a solution of the unexpected problem posed by amputation. Moreover, this reorganization . . . is not produced unless it is rendered necessary by the nature of the surface: on a rough surface where the member, even though shortened, can find points of application, the normal process of walking is conserved.⁵⁷

Merleau-Ponty offers many examples of this sort, citing aspects of biology and reflex psychology which require functional concepts rather than physicalist-reductive concepts. His examples illustrate and give specificity to his philosophical discussion of reductive and non-reductive concepts. The general points are illustrated in one specific context after another. One major conclusion is that biological reactions are not reducible to structural parts within the organism or to localized origins of stimuli. But neither does Merleau-Ponty permit the introduction of an entelechy, a vitalist principle of some sort. Vitalism is merely the other side of the same error mechanism commits. For Merleau-Ponty, there is no such vital principle. There is only the 'functional dependence of variables.' This requires concepts of embodied form rather than brute pieces in need of a superimposed, mythically causal form.

Merleau-Ponty wishes to show the extent to which the biology of the lower forms of life already requires non-reductive concepts. For Merleau-Ponty, the biological is

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp.128-129.

⁵⁷ Op. cit., *The Structure of Behaviour*, p.39.

already both concreteness and organizing (surpassing). Thereby the creative, organizing, surpassing activity is not made into something separate (a pure form, a pure negativity, Sartre's *pour soi*) but already embedded, embodied, concrete. Merleau-Ponty begins with the lower orders of biology and physics, and views them as already organized, already having a surpassing activity. Hence, when he moves from lower to higher orders of behavior, he is in a position to argue that the higher modes are not explainable as an added-on consciousness or form. The already organized concrete is never left behind. Any further forming reorganizes the whole (already organized) concreteness and is thus embedded in it. The higher orders are, therefore, not explainable wholly by added forms but only by seeing how the whole of the concrete is reorganized. Thus, the higher and lower do not reduce to each other. It is easy to see that the higher cannot be reductively explained by the lower. It is more difficult to see how the lower is also not explained by the higher; or, to put it another way, the further organization does not alone explain.

Since the newly reorganized concrete was already organized and since form exists only as the organization of the concrete now, therefore a new form alone cannot explain the whole which results. It further organizes the already organized with no line to be drawn between what was before and is retained, and what was before and is now changed. Therefore the new form cannot alone explain the new reorganization; and no pure *pour soi* is conceivable as such, or explains anything as such, apart from the way in which it is the pattern of the whole concrete somatic process in man. In man, the somatic processes do not unfold in isolation, but the advent of higher orders give a new significance to the steps which constitute them. In the way, Merleau-Ponty related lower and higher we see one application of the principle 'not thing and not idea'; form is real only as embedded reorganizing of the concrete.⁵⁸

Merleau-Ponty's view of form aims to provide the solution to the antinomy of matter and idea. We will be led to this solution if we ask "in what sense form can be said to exist 'in' the physical world, 'in' the living body."⁵⁹ It is only a caricature of form when it is portrayed as abstract clearly thought laws. The two sides of the artificial split imply

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.180.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p.137.

each other. For Merleau-Ponty, whether thing or law is separated out, the splitting off of one implies the splitting off of the other. He defines a specific embodied sense of form as in the concrete, as its functional organization. Even physics, he argues, already requires this embodied sense of form.

For Merleau-Ponty, there is a close crucial relationship between the lived as given and science, which makes it more precise. We want to see what science moves from (the lived) and how it may make more precise without falsely assuming this precision in advance and without fatally distorting or falsifying. Therefore, he is so much concerned with science and applies his concepts to specific scientific discussions. Science makes precise that which is not given precisely.⁶⁰ Therefore no causal power can be attributed to laws. They are retrospective thoughts, afterthoughts. Only in thought do laws stand out clearly and independently. Physical systems illustrate what Merleau-Ponty is after how form exists in matter.

In physical systems, each local change will be translated by a redistribution of forces so that the system remains in equilibrium, and it is this internal circulation which *is* the system as a physical reality. Embodied form is really functional interdependence of variables. He further illustrates:

in a soap bubble as in an organism, what happens at each point is determined by what happens at all the others. But this is the definition of order. There is, therefore, no reason whatsoever for refusing objective value to this category in the study of the phenomena of life, since it has its place in the definition of physical systems.⁶¹

The chief point here is not a preference for holistic conceptions. The point is not merely that the whole informs the parts. Especially, the point is not the Gestaltist argument that because physics is structurally organized, therefore so is perception. Merleau-Ponty criticizes the Gestalt theorists for deriving the perceptual behavioral from

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.219.

⁶¹ Ibid., p.131.

the physical forms of a holistically viewed physical environment. It is useless to argue that because the physical environment requires holistic conceptions, therefore perception and behavior must be viewed as responses to holistic conditions. Behavior is not a function only of the physical environment, however conceived. The character of an external event to which an animal reacts is already a function of its own kind of process of living. As we said, a reorganization of everything occurs at each level. In moving from physics to biology, the actions of living beings present the peculiarity of having behaviour, which is to say that their actions are not comprehensible as functions of the physical milieu ⁶² While a physical system equilibrates itself in respect of the given forces of the milieu the animal organism constructs a stable milieu for itself corresponding to the monotonous *a priori* of need and instinct.⁶³

He further contrast the human is then seen as a further reorganizing of these embedded patterns of need and instinct. "Behavior . . . is related to . . . the geographical environment . . . only by the intermediary of the environment proper to each species and to each individual."⁶⁴ This 'environment proper to' is not the geographical environment; but rather it is this environment reorganized, significant as a function of that animal's particular biological organization, not simply caused by geographical parts, or a geographical whole, conceived no matter how holistically.

The main feature of Merleau-Ponty's embodied form is not its wholistic aspect. This philosophy is not generated only by a preference for Gestaltist assumptions or generally by a dialectical preference for wholes that infuse every part. No doubt Merleau-Ponty prefers, accepts, and employs dialectical and wholistic modes of thinking rather than analytic, reductive, and constructive modes. This is a conceptual assumption which 'makes precise' as science does. However, it is important to see how his philosophy is not at all merely (or even mainly) derived from this preference for wholistic conceptions. Not the wholistic aspect of form but the embodied aspect of form is his concern. He argues that Gestalt, in preferring the whole, misses the reorganizing aspect of embodied

⁶² Ibid., p.159.

⁶³ Ibid., p.162.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.133.

form. Gestalt would transpose directly from the whole as given geographically to the whole as perceived.

In moving to the human order, Merleau-Ponty follows Hegel and Heidegger in making use their basics. However, the means-ends relation which seems implicit in use is secondary. One can look at human work and think about the purposive relationships to ends which seem to explain activities. But that does not rightly explain human behavior; it is an afterthought and artificially pure *pour soi*. Human behavior is the concrete creation of new structures and the capacity of going beyond the created structures in order to create others. Human activity creates use-objects and thereby also “has as its meaning to reject and surpass (given) use-objects.”⁶⁵ Freud’s psychological determinism and Marx’s historical determinism cite are only given complexes and given circumstances concerning means. These have deterministic force only to the extent that the human individual does not succeed in reforming the given, reorganizing it, endowing it with a new significance.⁶⁶ They explain man only to the extent he often fails at being properly human. Human surpassing does not always and necessarily happen. We may be determined by the Freudian complexes and their force of ‘monotonous need and instinct.’ Hence Merleau-Ponty assigns these complexes a considerable role, the role of that already organized concrete which is then further organized.

In denying that given psychological or historical patterns have (the properly human) causal force, Merleau-Ponty differs from Sartre’s acceptance of historical determinism. Sartre accepts as given the currently posed historical factors which Marx outlined. For Merleau-Ponty such factors are posed by and for our creative surpassing, and this means that properly human living would reject and reorganize this seeming historical determinacy. Though it is posed to us, to the extent we fail at the properly human, it may determine us. On the other hand, the properly human will be to reorganize the concrete even though it is historically given. What was said of biological or physical laws is as true of psychological and historical laws. For Merleau-Ponty, they are

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp.175-176.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p.179.

disembodied afterthoughts, the temporary products of human living, not its explanatory causes.

Like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty also holds that the lived experience ‘exceeds the representative consciousness;’ that is to say, there is a process of thought and activity. This activity is prior to and wider than thought; it is “this sensible mass in which I live.”⁶⁷ The lived activity is wider than any datum or ‘what’ is known or perceived. Hence it is also wider and prior to any inward datum of feeling or perception. From Husserl through Heidegger and Sartre, the point has been made that phenomenology does not consider experiences as inward subjective data. They can be viewed this way only by artificial effort. The world is not a spectacle of data. Behavior is not “something spread out in front of me.”⁶⁸ The felt living activity is always ‘in the world’; feelings are out being affected in it. For Merleau-Ponty, this process occurs in animals as well as humans, and it is observable externally. He says:

Spinoza would not have spent so much time considering a drowning fly if this behaviour had not offered to the eye something other than a fragment of extension. . . . The structure of behaviour as it presents itself to perceptual experience is neither thing nor consciousness.⁶⁹

Humans, animal behavior are neither pure brute things nor perfectly analytic logics of defined ideas. To say they are ‘not fully analytic and yet organized’. Yet, it seems true and obvious to say that living things, especially human behaviour are neither brute chaos nor analytic systems. Then what is this crucial ‘experience of behaviour’? It is opaque to the mind because it is neither thing nor consciousness. It is concrete and individual. It is an individual consciousness and not the consciousness in general.⁷⁰

Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological focus emphasizes the *prereflective* awareness as an intentionally unified field. He establishes the fact that physiology and experimental

⁶⁷ Ibid., p.211.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p.126.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p.127.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p.211.

psychology distort behaviour that nature and consciousness reinterpreted can be understood in terms of one another instead of in opposition to one another and that these scientific treatment of behaviour demand a phenomenology of perception which as such can reawaken the experience of the world which because it is overlooked in ordinary experience needs to be rediscovered in reflection. For Merleau-Ponty, the notion of structure is a means of understanding meaning in lived experience or phenomenal being in a way that overcomes the notion of the in-itself without reverting to idealism or to a phenomenalism. He holds that the character of meaningful experience is inseparable from the structure of human behaviour. He holds that any adequate articulation of the structure of human behaviour must begin with and elucidate the irreducible features of its phenomenologically grasped dimensions. For him, human perception is inextricably linked to human action which as anticipatory in its receptivity of things perceived in the world, has the capacity of orienting oneself in relation to the possible to the mediate. Thus he distinguishes human actions from animals in their limitations to their immediate milieu. For Merleau-Ponty, primacy of perception means perception is irreducible in that it must be accounted for holistically as vital intentionality bringing to life a world of meaning within interactive experience rather than explained via reductionistic accounts. With this thesis, he attempts to deal with the perceiving mind, by reestablishing its roots in its body and in its world at the human level of behaviour.⁷¹

According to Merleau-Ponty, experienced behaviour and lived perception are reducible neither to things nor to idea patterns. Behaviour is rather always structured but the methods used in psychology are inadequate to study it as behaviour. So he saw a systematic phenomenology of perception as an appropriate method of study. He held a view that human behaviour consists of three levels: the physical, the vital (biological), and the human (psychic). Each possesses its own dynamic form. The highest and most specifically human is the third level, which is however, is dependent in its emergence on the integration of the two lower levels. He avoids both Lockean and Cartesian extremes

⁷¹ Ibid., pp.221-222.

of conception of man's mental life, by upholding that mind is neither reducible to physical reality nor entirely cut off from it.⁷²

Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Freedom

According to Merleau-Ponty, "my actual freedom is not on the hither side of my being, but before me, in things."⁷³ In other words, for Merleau-Ponty, freedom is realized through his commitment in the world. He accepts that human beings are free like Sartre. According to Sartre, if there is any possibility of freedom it must be absolute. Stephen Priest states that Sartre is being misunderstood for in his lecture on *Existentialism and Humanism* claims that there is no determinism, we are free, we are freedom, we are condemned to be free, and we are not free not to be free. But he draws a crucial distinction in his *Being and Nothingness* between freedom and power. Therefore he holds, although my freedom is my power may be severely constrained. There is no situation in which one do not have a choice, no matter how unpleasant it may be.⁷⁴ Merleau-Ponty also holds that freedom is possible but it is relative and the actions of the human body in an indeterminate world are the basis of freedom. According to him, "to be born is both to be born of the world and to be born into the world."⁷⁵ He further argues:

I am free to posit as another consciousness even if I have a nature of handsome or ugly etc... it is I who make another to be for me and makes each of us as human beings.⁷⁶

A person as individual he is absolutely free to think but when he is in the society, he is not absolutely free to put his views into practice. Therefore a question arises whether a person can live as individual with no dependency or relation to others. The answer would be 'No.' Therefore; does freedom mean choice alone or action also to be considered? The choice is between scientism's conception of causality and absolute

⁷² Op. cit., *Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Psychologies: A Historical Survey*, pp.32-33.

⁷³ Op. cit., *Phenomenology of Perception*, p.526.

⁷⁴ Stephen Priest (ed.), *Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings*, London: Routledge, 2001, p.177.

⁷⁵ Op. cit., *Phenomenology of Perception*, p.527.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.505.

freedom, directed from outside. There is free choice of freedom comes into play in its decision and posits the situation chooses as a situation of freedom. The real choice is that of whole character and our manner of being in the world. Freedom is not to be confused with those abstract decisions of will at grips with motive or passions.⁷⁷ The choice is mental whereas action is external, the manner of being in the world. So we discuss here how Merleau-Ponty portrays his views by way of criticising empiricists and intellectualists account (objectivistic account) of freedom to bring forth his own stand point of freedom.

Merleau-Ponty tries to put forth his view through three steps as below: first, he refutes those who would deny freedom: the proponents of empiricism. According to them world is predetermined so there is no possibility of freedom. He wants to resist those who argue that the human activity is casually determined by objective features of the world, such as biological or environmental ones.⁷⁸ Second, he objects to what he regards as false conceptions of freedom. The principal target here is the intellectualists who respond against determinism: they claim that there is absolute freedom. This absolute freedom, the unrestricted power to initiate new actions in the world despite any causal processes that happen to be around, is seen by its advocates either as fundamental features of all human beings as understood by Sartre, or as a condition of possibility of any kind of moral evaluation as understood by Kant. But both the existentialists are against Kantian kind of freedom as moral bases. Merleau-Ponty holds that there is no absolute freedom.⁷⁹ As a third step, he denies the dilemma that either human action is completely causally determined or it is absolutely free. So he says that the denial of determination does not mean one upholds absolute freedom. He comes up with the mid-path that freedom is relative. There can be degrees of freedom: some actions and some people are freer than others because the choice which we make of our life is always based on certain givenness. Our freedom does not destroy our situation but gears itself to it. It has opening as well as powerless. History by itself has no significance but only that conferred upon it by our will. So to support his views, he brings out characterization of freedom as

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp.507-509.

⁷⁸ Michael Hammond, Jane Howarth, Russell Keat, *Understanding Phenomenology*, London: Basil Blackwell, 1991, p.236.

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp.236-237.

embodied action in the world. Through which he assert that he takes the stand in between empiricists and intellectualists' position or determinism and indeterminism.⁸⁰

According to Empiricism, all human actions are causally determined: that there objectively identifiable phenomenon (causal conditions) standing in law –like regularities with other objectively identifiable phenomena (including all aspects of human action). It is an essential presupposition of the thesis of causal determinism that the causal conditions regulate the human actions. Therefore freedom is not possible. The question which arises is that whether human acts can be said to be determined by mere cause and effect relation alone. So Merleau-Ponty starts his discussion on freedom in *Phenomenology of Perception*. According to him, there no causal relationship is conceivable between the subject and his body, his world or his society. He further argues that consciousness can never objectify itself into invalid-consciousness or cripple-consciousness.⁸¹

He goes on arguing that causal explanations to human actions would misrepresent those actions. If we try to show the relationship between a subject and the world or society as a causal one, we need to take the help of third person's point of view of the subject; and this will misrepresent how the person concerned experiences his own activity. Each individual is unique with freedom to think and act differently. A person with consciousness which is intentional can never be causally determined. Merleau-Ponty remarks that we are not things of the world to be determined:

In order to be determined ...by an external factor, it is necessary that I should be a thing.⁸²

The causal explanation ignores the subject's experiences of reality but misrepresent the factors they take to be causes. In doing so, it treats the subject as a thing. Treating someone as a thing involves precisely ignoring those aspects of them and their circumstances which are seen only from one's own point of view. A causal explanation

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.237.

⁸¹ Ibid., pp.237-238.

⁸² Op. cit., *Phenomenology of Perception*, p.505.

presents factors in one's environment or in one's background as external; whereas Merleau-Ponty tries to show that in causal explanation the intentional relationship to the subject is not taken into consideration because he strongly believe that the external cannot produce anything meaningful of human behaviour. That is to say, the conscious activity of a human body cannot be produced in this manner of cause effect relation.⁸³

Here it would be appropriate to take the psychological example of inferiority complex to make vivid about Empiricists position. The empiricists would say that such persons will behave in certain pattern in a given situation and their reasons would be that his relations with parents or continuous failures have determined such behaviour. But Merleau-Ponty would hold that the correct description is the role of human body interaction with what he perceives at the given situation. So there is can be no determinism which plays any role in freedom as far as human being is concern. The contention of impossibility of freedom is rejected.⁸⁴

The intellectualists claim that there is freedom and that freedom is absolute. Merleau-Ponty agrees with the first part but rejects the second. Freedom for intellectualist is that human action is free because it results from acts of constituting consciousness-intentions or acts of will. The rejection of determinism of human activity means that all human actions are entirely constituted by consciousness. So intellectualists view is that either all actions are free or none of them are free.⁸⁵ Merleau-Ponty calls this as:

The rationalist's dilemma: either the free act is possible, or it is not-either the event originates in me or is imposed on me from outside.⁸⁶

And he tries to show that it cannot be applied to our relations with the world and with our past. For intellectualists, an action is free, absolutely free, when a subject performs free actions, whether these are all its actions or only some of them but the subject is absolutely free. There are no limitations on freedom. Human freedom is not

⁸³ Op. cit., *Understanding Phenomenology*, p.238.

⁸⁴ Ibid., pp.239-240.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p.240.

⁸⁶ Op. cit., *Phenomenology of Perception*, p.514.

dependant on and so not limited by any state of the world. Freedom admits of no degree: human subjects cannot be more or less free. Intellectualists argue that human subjects who are responsible for making sense of the world, so the thesis as freedom is determination cannot be accepted.⁸⁷

Any causal relation in the objective world is due to the activities of the subject but not the other way round. It is meaningless to say that activities are causally determined. So the sense giving actions of the subject can neither be partially nor universally determined by the causal relations. Hence all human actions of free, a free subject is the one who makes sense of the world. The activity is not dependent on any state of the world. So free subject is not depend on any other than itself, hence its freedom cannot be limited by anything outside itself. This is to say that its freedom is unlimited.⁸⁸

Merleau-Ponty argues that since the subject is free prior to any actions and actions cannot be free. For instance, we take again the example of a person with the inferiority complex to make his point obvious. Absolute freedom holders would have two claims whether the person acts in accordance with complex or not in accordance with complex in both the case the person is free. The person may try to stop to be inferior, whether he or she succeeds or not, the person is still free. Merleau-Ponty would say that such actions not free, actions free only if the person cease to be inferior. That means the person is free only if it is actually possible for him or her to cease to be inferior. Intellectualists' position is that possibility dependent on the conscious deliberative activities of the subject so freedom is dependent on deliberation. Merleau-Ponty argues that it is wrong to say that one makes decision and at the same time one cannot guarantee the success would mean that absolute freedom is of intention but not of action. Whereas according to Merleau-Ponty intention and action both are different. For intellectualists, deliberative intentions are the sources of freedom and deliberative intention is need not to be in accordance with action. For intellectualists, Action is not considered to be relevant in freedom whereas for Merleau-Ponty freedom must be seen in action. The second criticism against Intellectualists is that one does not intent first to change ones behaviour

⁸⁷ Op. cit., *Understanding Phenomenology*, p.241.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p.241.

and second decides to change and finally changes but one discourse that one has decided through having changed and then one deliberates about this changes.⁸⁹

Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the natural and social situation as part of the subject's being in the world. And he links this to freedom to state that all human beings are free to the extent to which they are open to different possibilities. There is openness in any existential project. The project cannot be fixed in advance; and indeed the only way a project can be fixed is retrospectively, when one has achieved this goal or abandoned the project. This much is Sartrean, and it suggests that freedom is a capacity of any being capable of projects or capable of perception. All human beings are free in virtue of their capacity to structure their world. However Merleau-Ponty differs from Sartre in regarding this openness to possibility as being manifested differently in various modes of being in the world. Sedimentation is both the root and route of freedom; as was clear in the case of the intellectual. But it is also a factor which makes some people less free than the others. Some people are more weighed down by their sedimentation than others. Hence Merleau-Ponty says that people who live a very sedimented life, they find it very difficult to shake up their sediment, are none the less free to the extent that they act in and perceive the world.⁹⁰

Merleau-Ponty prefer to stand with the philosophers who does not give clear yes or no answer to the questions of metaphysical issue of free-will and determinism. But they answer in piece-meal analyses of different cases in which one might say that some cases it is clear that one is free but not in some other. Therefore the philosophical speculations of freedom can be too abstract; freedom should really be of concern only in action. In action one sees freedom's real roots in social and personal history in relation to futures which are never firmly fixed.⁹¹

To conclude Merleau-Ponty's understanding, 'to be free' means in two ways, one is to be born of the world. In this state one is passive and just accepts one's facticity situation where one is born. And other is to be born into the world that means one is

⁸⁹ Ibid., p.242.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p.246.

⁹¹ Ibid., p.246.

active and initiates action, gives new meaning and being open to possibilities.⁹² Sartre and Heidegger accept the second mode of freedom whereas Merleau-Ponty accepts both the modes of freedom, accepting both modes of being implies that one is conscious of the situation. Since one is in a situation there cannot be absolute freedom. According to him, one's freedom means one's commitment. He expresses as:

Our commitments sustain our power and there is no freedom without some power. Our freedom, it is said, is either total or non-existent. This dilemma belongs to objective thought and its stable-companion, analytical reflection. If indeed we place ourselves within being, then it must be necessary the case that our actions must have their origin outside us, and if we revert to constituting consciousness, they must originate within. But we know since we are in the world.”⁹³

So there is no complete freedom. Freedom is the combination of outer and inner dimensions. As Merleau-Ponty's view is cited in *Phenomenology of Perception*:

Freedom is always a meeting of inner and outer... As Husserl says that there is on the one hand 'a field of freedom' and on the other a 'conditioned freedom;' not that the freedom is absolute within the limits of this field and non-existent outside it (like the perceptual field, this one has no traceable boundaries), but because I enjoy immediate and remote possibilities.⁹⁴

Human are physical and historical structure. Freedom is realized only through motives, inclinations and deliberation. Freedom is not in the absences of naturalistic

⁹² Op. cit., *Phenomenology of Perception*, p.527.

⁹³ Ibid., p.528.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p.528.

world, social situation; etc. Freedom is realized in the contexts of life but not among the theoretical concepts.

Merleau-Ponty sums up his discussion on freedom as “we choose our world and the world chooses us.”⁹⁵ According to him, the actual freedom is not hither side of the being, but before oneself in things. Consciousness holds itself responsible for everything and takes everything upon itself but it has nothing of its own and makes its life in the world. The world is already constituted but never completely constituted. In the first case one acts upon, in the second is open to an infinite number of possibilities. But this analysis is still abstract, because one exists in both ways at once. Therefore there is never determinism and never absolute choice, a person can without consciousness. In fact, even our own pieces of initiative, even the situations which we have chosen, bear us on, once they have been entered upon by virtue of a state rather than an act. Man is said to be a network of relationships hence he cannot escape the situation.⁹⁶

The psychoanalytical treatment does not cure patient by knowing direct past of him, instead making a new existential relationships and trying to interpret the past in present significance, where the patient sees his past with the co-existent of his doctor, but this complex is not dissolved by a non-instrumental freedom, but rather displaced by a new pulsation of time with its own supports and motives. The same applies in all cases of coming awareness: they are real only if they are sustained by a new commitment. The commitments also are entered into sphere of the implicit, and are therefore valid only for a certain temporal cycle.

For Merleau-Ponty, subject and world determine each other reciprocally. He holds that the world has meaning even before any choice is made but it may change or may not be ignored. According to him, we never start with zero. It is necessary that one must exist in certain incarnation. So the existence is along with essence.⁹⁷ According to Merleau-Ponty, though human beings are free. They are found in network of relationship with world. As embodied human beings, they are correlated to the structure of perceived

⁹⁵ Ibid., p.528.

⁹⁶ Ibid., pp.526-530.

⁹⁷ Op. cit., *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, pp.568-569.

world. The behaviour is a structure or form which cannot be understood without reference to an individual's commitment to world and his or her perception of the lived world as an embodied human subject in the world. Thus the phenomenological psychology is very much indebted to Merleau-Ponty.

CHAPTER - V

CRITIQUE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Introduction

Phenomenological psychology has emerged as distinctive discipline of psychology with the writings of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenological psychology has a creative and critical intervention in the field of psychology. This chapter deals about significance of phenomenological psychology in the discourse of psychology. In this context, it explains the similarities and difference between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. This chapter further goes on to portray the phenomenological insight and interventions in the major psychological schools and its influence on contemporary psychologists.

Sartre and Merleau-Ponty as existential phenomenologists were more concern with phenomenological psychology as method than pure eidetic psychology as viewed by Husserl. Phenomenological psychology applies the phenomenological method in order to pursue a more appropriate understanding of the central concerns of psychology. Phenomenological psychology is against the present psychological method of hypothetical reduction models on the study of human beings. It assumes that all human behaviours are intentional. Thus human beings are always active interpreters of their experience of the self, the other and the world rather than as passive reactors to both bio-physical and environmental forces. Phenomenological psychology also acknowledges the inevitable role and impact of the world in shaping the very means through which our investigations are structured.¹

Although the credit goes to Husserl for the initiation of the movement of phenomenological psychology, a very few psychologists accept his views without much modification. It is due to the influence of existential phenomenologists: Sartre and

¹ Ernesto Spinelli, *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, (2nd Edition), Los Angeles: Sage Publication ltd, 2005, pp.203-204.

Merleau-Ponty.² Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have contributed to phenomenological psychology in their own way. Though they belong to existential phenomenology, their approach to psychology differs. They both agree that human behaviour must be intentional and hold the same view that human experience manifests a meaningful structure as any phenomenologists. Yet their understanding of human being differs. So ultimately there is a difference in their approach to psychology becomes inevitable.³

Phenomenological Psychology: Sartre and Merleau-Ponty

Phenomenological psychology initiated by Husserl has been enriched further by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty and also has undergone significant changes with the writings of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. For Husserl, phenomenological psychology is ‘pure eidetic psychology’ and the existing world can be bracketed. He proposes abstract ‘universe of essence’ and ‘transcendental ego’. Sartre argues that Husserl was mistaken in thinking that the existing world can be bracketed. The suspensions of all affirmations of existence beyond consciousness leaves only ‘a great emptiness’ because consciousness has no contents. Therefore consciousness can never be isolated from the existing world. For Sartre, the reflective consciousness became a study of human existence situated in the world. Merleau-Ponty criticized Husserl’s understanding of intentionality of consciousness which is based on transcendental ego. Merleau-Ponty rather emphasizes on the bodily consciousness. According to Merleau-Ponty, the perceiver is not a pure thinker but a body-subject. For Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology must awaken human being to be aware of consciousness as incarnate in a body and inhering in a world. Thus the notion of ‘incarnate subjectivity’ is central to Merleau-Ponty.⁴ In a way, both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty reject Husserl’s abstract ‘universal essence’ and ‘transcendental ego’.

Sartre and Merleau-Ponty as existential philosophers have emphasized on concrete thinking. For them, the actual human situation is the starting point for any authentic philosophy. They felt that genuine thinking must not be abstract. They

² Joseph J. Kockelmans, *Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967, pp.314-315.

³ *Ibid.*, p.331.

⁴ Monika M. Langer, *Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and Commentary*, London: Macmillan Press, 1989, pp.xiv-xv.

emphasize the central importance of pondering on the meaning of our being-in-the-world. Existential philosophers' central concern is to prompt humans not to live thoughtlessly but rather, to have a keen awareness of their freedom and responsibility in the shaping of a situation in which they are involved. Both, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty criticized the rationalistic abstract thinking which evades the implications of the concrete situation. They also warned that this attitude would lead to disaster.⁵

Besides their difference with Husserl, as contemporaries, both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were in regular interaction with each other. The relationship of closeness and contrast has been result of their philosophical differences. The primary concern of both existential phenomenologists, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty was to understand human existence. In their endeavour to understand human existence, they have transformed the psychological aspects human existence. Like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty also argues that the human power to become conscious of one's situation implies that human behaviour is not mechanically determined. Both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty emphasize the centrality of intentionality in every human behavioural act. Merleau-Ponty developed an attitude where he has broken away with the abstract dialectical schematism, marxism and developed an existentialism which is more applicable to psychology and other sciences. He keeps emphasizing on the concrete and the lived experience. For Merleau-Ponty, Sartre's concepts put forth too strong a pull toward abstract schematicism. He opposed what he considers Sartre's translation of lived concreteness into these conceptual patterns. According to Merleau-Ponty, Sartre seems to replace concreteness with pure ideas which do not touch the lived concrete of science and history. Merleau-Ponty is concerned with the specific kinds of concepts needed in biology, in psychology, in history, given the primacy of the lived over the conceptual.⁶

Existentialism denies the priority of objective truth. The main concern is what one does and how one lives within the given world. This is a response to Aristotelian metaphysics and medieval Scholastic philosophy which believed in a human nature and

⁵ Ibid., pp.viii-x.

⁶ Eric Matthews, *The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty*, Buckinghamshire: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2002, p.21.

God. As existentialists, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty analyze the nature of human beings. They express different views on human nature. According to Sartre, there is nothing like human nature. As human beings encounter the world, he or she makes of himself or herself. According to Sartre, there is no pre-determined human nature. For Sartre, 'existence precedes essence'. In other words, first we exist, then we form our own nature through the many decisions we make throughout our life. There is no universal nature like being a rational animal for humans; rather, we create our nature through choice. In similar fashion, Merleau-Ponty also rejects the predetermined human nature as such. According to Merleau-Ponty, there is no inner man, human being is in the world, and only in the world individual knows oneself. Human being is not the outcome of numerous causal agencies which determine human bodily or psychological make up.⁷ He makes it clear by stating:

Man taken as a concrete being is not a psyche joined to an organism, but the movement to and from of existence which at one time allows itself to take corporal form and at others moves towards personal acts.⁸

According to his theories, we are only able to know ourselves based upon the input of others, all our actions, thoughts, and statements define us and have historical consequences. Thus human nature never ceases to change.⁹

Both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are concerned about the meaning of human existence that has been realized through freedom. However, they differ in conceptualization of freedom. Merleau-Ponty conceives human being as being-in-the-world which implies that there is no absolute freedom. For Sartre, there is absolute freedom. According to Merleau-Ponty, Sartre conception of consciousness and its relation to world, and his conception of freedom are unhistorical. For Sartre consciousness was a pure 'negation'. Freedom was power to negate the situation in which one found oneself. Although Sartre holds that freedom is always 'in a situation', his

⁷ Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Colin Smith (trans.), London: Routledge, 2002, pp. ix-xii.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p.101.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.xxii.

doctrine of consciousness and choice effectively denies the importance of history of the time and place in which one has to make one's choices.¹⁰ For Sartre, freedom means radical indeterminism and pure spontaneity whereas for Merleau-Ponty, freedom is conditioned and not absolute. It is conditioned by a pre-conscious engagement with the world and by one's personal history.¹¹ Therefore, in contrast to Sartre's contention 'we are condemned to freedom', Merleau-Ponty stated that 'we are condemned to meaning'.¹²

Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, as phenomenological psychologists were critical about the other schools of psychology of their times. Especially, they are critical about psychoanalysis, behaviourism and Gestalt psychology. Sartre criticizes the psychological methodology which claims to be scientific. Merleau-Ponty is also critique of 'scientific psychology' which is based on the philosophical conception 'dualism'. He was never completely opposed the scientific psychology as such rather he is opposed the dualistic conception which holds that 'the mental' and the physiological realities are two different orders of reality that are external to each other and causally connected. He identifies two types of 'objective thinking' to which his phenomenology is opposed: empiricism and intellectualism. According to him, both empiricism and intellectualism adhere to 'natural tendency'. In other words, both make a strict and rigid distinction between nature and consciousness, the physical and mental and to look for causal relationships between them. Empiricism in particular, attempts to explain phenomena, both external objects and internal states of consciousness or mental acts, in terms of sensory qualities or sensory experiences and causal relationships between them. Intellectualism as such, it relates perception to *a priori* forms and categories. He also disagrees with Sartre's rigid distinction between being-in-itself (*etre en soi*) and being-for-itself (*etre pour soi*) as object and consciousness. He also rejected Sartre's disregard for body in Sartre's book *Imagination*.¹³

¹⁰ Op. cit., *The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty*, p.14.

¹¹ A. Phillips Griffiths, *Contemporary French Philosophy*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p.124.

¹² Op. cit., *Phenomenology of Perception*, p.xxii.

¹³ Op. cit., *Contemporary French Philosophy*, pp.127-128.

As phenomenologists, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes on lived experience in understanding human behaviour. It is obvious that one's own intentionality plays important role in lived experience. Like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty also holds that the 'lived' activity exceeds the 'representative consciousness' that is to say, there is a process of thought and activity. This activity is prior to and wider than thought.¹⁴ The lived activity is wider than any datum or 'what' is known or perceived. Hence it is also wider and prior to any inward datum of feeling or perception. From Husserl through Heidegger and Sartre, the point has been made that phenomenology does not consider experiences as inward subjective data. They can be viewed as inward subjective data only by artificial effort. The world is not a spectacle of data. In other words, behavior is not "something spread out in front of me."¹⁵ According to Merleau-Ponty, the felt living activity is always 'in the world' and the feelings are being affected in it. Merleau-Ponty sarcastically remarked:

Spinoza would not have spent so much time considering a drowning fly if this behaviour had not offered to the eye something other than a fragment of extension. . . . The structure of behaviour as it presents itself to perceptual experience is neither thing nor consciousness.¹⁶

Merleau-Ponty views consciousness as embedded form, the form of concrete activity, when 'felt movements are linked together by a practical intention' in a situation rather than being inner entities, mental or subjective data spread out before us in reflection.¹⁷

In psychology, the Freudian theory of psychoanalysis is one of the major schools of psychology. Phenomenological psychology is not only critical about Freud's theory of psychoanalysis, they have taken up consciousness as their starting point rather than unconsciousness. Sartre is critical about Freudian psychoanalysis from the existential

¹⁴ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behaviour*, Alden T. Fisher (trans.), Boston: Beacon Press, 1963, p.211.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.126.

¹⁶ Ibid., p.127.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp.128-130.

phenomenological stand point. Sartre rejects Freud's theory as mechanistic and speculative rather than phenomenological in nature. However, Merleau-Ponty approaches Freud's theory of psychoanalysis sympathetically rather than dismissing it totally. Merleau-Ponty believes that the proper and deeper understanding of psychoanalysis will lead to a meaningful convergence between phenomenology and psychoanalysis.¹⁸

Gestalt psychology is another prominent school of thought in psychology. Gestalt psychology argues for holistic understanding of human being. Gestalt psychology is a school of thought that looks at the human mind and behavior as a whole. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty considered Gestalt psychology has much to their similarity. They appreciate the holistic approach of Gestalt psychology in understanding human being. At the same time, they are critical on the issue of causality. Sartre made use of Gestalt psychology and the principle of form and background in his philosophy. It is vivid in his dealing with nothingness. He has shown how *a lack* can be organized as a form, against the background of the existing perceptual field. According to him, there are no lacks in perception; nothingness *is not*, apart from on the ground of our expectations. The figure-ground principle is for Sartre a fundamental feature of our perception, which means that it is an essential way of our apprehending and being in the world.¹⁹ Merleau-Ponty considers Gestalt psychology as basis for his understanding of perception. He further uses the Gestalt principle of form in understanding human behaviour as whole and as parts.

The basic disagreement between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty is their views on Cartesian dualism. For Sartre, there is a distinction between object or thing and consciousness. For Merleau-Ponty, there is no clear cut distinction between consciousness and object, mind and body.²⁰ This clear cut difference between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty also reflected in their understanding of human being and the world. According to Sartre, 'being-in-itself' and 'being-for-itself' never could unite. Merleau-Ponty critically argues that we see that 'being-in-itself' and 'being-for-itself' are united in our everyday daily lives. In order to explain this, he often referred to the 'hybrid'

¹⁸ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, pp.332-335.

¹⁹ Op. cit., *The Structure of Behaviour*, p.xix.

²⁰ Op. cit., *Contemporary French Philosophy*, p.124.

situations where the distinction between man and thing is fuzzed. The example of the blind man and his white cane shows that this device, for the blind man a technology for orientation in the world, becomes an extension of his own body. It becomes a part of his bodily experience, part of his abilities, and his way of mobility. In other words, the blind man and the cane becomes a gestalt; he extends himself in the cane and the cane becomes an extension of him. Merleau-Ponty criticizes Sartre for not only upholding the Cartesian distinction and making it more complicated. According to Merleau-Ponty, Descartes' two substances at least had the thing in common that they were both substances whereas Sartre's model, on the other hand, makes consciousness into a complete nothingness.²¹ For Sartre, the body is one's facticity that binds individual to the world as a concrete, contingent being. But individual never feel the body as a constraint of one's freedom, apart from exceptional situations which reminds individual of one's facticity. In other words, when an individual is exhausted or ill but these are situations that reveal to individual one's usual sense of transcendence and nihilation of the body. The 'being-for-itself' is thus both consciousness and body, and the problem of the body must be viewed in a dialectic of utility and facticity. For, Merleau-Ponty thought the whole dialectic of 'being-in-itself' and 'being-for-itself' was too exaggerated. For Merleau-Ponty, perception remained a central theme throughout his authorship, as a mediation between consciousness and things, subject and object.²²

Gestalt theory becomes important for Sartre through the principle that it is the direction of our consciousness that determine what will be figure and what will be ground; the things we choose are thus the things we have chosen to be our figures, our tastes, manners, our commodities are all determinations that manifest our particular choice of the world, negating the other possible as background for the particular *this*. How we perceive the world, what we choose, is dependent on what our project is. For Sartre, it is based on ontological choice. In other words, he calls it as fundamental project. The Gestalt principle is in this way the key to understand the concrete freedom of the other or oneself. Merleau-Ponty did not use the category of a *fundamental project*, and he did not assign such a grand importance to the category of negativity and

²¹ Op. cit., *The Structure of Behaviour*, p.xx.

²² Jean-Paul Sartre, "Merleau-Ponty," *Situations IV*, Gallimard, Paris 1964, p.195.

nothingness. Therefore, he did not hold that we always negate and choose when we perceive. His task was more to understand the puzzle it is that the world as perceived is *meaningful*. For Merleau-Ponty, we are not condemned to freedom but we condemned to *meaning* and to always *express* something. For Merleau-Ponty, we are not thrown out in a perpetual state of anxiety rather we are in the midst of a world of meaningful wholes. We are *not* free to perceive, choose or interpret the world as we like.

The ambiguous figures of Gestalt psychology does not imply a complete perceptual relativism, they are rather the exceptions that confirm the rule. The puzzle is not what meaning we choose or confer onto the world, but the fact that the meaning of perception is always already there, a fact that the intellectualists and realists commonly forget. Merleau-Ponty was more occupied with how we perceive structures around us that insert themselves in us as institutions and conversely, how we extend ourselves in the things. This was a point that Sartre later acknowledged as a downplayed point in his first work he had not been sufficiently aware of the forces of circumstance. Still, he did not discard the principle of unconditional freedom, he only made deeper investigations into the situational aspect of our freedom in the practical-inert field, society and history. For Sartre, there is no contradiction between being free and existing in a situation with restraints, our situation is the contingency necessary for the freedom to emanate at all, for it to be our concrete freedom, and not just an idea it is the background that makes freedom appear.²³

Phenomenological Psychology and Its Influence

Historically, phenomenological psychology has interacted and influenced other major schools of psychology through its unique method of understanding human being and human behaviour. In other words, phenomenological psychology is having constant fruitful dialogue with others school of thought such as psychoanalysis, behaviourism, cognitive behaviourism and Gestalt psychology. Phenomenological psychology had its influence on some particular contemporary thinkers of different schools. Phenomenological psychology is a unique and systematic approach to psychology

²³ Ibid., pp.215-217.

through phenomenological investigation. Phenomenological psychology seeks neither to dismiss nor to diminish the contributions of other contemporary psychological systems. But it attempts to reconsider and reassess their assumptions wherever possible. It is also to point out their relative strengths and weaknesses and to incorporate significant findings obtained from phenomenological enquiry.²⁴ The primary criticism of phenomenological psychology on other schools of psychology is that the exclusion of conscious experience from their studies. Phenomenologists argue that this lacuna has harmed psychology and restricted its practical applications.²⁵ Rollo May has rightly pointed out the need for phenomenological method in psychology. He said:

We need a form of psychology that does not dwell on behaviour to the exclusion of experience, or experience without regard for behaviour, but centres on the relation between experience and behaviour.²⁶

a. Phenomenological Psychology and Psychoanalysis

Phenomenological psychology and psychoanalytic theories emphasize on questions of meaning and interpretation. Phenomenology is said to study consciousness as immediately given whereas psychoanalysis said to study the unconscious and constructive hypothesis. Phenomenology as a philosophy confines itself to the universe i.e. the world of consciousness whereas for psychoanalysis, consciousness is powerless by product of irrational forces. Psychoanalysis was on the assumption that not only conscious but even unconscious mental life has purpose or meanings. Psychoanalysis was bringing unconscious into conscious and thus redirect and channelize them into rational force through which it gave a special status to consciousness.²⁷ Sartre challenged the whole mechanism of repression upon which the notion of a psychoanalytic unconscious rested and suggested instead an alternative that centred upon his idea of unreflected

²⁴ Op. cit., *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, p.186.

²⁵ Ibid., p.187.

²⁶ Rollo May, *Existential Psychology*, 2nd edition, New York: Random House, 1969, p.27.

²⁷ Op. cit., *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, p.125-126.

consciousness. Phenomenology simplifies and demystifies the underlying ideas associated with psychoanalytic notions of the unconscious.²⁸

In general, both approaches can be seen to consider the limits and potentials of human inter-relation with assumption that people are active interpreters of their environment. Freudian psychoanalysis would point to a number of important differences and divergences between the two approaches. Freudian psychoanalytic theories emphasize the role of the unconscious, of our earliest infantile experiences, of the instinctual forces of *eros* and *thanatos*, and of the psychic conflict between id-ego-superego as prime instigators and determinants of conscious thought and behaviour. Equally, Freudian psychoanalysts argue that unresolved sexual and aggressive wishes are basis for human motivation.²⁹

Psychoanalysts understand human being and predict human behaviour based on their assumption of causality that is rooted in past. Phenomenologists question this very foundation of psychoanalytic school. Phenomenology argues that any divide between past and present (and, indeed, future) is both artificial and misleading. Instead one must investigate the current 'being' of a person from the standpoint of an indivisible inter-relational matrix composed of past events, current experience and future expectations. Phenomenological psychologists would certainly agree that past experience plays a major central role in the person's current psychic life. Phenomenological psychologist focuses on the description and examination of current experience as a possible means of liberating oneself from sedimented attitudes, values, stances, beliefs and behaviours. In both cases, one's past is exposed to examination, psychoanalyst seek to establish causal links between past and present experience whereas phenomenological psychologists eschews both the necessity for and more importantly, the very possibility of such links. The phenomenological psychologist seeks to expose the interpreted significance of past events in the light of current experience. If psychoanalysis adopts the shift in perspective

²⁸ Ibid., pp.189-190.

²⁹ Ibid., pp.187-188.

of linear causality, psychoanalysis would free itself from mechanistic orientation without doing serious damage to its central emphases.³⁰

Phenomenological psychology has also influenced psychoanalysts, particularly, Angelo Louis Hesnard, Paul Federn and Jacques Lacan. Angelo Louis Hesnard was a pioneer in Freudian psychoanalysis who was also a chief advocate of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and its application to psychoanalysis. His work *Psychoanalysis of the Human Bond* is an effort to fill the gaps in psychoanalysis through phenomenology, especially its failure to do justice to the interpersonal relations. He was interested in Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the close bonds of consciousness with the body and the world. He argued that phenomenology can offer an enlarged version of consciousness to psychoanalysis which can do justice even to unconscious. For him, the concept of consciousness is intentionality engaging man in his world. Its application to neuropsychiatry yield a better understanding of cerebral lesions, of lesional psychoses, and finally of neuroses. He provides his own interpretations of the psychoses, based on the idea that mental disease is an existential disease, and its main feature is the disturbance of intersubjective bond, which results in its replacement by an intrasubjective world. He claims that the use of Merleau-Ponty's approach would support in development of psychoanalysis. He also applied Merleau-Ponty in his study of world of 'morbid consciousness'. According to him, the patient's inability for unified organization causes his or her perception of world as fragments which deeply affect his or her mode of existence in the world. He further argues that all mental sickness is existential sickness. He holds that a neurotic person as a subject who is no longer capable of maintaining an authentic intersubjective bond with other people. According to him, the psychotic patient as one who out of the debris of his normal world constructs a fictitious world, an *intrasubjective* world. On this basis, he tries to give interpretations of specific forms of neuroses as special forms of disturbances in human being's relations to the world.³¹

³⁰ Ibid., pp.188-189.

³¹ Herbert Spiegelberg, *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, pp.137-140

Paul Fedem was of Freud's intimate circle, but he went beyond Freud in applying psychoanalysis not only in neurotics but also to treating psychotics. He used to define psychoanalysis in terms of descriptive phenomenological and metapsychological. He understood phenomenological to be subjectively descriptive in terms of feeling, knowing, and apprehending. His phenomenological definition of ego is felt and known by the individual as a lasting or recurring continuity of the body and mental life in respect of time, space, and causality and is felt and apprehended by him as a unity.³²

Jacques Lacan was French psychoanalyst and psychiatrist who reconstructed Freud using post-structuralism. He has made prominent contributions to psychoanalysis and philosophy. Though Jacques Lacan was quite often critical of Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty yet phenomenology was implicit in his thought. His post-structural theory rejected the belief that reality can be captured in language. For him, language is subjective perception. In his theory of symbolism which chiefly refers to de Saussure's linguistics with its distinction between what signifies and what is signified and asserts the primacy of the former over the latter, seems to be closely related to Merleau-Ponty's explicit phenomenology of language.³³

Antoine Vergote was a scholar in psychoanalysis, philosophy and theology. He was a disciple of Jacques Lacan. Vergote has devoted himself to the analysis of the religious phenomenon. He applies phenomenological method to Freud's interpretation of dreams. He has made an attempt to understand the meaning of the manifestation of the unconscious, which is essentially 'effective and dynamic intentionality of forces.' He argues that phenomenological method allows the phenomena to speak as they are in themselves into action.³⁴

b. Phenomenological Psychology and Behaviourism

Behaviourism suggests that all behaviour can be explained by environmental causes rather than by internal forces. Behaviourism is focused on observable behaviour.

³² Ibid., p.133.

³³ Ibid., p.141.

³⁴ Ibid., p.145.

Behaviourism arose in direct reaction to psychological schools that emphasized the centrality of conscious experience. Behaviourism rejects the possibility that consciousness could be explained scientifically. Behaviourism has rejected the role of consciousness in human behaviour. Perhaps the most basic assumption of behaviourism is that human beings are by and large passive reactors to natural and culturally derived environmental stimuli which mould and shape our behaviour through conditioning and reinforcement. Despite different attitude towards human behaviour, there are some similarities exists between these two contrasting approaches. Both phenomenological psychology and behaviourism emphasize the importance of environmental stimuli as catalysts to action. Of course, there is disagreement because behaviourism claims that human beings are primarily passive reactors to directly experienced stimuli. On the other hand, phenomenological psychology argues that human beings are active interpreters of the stimuli in that our response to them is intentionally determined through both innate invariants and individual experience.³⁵

Phenomenological psychologists argue that the stimuli are unknown and unknowable. According to them, it is rather the constructed meaning added to stimuli to make sense of our behaviour. Though behaviourists implicitly appear to suggest that we are slaves to our environment, their altitude to this position reveals a major inconsistency. Behaviourists hold some sort of sedimented beliefs concerning the experience of autonomy and freedom of choice. On the other hand, the phenomenological outlook, while acknowledging the uncontrollable limits to freedom, points out, nevertheless, its largely untapped and unacknowledged potentials. The most extreme behaviourist position (B.F. Skinner) is that freedom is an illusion. The phenomenological perspective, in its admission of the situatedness of freedom, falls outside Skinner's line of attack since it, too, criticizes optimistically naïve notions of individualistic and autonomous freedom.³⁶

The major source of dispute between the two approaches lies, of course, in behaviourism's dismissal of consciousness. Behaviourists claim that any attempted investigation of inferred non-directly observable agencies such as consciousness

³⁵ Ibid., pp.194-195.

³⁶ Ibid., pp.195-196.

threatens its objective, experimental stance. In spite of their dismissal of subjective experience, behaviourists depend on some degree of accurate correspondence between private experience and public report in order to provide validity and significance for their experimental data. Furthermore, as Koestenbaum has pointed out, all public statements begin as first-hand subjective experience; as such:

To claim public verification of my private experience is legitimate only to the degree to which all of us. As philosophers of science and students of human behaviour, agree on a fundamental philosophical assumption – namely that if each of our private experiences indicates a particular event to have occurred, we can then conclude that the event has actually taken place.³⁷

In other words, rather than rely upon direct verification, behaviourists actually depend upon indirect constructs or assumptions.

The critics of behaviourism have pointed out that behaviourism gives importance to quantitative research than qualitative research. In a sense, having denied the importance of subjective data, their findings appear limited, alien, even 'soul-less'. The phenomenological method helps to expose experiments' implicit, even hidden, assumptions, thereby allowing them to arrive at more adequate and descriptively accurate analyses and conclusions. The major differences between behaviourism and phenomenological psychology remain irreconcilable; there still exists much scope for constructive dialogue.³⁸

Donald Syngg emphasized on the importance of a new phenomenological psychology in his article entitled "The need for a phenomenological system of psychology."³⁹ Phenomenal field theory is a contribution to the psychology of personality proposed by Donald Syngg and Arthur W. Combs. According to this theory, all behavior

³⁷ J.B.P. Shaffer, *Humanistic Psychology*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1978, p.176.

³⁸ Op. cit., *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, p.196.

³⁹ Donald Syngg, "The need for a phenomenological system of psychology," *Psychological Review*, Vol. XLVIII, 1941, pp.404-424.

is determined by the phenomenal field of the behaving organism.⁴⁰ Phenomenology therefore consists primarily in the exploration of the phenomenal field of the individual, including his phenomenal self. He was for phenomenology as the necessary complement for behaviourism.⁴¹

c. Phenomenological Psychology and Cognitive-Behavioural Psychology

Cognitive-Behavioural Psychology is modernized version of behaviourism. It adheres to the behaviouristic principal methods for its own accumulation of data. The cognitive school in general, is far more open to the consideration of conscious experience. It emphasizes the importance of the interpretational elements that mediate between stimulus input and behavioural response. Cognitive behaviour therapy is a type of psychotherapeutic treatment that helps patients understands the thoughts and feelings that influence behaviours.⁴² Cognitive psychologists accept with little dispute the conclusions of phenomenological psychology. Current circumstances suggest that a colloquium between phenomenological and cognitive psychology would be more beneficial with those cognitive approaches whose primary focus of interest lies in the study of the ‘the processes that come between stimulus and response’.⁴³ One fairly obvious example of just such an area of co-operative exploration might well be that of emotion. There have already been several interesting, if by no means conclusive, experimental studies on cognitive factors in emotion and the modification of arousal via the alteration of cognition whose results might best be interpreted and clarified from a phenomenological perspective.⁴⁴ For instance, Schachter’s cognitive-physiological theory of emotions emphasizes the centrality of interpersonal variables in determining how we come to label, or conclude the presence of, a particular emotion. Schachter argues that feedback to the brain from physiological activity is insufficient in itself to allow for any clear identification of an emotion. Instead, individuals also require information gained from past experience in order to be able to give a particular interpretation, or meaning, to their

⁴⁰ Donald Syngg, *The Phenomenological Problem*, Alfred E. Kuenzli (ed.), New York: Harper, 1959, p.12.

⁴¹ Op. cit., *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, pp.146-148.

⁴² Ibid., p.197.

⁴³ J. Medcof and J. Roth, *Approaches to Psychology*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1984, p. 182.

⁴⁴ F. Strasser and A. Strasser, *Existential Time-Limited Therapy: The Wheel of Existence*, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1997, p.132.

current emotion. This view demonstrates striking parallels with conclusions derived from phenomenological investigation.⁴⁵

At the same time, like phenomenological psychologists, cognitive-behavioural therapists increasingly view persons as active agents who derive meaning from the world via inference and evaluation. However, a critical difference between the two approaches can be seen in cognitive-behavioural therapy's common assertion that client distress is the result of misinterpretations of situations. Phenomenological psychology views such 'misinterpretations' as meaningful and views it as often restrictive response to the uncertainties and anxieties of inter-relation.

Perhaps most notably, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy has emerged as one of the most significant of recent attempts to reconfigure cognitive-behavioural therapy. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy's major deviation from more classical cognitive-behavioural therapy approaches lies in its explicit acknowledgement that the endeavour to change or remove 'misinterpreted' thoughts that have arisen in the person's attempt to cope may well be counterproductive and even dangerous. Rather, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy concentrates on the clarifying and opening up of the meanings expressed within the 'misinterpretation'. This undertaking on the part of the Acceptance and Commitment Therapy practitioner to 'stay with' the client's currently experienced meaning brings to the foreground a much more focused inter-relational perspective. This stance suggests a valid 'meeting point' for phenomenological and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy theorists and practitioners. At the same time, it does remain the case that Acceptance and Commitment Therapy continues to employ explicitly directive interventions that, from a phenomenological perspective, run counter to its stated enterprise. Nonetheless, as with the other radical constructivist reworkings of cognitive-behavioural therapy, there exists solid ground for worthwhile dialogue with phenomenological psychology.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Op. cit., *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, p.198.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp.199-200.

d. Phenomenological Psychology and Gestalt Psychology

Phenomenological influence was found in Gestalt psychology. The aim of Gestalt and phenomenology was to free modern man to fresh reality. Both streams of thought developed simultaneously. Though Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka and Wolfgang Kohler were not interested in philosophy but when they were to face the challenges of behaviourism, then they sought the help of philosophy especially phenomenology. Phenomenology was a methodological support to Gestalt psychology. Kurt Koffka has identified the methods of Gestalt with that of phenomenology in his work *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*.⁴⁷ He viewed phenomenology as naïve and full of description of direct experience as possible. He distinguished direct experience and introspection.⁴⁸ Fritz Heider was a Gestalt psychologist. His work *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations*, provides the conceptual framework and the psychological processes that influence human social perception. In his study of social perception, he makes use of phenomenological method to understand the perceptual phenomena. His objective was to describe phenomena faithfully and allow them to guide the choice of problems and procedures.⁴⁹ Aron Gurwitsch has played an important role in bring about Gestalt psychology to have phenomenology as its philosophical ally. Aron Gurwitsch explained the relationship between phenomenology and Gestalt thoughts. He also showed how Gestalt can contribute to the phenomenology of perception.⁵⁰ David Katz was a German-Swedish psychologist. In his work *Gestalt Psychology*, he argues that comprehension of contemporary psychology necessitates an understanding of the phenomenological method.⁵¹ He used phenomenological method in his animal psychology because the method was giving the greatest possible freedom. According to him, phenomenological method helps to describe the animal behaviour meaningfully and provides the unbiased description of phenomena. His phenomenological method was to simply describe phenomena as they appear without any distortion. He argues that the ‘world’ is with

⁴⁷ Kurt Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1955.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp.74-75.

⁴⁹ Fritz Heider, *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations*, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1958, pp.20-58.

⁵⁰ Aron Gurwitsch, *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1979, p.175.

⁵¹ David Katz, *Gestalt Psychology*, Robert Tyson (trans.), New York: Ronald Press, 1950, p.18.

abundance of phenomena but pre-phenomenological psychology overlooked. He was trying to have presuppositionless phenomenological analysis of phenomena.⁵²

e. Phenomenological Psychology and Contemporary Psychologists

Phenomenology has profoundly influenced many thinkers in psychology. Phenomenological literary influence was found among thinkers of Wurzburg school of psychology. Wurzburg school was to explore higher psychological functions such as thinking and willing, through experiments in disregards to Wundt. They found an unexpected fact that thinking as well as willing do not exclusively come from sensuous images. August Messer argues that Wurzburg school needs phenomenological methods for better understanding of its studies. He was speaking of intention, intentional act and intentionality but he was sceptical about essential intuition. According to him, phenomenology means to describe the higher function of thinking in psychology. Phenomenology supplied an active ingredient in his interpretation of his own findings. Narziss Ach, Otto Selz and Albert Michotte of Wurzburg school were also using phenomenological methods in their studies.⁵³

Kurt Lewin was one of the modern pioneers of social, organizational and applied psychology. He was even moving beyond phenomenology because he was interested in a psychology of action, of will and of dynamics of human personality. He refers to works of Sheler, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty in his understanding of human personality.⁵⁴ Karl Duncker was another psychologist. His treatment of phenomenological pleasure and phenomenology of the object of consciousness was significant.⁵⁵

Ludwig Binswanger was a Swiss psychiatrist. His phenomenological interest was trying to absorb his main interest of psychoanalysis. Binswanger is considered to be one of the most distinguished of the phenomenological psychologists. He eventually developed his own distinctive brand of existential-phenomenological psychology. He has combined psychotherapy with existential phenomenological ideas. He saw concept of life

⁵² Op. cit., *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, pp.45-47.

⁵³ Ibid., pp.48-52.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp.80-81.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.79.

world as a key to understanding the subjective experiences of his patients. He holds that the patients with the mental diseases undergo modifications of the fundamental structure and of the structural links of being-in-the-world. In other words, the mental illness involves one's perception of the world which includes one's altered understanding of the lived experience of time, space, body sense and social relationships.⁵⁶

Carl Rogers' interest in phenomenology was late and slow in developing. His primary interest in psychology was clinical therapy. In the beginning, he was neither interested in phenomenology nor had any contact with those movements. His twelve years of experience with children in Rochester, New York made him to realize the defects in narrow psychoanalysis and coercive approach and felt the importance of client's perspective. In his book *Client-Centered Therapy*, he refers to phenomenology as source for his new interpretation of human behaviour. According to him, the therapeutic process is to understand the way the client perceives the objects in his or her phenomenal field, his or her experiences, his or her feelings, his or her self, other persons, his or her environment which undergoes change in the direction of increased differentiation. According to Rogers, phenomenology is a main ingredient for the 'third force' in psychology. The other two are behaviourism and psychoanalysis.⁵⁷

In Defense of Phenomenological Psychology

Apart from its influence in the field of psychology, phenomenological psychology has been criticized by modern psychologists on following issues; such as, phenomenological psychology leads back to subjectivism, back to introspectionism, lacks objective method and lacks scientific verifiability. The most vociferous opponents of phenomenological psychology have tended to represent it as an anachronistic reversion to outdated doctrines, incompatible with the scientific character of psychology and harmful to its progress.⁵⁸ Phenomenological psychologists defended their position against these criticisms and responded to them in their own way.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.132.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp.148-150.

⁵⁸ Op. cit., *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, p.207.

Behaviourists have argued that both the methodology and the conceptual basis of phenomenology are little use to any modern day psychologist whose aim is to manipulate and predict behaviour from standpoint focusing on generalizable rules which emphasize similarities in behaviour or mental processing. Such critics have also questioned the significance and effectiveness of phenomenological theory and its application and reliability. They also questioned the over dependence on verbal descriptions, ambiguity of phenomenological concepts and esoteric language of phenomenologists.⁵⁹ Phenomenological psychologists defended their position and argued that the long neglect of the issue of human inter-relatedness in academic psychology has not only severely put into question the validity and reliability of psychology's own accepted views and positions. In its neglect of the issue of inter-relational experience, psychology has not only lost its soul in a metaphorical sense, it has lost its original purpose and has focused instead on the construction, analysis and interpretation of ever more ornate and esoteric experimental studies. According to phenomenologists, the implication of psychology is to understand the person. Therefore the starting point must be the exploration of human experience. Phenomenologists do not wholly dismiss the findings and methods of other approaches but they more accurately argue that the progress of psychology requires a more fundamental investigation of the attitudes and assumptions that underlies psychological explorations.⁶⁰

According to T. W. Wann, many critics have assumed that phenomenological psychology is the modern-day equivalent of earlier psychological introspectionist approaches.⁶¹ This incorrect association is due to the fact that the basic focus of phenomenological psychology and intropectionalism is consciousness. The principal subject matter of both approaches is conscious experience. However, their purposes in engaging in such studies are markedly different. In introspectionist studies, well trained observer focused upon their subjective reaction to external stimuli in order to note various characteristics in their impressions and sought, ultimately, to reduce their

⁵⁹ Henryk Misiak, Virginia Staudt Sexton, *Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Psychologies: A Historical Survey*, New York: Grune & Stratton, 1973, pp.54-55.

⁶⁰ Op. cit., *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, pp.207-208.

⁶¹ T.W. Wann (ed.), *Behaviourism and Phenomenology: Contrasting Bases for Modern Psychology*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, p.174.

subjective experiences to the simplest mental elements, that is sensations, feelings and images. They also attempted to examine certain attributes of their experiences, such as their quality, intensity and duration. In contrast, there is assumption concerning the composition of impressions is permitted in phenomenological studies. An introspectionist report excludes the objects and meanings. The phenomenological psychologist is interested in the meaning that stimuli or situation have for the observer whereas introspectionism primarily focused on their sensory experiences that are analyzed impressions of various stimuli and provided reports. Though phenomenology and introspectionism concern with issues of consciousness, it is necessary to understand that they not only differ in methodology but they also differ in scope and focus of investigation.⁶²

According to Hubert Dreyfus, many critics view that it is absurd to conclude in phenomenology that reality as experienced by an individual is a construction of intentionality. Phenomenologists say that they never dispute existence of the physical reality separate from our conscious experience of it, rather they insist on the point that our experience of reality must always be situated within intentional interpretations.⁶³ Experimental oriented critics raise question regarding phenomenological conclusion that each individual perceives the world uniquely. But phenomenological psychologists argue that the assumption of a shared reality is an illusion because what each of us perceives is the result of a combination of both species specific 'structural givens' or existential and unique experimentally derived intentional constructs. Those share the similar language or cultural perspective may develop mental frameworks which in influencing the labels the viewers impose as well as their general attitudes towards those of others. At the same time, the diversity of perspectives and attitudes between persons sharing similar socio-cultural influences that are apparent in any given situation makes clear that what is perceived as shared is at best partial and that alongside every shared experience, unique perspective will emerge if they are given due attention and structured enquiry. Similarly, while it may be the case that substantial attention is given by phenomenological psychology upon the unique variables that make up a person's worldview, this is not

⁶² Op. cit., *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, pp.208-209.

⁶³ Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Husserl Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, London: MIT Press, 1982, p.122.

because such are considered to be inherently more significant or more worthy of inquiry, but because the other systems of psychology either minimize or deny these variables in their studies. In addition, existential phenomenology takes the view that it is precisely via the study of particular way of being that the investigator is directed to the universal or ontological, structural being.⁶⁴

Another criticism against phenomenological psychology is related to its scientific status of research. The contrary to the common assertion that phenomenology is antagonistic to or disinterested in psychological research, phenomenology continues to play a major role in the development of qualitatively focused approaches to research.⁶⁵ At the same time, phenomenology's view of suitable paradigms for psychological research stands in direct contrast to the natural scientific viewpoint and its underlying assumptions. Phenomenological psychologists deny the possibility of truly objective observation and analysis in traditional natural science psychological research models and further holds that psychological research assumes an indissoluble inter-relationship between the observers and observed. Secondly, phenomenology places conscious experience as central to all inquiry since its primary aim is to arrive at a description of the structure of conscious experience. Thirdly, phenomenological research rejects standard research notions of control groups, dependent and independent variables preliminary hypotheses and so forth. Since all these suggest and rely upon to a greater or lesser degree the notion of linear causality. Instead, phenomenological research is principally qualitative interpretative in nature. It focuses upon descriptive methodologies that seek to remain as faithful as possible to the data of experience. In other words, it seeks to understand rather explain and by doing so, it searches for meaning rather than seeks to collect facts.⁶⁶ As Gunmar Karlsson has clarified this distinction:

In line with logical empiricism, traditional psychology neglects to study meaningful experience

⁶⁴ Op. cit., *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, pp.210-212.

⁶⁵ S.D. Churchill and F.J. Wertz, "An Introduction to Phenomenological Research in Psychology," *The handbook of Humanistic Psychology: Leading Edges in Theory, Research and Practice*, London: Sage Publication, 2001, p. 256.

⁶⁶ Op. cit., *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, p.212.

in a 'direct' way. Instead, one *operationalizes* variables so as to turn them into observable facts. Phenomenology rejects the idea that there exist objective facts... The 'objectively' given fact is always present in relation to ... a constituting and meaning-imbuing subject.⁶⁷

While the notions of reliability and validity, which remain central elements of natural science research methodology, are not employed by existential phenomenology, the approach relies upon the verifiability of the researcher's conclusion in so far as verifiability refers to whether another researcher can assume the perspective of the present investigator, review the original protocol data and see that the proposed insights meaningfully illuminate the situations under study.⁶⁸

In the contemporary psychological research, there is search being made to find areas of unity among the various diverse approaches. But phenomenological psychology stands in the vanguard of this movement. Although phenomenological psychology has its distinctive features which has clear contrast with other contemporary approaches in psychology yet phenomenological psychology remains an 'open' system which is both capable and willing to incorporate relevant data obtained by other systems. In the same way, phenomenological psychology has ability to assimilate and to accommodate to the 'stimuli' of the other psychological systems which would increase the adequacy of its own assumptions and conclusions. At the same time, it would also have significant change in the assumptions and conclusions of other systems. It is this very 'adaptive' openness that allows phenomenological psychology to provide pivotal contributions to increased communication and substantial rapprochement between all the contemporary systems in psychology.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Gunmar Karlsson, *Psychological Qualitative Research from Phenomenological Perspective*, Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1993, p.16.

⁶⁸ Op. cit., "An Introduction to Phenomenological Research in Psychology," p. 259.

⁶⁹ Op. cit., *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, pp.200-201.

CHAPTER - VI

CONCLUSION

Phenomenological psychology is firmly rooted in the philosophy of phenomenology and existential phenomenology. Phenomenology has played a pivotal role in the development of novel research methodology which focuses upon all facets of distinctly human experience. Though the starting point of phenomenological investigation is consciousness, the principal task of phenomenological psychology is the analysis of how individuals arrive at unique interpretations of one's experience by means of both innate or social constructs and frameworks. Phenomenological perspective in psychology would offer the possibility of reconsidering many established psychological issues and concerns in ways are both original and illuminating. More importantly, phenomenological approach seems to bring a breath of fresh air to how we think about 'doing' psychology.¹

Phenomenological psychology is an application of the phenomenological method to the issues and problems in psychology so that an individual's conscious experience of the world can be more systematically observed and described. The conscious acts such as perception, imagery, memory, emotion and so on are studied under the phenomenological investigation.² In keeping with the rules of the phenomenological method, the focus of such a psychology is placed on the description of current experience as a result of 'bracketing' as many assumptions, suppositions, theoretical explanations and habitual psychological biases as possible. Phenomenological psychology as a discipline is not concerned with the prediction and control of human behaviour; instead, its emphasis is on understanding the individual's life-world and experiences. Human behaviour depends primarily on how the individual perceives the world in general and immediate situation in particular. Phenomenological psychology is envisaged as complementary to other psychological movements and orientations.³ Phenomenological psychology is basically concerned with the issues of intentionally derived experience. Phenomenological

¹ Ernesto Spinelli, *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, 2nd edition, Los Angeles: Sage Publications Ltd, 2005, pp.xiii-4.

² Ibid., p.32.

³ Joseph J. Kockelmans, *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967, p.314.

psychology is an orientation towards the examination of central psychological issues via the use of a specific methodology known as the phenomenological method.⁴

The starting point of phenomenological psychology is that human experience manifests a meaningful structure. Phenomenological psychology wants to uncover this structure and rescue it from the multitude of human experience in which it lies buried. Phenomenological psychologist wants to describe these structures with the help of a dialectical method which is essentially distinguished from the methods of science. An intentional analysis method of phenomenological psychology makes it possible to be easily approached from other positive science like empirical psychology.⁵ Phenomenological psychologists argue that the goal of phenomenological psychology is the application of the phenomenological method to psychological enquiry.⁶

Phenomenological approach has made a significant difference in the fields of psychology and psychiatry by replacing the restrictive methodologies of a narrow positivism and naturalism; it has made room for new phenomena and new interpretations. It has broken the strait jacket of behaviourism without denying its relative value. It has also contributed to the overcoming of automatic associationalism. Concretely, it has helped in reforming the psychology of perception, of the emotions, and of the will and has added to such specialized enterprises as the study of the self and social psychology. In psychiatry, it has made room for much wider and deeper understanding of pathological phenomena and has helped to open the way for new therapies.⁷

In the nineteenth century, the emergence of objective thought has brought about a paradigm shift in the methodology of study of the man and the world. The philosophical methods were rejected as mere speculative. The naturalistic scientific method is made a standard model of exploring the truth of the man and the world. The change in the application of methodology has influenced both the fields of psychology and philosophy.

⁴ Op. cit., *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, p.32.

⁵ S. Strasser, *Phenomenology and the Human Sciences*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1963, pp.277-280.

⁶ Op. cit., *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, p.32.

⁷ Herbert Spiegelberg, *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, p. xlii.

For many centuries, psychology which was part of philosophical endeavour has separated itself from philosophy for striving towards naturalistic tendency. Wilhelm Wundt was the one who separated psychology from the clutches of philosophy. Psychology started making use of naturalistic methods of laboratory experimentations. At some times, the affinity with the natural science has become so close at times, it was impossible to view that where psychology ends and physiology begins. Psychologists adopted the same method to study the 'science of human consciousness'. The naturalistic scientific method had its limitation. Though this method was useful in the analysis of sensory realm of psychology, the method could not penetrate into the realm of psychic of human beings. In other words, the results derived through this naturalistic scientific method were disappointing. As a result of the naturalistic scientific method, the experimental psychology committed a grave mistake of searching for universally valid laws of human behaviour. Some psychologists, like, Franz Brentano, Carl Stumpf, Theodor Lipps have rather paid attention to human differences.⁸

Wilhelm Dilthey has shown that there should be different methods to be used to study the problems of science and humanitarian subjects. With the severe criticisms, many scientists also declared that naturalistic scientific method was successful in the natural science as it was designed for specific purpose. The same method is not necessary to be used by other sciences. Psychologists also realised that the naturalistic scientific method is designed for studying particular issues. They need to look for new method suitable for studying human science. As a result, in the field of psychology, different conflicting approaches have emerged to study human beings. They failed to study human beings as holistic person due to their application of naturalistic scientific methods to establish the universal laws of human behaviour. Edmund Husserl's phenomenology was a reaction against the traditional speculative philosophy. Though his intention was also to make philosophy a rigorous science, he realised that naturalistic scientific method is not an appropriate method to study human beings. He could not reconcile with the view of empiricists and associationalists notion of consciousness. He viewed the psychology based on these assumption as empirical psychology. He strongly opposed their approach

⁸ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, pp.28, 115.

to psychology. He designed his own phenomenological method to study the 'science of human consciousness'.⁹ Husserl also proposed phenomenological psychology with the purpose that it can be better basis for his transcendental phenomenology. The aim of phenomenological psychology is to study consciousness in its meaningful structure and function. Husserl viewed that the phenomenological psychology can be bridge between psychology and phenomenology. In other words, such a study would lead towards transcendental phenomenology, also provided a justification and basis for empirical psychology, as well as a methodology for exploration of consciousness.¹⁰

According to the phenomenological psychology of Husserl, all human behaviour is intentional behaviour. Psychology must make intentionality as the starting point of its research.¹¹ Husserl furthers states that human being experiences himself or herself in the life-world in which he or she dwells only through the intentional relationships which he or she maintains with the real things in the world around him or her. Sartre goes on to say that even emotion is deliberate spontaneous conscious act of human being with purpose. Phenomenological psychologists view human beings as free individuals to act or react to environment in their own manner. Phenomenological psychologists also make human beings responsible for their acts. In this connection, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty oppose the deterministic nature of human beings as understood by 'traditional' psychology.

Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have no longer viewed human being as 'pure consciousness' but rather 'being-in-the-world'.¹² They do not accept the transcendental reduction of Husserl. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty as existential phenomenological psychologists cannot be fit into Husserl's view of phenomenological psychology. Their phenomenological psychology is interested in existential orientation of man towards the world. This existential orientation can be studied through positive sciences such as empirical psychology. This existential orientation can also be studied by philosophy such as existential phenomenology with its phenomenological, interpretative and dialectical

⁹ Ibid., pp.28-30.

¹⁰ Henryk Misiak, Virginia Staudt Sexton, *Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Psychologies: A Historical Survey*, Grune & Stratton, New York, 1973, pp.12-13.

¹¹ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, p.24.

¹² Ibid., p.332.

approaches. The primary task of existential phenomenological psychologists is to study the empirical basis of this science and free the psychological studies from all pseudo-philosophical prejudices which led psychology into positivism, objectivism, reductionism and scientism. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are opposed to these positivism, objectivism, reductionism and scientism. According to them, the point of departure for any psychological investigation must be rooted in and nourished by a real experience of man and human realm.¹³ As a result of refocusing and introduction of phenomenological investigation to understand, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have tried to explore the potentials for human freedom and the unavoidable limitations inherent in human beings' experiences of themselves as *beings-in-the-world*.¹⁴

Sartre argues that phenomenological psychology is a distinct and separate discipline.¹⁵ His phenomenological psychology has academically preceded his philosophy. For him, the objective of phenomenological psychology is to furnish necessary foundations to empirical psychology for its empirical investigations, experiments, tests, correlations and so forth. Sartre tries to show the inadequacies of a mere empirical psychology in accounting for human existence. He says that psychology wants to be positive science that it tries to be science in which all insights are based on human experience. According to him, psychology must look for genuinely interpreted data. He argues that it is not possible with the experimentation method of physics in psychology. He further argues that psychology should define experience even more accurately than physical sciences. Sartre also emphasizes that psychology should not depend on the definition of man provided by purely empirical analysis of physiology and sociology rather it should look for the definition of its own. Sartre as existential phenomenologist strongly opposes the view that the world can be understood through natural sciences. According to him, these sciences rather only explain the conditions which lead us to understand certain universal phenomena. He also upholds that we cannot separate human reality from the world. Therefore, a psychology which uses purely empirical methods cannot understand human reality. According to Sartre, traditional psychology starts with

¹³ Ibid., pp.332-333.

¹⁴ Op. cit., *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, p.1.

¹⁵ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, p.334.

heterogeneous facts and tries explain human reality through synthetic totalities of facts. For Sartre, true psychology is possible only after establishing the nature of human reality. Phenomenology studies spontaneous appearance of the phenomena, not the facts. This spontaneous appearance of a phenomenon is questioned and described as it appears. The whole of man can be found in any particular human attitude. Sartre holds that emotion as human reality itself which gathers itself and directs itself emotionally to the world. According to Sartre, human being to *ek-sist* means to take one's own being upon oneself in some existential mode, in some or other orientation towards the world.¹⁶ Sartre's phenomenological psychology directs itself to man-in-the-world, to the multitude of situations in which human realizes himself or herself. He holds that since this psychology depends on phenomenological philosophy in understanding human, world, being-in-the-world and situation, it is subordinate to phenomenological philosophy.¹⁷

Sartre argues that human beings enjoy absolute freedom. The actions of human beings are based on their own choice. According to him, human beings are responsible for their own action and behaviour. He upholds that emotional consciousness is the primarily consciousness of the world.¹⁸ He further emphasises that emotion is an organized form of human existence. For Sartre, emotions are certain way of apprehending the world.¹⁹ Emotion is behaviour which refers to our position in a world as a whole. It has its own teleological structure.²⁰ The predicament of human being is based on one's own imagination. According to Sartre, 'every image is an image of something.' The image is in fact a vehicle of intentionality. It is a mediated relation between consciousness and its object. The image is not the thing, nor is it in any way thing like rather it refers to the thing or stands for it in an experience that is structurally similar to but ontologically distinct from the experience of the thing itself. Sartre holds that there is no thing as an image in imagination. The first difference between perception and imagination is not the presence or absence of image but a different way of referring to the

¹⁶ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, Philip Mairet (trans.), London: Methuen, 1971, pp.14-25

¹⁷ Op. cit., *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, p.340.

¹⁸ Op. cit., *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, p.56.

¹⁹ Ibid., p.57.

²⁰ Ibid., p.3.

intentional object of our consciousness. There is no difference in imaged object or perceived object but the difference is on the side of the imaging act. The image is a constructive element of consciousness; it is one of the ways in which consciousness 'intends' the thing. He says that it posits its object to be either as non-existent or as absent or as elsewhere. In other words, imaging consciousness posits its object as nothingness as imaginative.

Sartre has proposed a methodological analysis called existential analysis instead of Freudian psychoanalysis. Freudian psychoanalysis is a therapeutic method to find out the sources for human behaviour. According to Freud, human action is meaningful action. But every action may not have the outward portray of meaning. So the meaning for action to be found in the unconscious desires or hidden motives of human being. These hidden motives stimulate human behaviour. He also holds that human behaviour is causally connected to these unconscious motives. For Sartre, there is a fundamental project based on which the behaviour of human being is designed. For the elucidation of human behaviour, it is necessary to go back to the fundamental choices of human being.²¹

Merleau-Ponty also holds that phenomenological psychology as a distinct and separate discipline.²² According to Merleau-Ponty, the starting point of phenomenological psychological approach must be describing perception as individual experience it before it is being theorized. The starting point for both empiricism and intellectualism is rooted in scientific theories in different manner. Thus he rejected their understanding of human being. For him, we can understand human nature taking into account of human being as bodily subject devoid of rigid dichotomy of Descartes.

Merleau-Ponty argues that the world of objects is not something apart from the experiencing subject acting upon the subject causally, but the place experiencing subject inhabits. The experiencing subject is able to have perceptual unity and meaning from the fact that the subject who perceives, lives, acts and moves about it. In other words, the perceiving subject is 'being-in-the-world'. Merleau-Ponty argues that there is inseparable

²¹ Op. cit., *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, pp.23-25.

²² Ibid., p.343.

unity between the subject and the world. He argues further that if the subject is essentially a 'being-in-the-world' then the subject must be necessarily 'embodied'. The body-subject looks at the world from a particular perspective. According to Merleau-Ponty, the real world stretches out beyond what an individual can perceive of it. He terms it as 'inexhaustible'. An individual has endless commitment to try to 'exhaust' the world to make a rational sense of the world and to examine the world from different perspectives and to seek to connect one perspective to others. Thus the experience of the world is necessarily 'ambiguous', and never capable of being fully spelled out in rational terms. The body-subjects are not mere inanimate objects in the world. But they are actively involved in the world. To explore the individual's 'being-in-the-world' is to explore one's way of being involved with the world. This leads to show that an individual involved in the world intentionally. Merleau-Ponty rejects the mechanistic or reductionist modes of thought. In other words, experience has a direction from the past, through the present to the future. The present action springs from the past and shapes the future action. The condition of embodiment sets limits to one's freedom. But he rejects Cartesian body and mind dualism in body-subject. According to him, one's subjectivity is not separate from one's embodiment. He further argues to show that the body-subjects are not isolated from other subjects. The body-subjects are being in the social and cultural world as well as in the world of physical nature. The body-subject communicates with other subjects through language.²³

Both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty reject the deterministic view of human nature in psychology and psychiatry that was espoused by orthodox psychoanalysis and radical behaviourism. In psychoanalysis, freedom is restricted by unconscious forces, irrational drives and past events. According to behaviourism, freedom is restricted by environmental forces and socio-cultural conditioning. Sartre proposed an existential psychoanalysis which was to deal with Freudian unconscious and the mechanisms of repression. Existential psychoanalysis was an attempt to decipher man's action especially his or her neurotic behaviour by going back to his fundamental choices. This was his most original contribution to phenomenological psychology. According to Sartre and

²³ Eric Matthews, *The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty*, Buckinghamshire: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2002, pp.8-9.

Merleau-Ponty, there is nothing which can determine human behaviour. Sartre emphasizes on absolute freedom whereas Merleau-Ponty emphasize that human beings are committed to the world and they are in regular interaction with the world which shapes their behaviour.²⁴

Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are not only opposed to the scientific approaches in psychology alone but also in philosophy. Though psychology was once a part of philosophy got separated from philosophy for the reason that philosophy is more of speculative in nature and psychology started to become more as physical sciences. This kind of attitude also was found in philosophy due to the influence of science, especially, empiricism and intellectualism became using objective thought. Merleau-Ponty opposed these objective thinking or natural tendency. They make straight and rigid distinction between nature and consciousness, the physical and mental, body and mind and they emphasized on either one aspects of human beings. They also look to find causal relationship between them.²⁵ Psychology was also influenced by science wanted to make use of scientific approach in understanding human beings. They also committed the same error as philosophers. According to Merleau-Ponty, we cannot separate the body and mind as done by Descartes. He holds that an individual is in the world and lives in the world as being-in-the-world. He or she perceives the world through one's bodily-subject. His notion of embodied incarnation has led to the abolition of body and mind dualism. But the psychological schools have failed to unite the body and mind dualism. Thus they hold that separation of subject and object dualism. According to Merleau-Ponty, this kind of dualism does not yield in holistic understanding of human being. Merleau-Ponty terms them as 'scientific psychology'. They have not only followed the dualism of body and mind, they went further to analyze human being as parts. These deterministic, atomistic and reductionist tendencies of psychology were opposed by phenomenological psychologists.

²⁴ Ibid., p.21.

²⁵ A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), *Contemporary French Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp.127-128.

The analysis of phenomenological psychology of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty has clearly portrayed that psychology as humanitarian subject cannot reject the finding of other humanitarian subjects, especially existential phenomenology. Existential phenomenology deals with human existents as being-in-the-world. It carefully analyses the human beings and their relationship with oneself, others and the world. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty as existential phenomenologists hold that human beings are the *ek-sistence* of the world. They behave in a manner which is based on their will. Though both differ in their understanding of freedom but they agree that human beings exercise their will of freedom in their action. Thus every human act is intentional willful act.

The primary focus of phenomenological psychology is consciousness. Consciousness plays an important role in human being's perception of the world. Human being as being-in-the-world has regular interaction with the world. According to Merleau-Ponty, we are in regular interaction with the world as passive recipient and active contributors. He argues that we perceive the world and the world perceives us.²⁶ The emphasis of consciousness by phenomenological psychologists is in contrast to that of behaviourism and psychoanalysis. These schools of modern psychology have neglected the study of consciousness. According to behaviourism, consciousness cannot be studied as subject of psychology as the subject matter of psychology for them is behaviour. Behaviourism emphasis on scientific approach does not permit the study of consciousness. They understand consciousness as proposed by either empiricism or rationalistic philosophy. Psychoanalysis has impoverished the consciousness. According to them, consciousness is powerless byproduct of unconscious irrational forces. Psychoanalysis has given consciousness a special status. Phenomenological psychologists argue that psychoanalysis has missed the essence of consciousness.

There are some similarities exists between phenomenological psychology and empirical psychology. Phenomenological psychology and psychoanalytic theories both emphasize on questions of meaning and interpretation. The phenomenological psychologist seeks to expose the interpreted significance of past events in the light of

²⁶ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Colin Smith (trans.), London: Routledge, 2002, p.61.

current experience. The psychoanalysis understands human being and predicts human behaviour based on their assumption of causality that is rooted in past. The orientation towards phenomenological view in this respect would free psychoanalysis from mechanistic orientation without doing serious damage to its central emphases.²⁷ Phenomenological psychology and behaviourism both emphasize the importance of environmental stimuli as catalysts to action. The role human beings are the cause for disagreement. Behaviourism claims that human beings are primarily passive reactors to directly experienced stimuli. On the other hand, phenomenological psychology argues that human beings are active interpreters of the stimuli in that our response to them is intentionally determined through both innate invariants and individual experience.²⁸ Phenomenological psychology and cognitive behavioural psychology both emphasizes the importance of the interpretational elements that mediate between stimulus input and behavioural response. Cognitive behaviour therapy is a type of psychotherapeutic treatment that helps patients understands the thoughts and feelings that influence behaviours.²⁹ Cognitive psychologists accept with little dispute the conclusions of phenomenological psychology. Current circumstances suggest that a colloquium between phenomenological and cognitive psychology would be more beneficial with those cognitive approaches whose primary focus of interest lies in the study of the ‘the processes that come between stimulus and response’.³⁰ The aim of Gestalt psychology and phenomenological psychology is to free modern man to fresh reality. Both emphasize on holistic understanding of human and human perception of the world.³¹

Phenomenological psychology has made room for new phenomena and new interpretations. It has broken the strait jacket of behaviourism without denying its relative value. It has also contributed to the overcoming of atomistic associationalism. It has helped in reforming the psychology of perception, of the emotions, and of the will and has added to such specialized enterprises as the study of the self and social psychology. In psychiatry it has made room for much wider and deeper understanding of pathological

²⁷ Op. cit., *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, pp.188-189.

²⁸ Ibid., pp.194-195.

²⁹ Ibid., p.197.

³⁰ J. Medcof and J. Roth, *Approaches to Psychology*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1984, p. 182.

³¹ Ibid., pp.81-82.

phenomena and has helped to open the way for new therapies.³² Despite the diverse approaches in psychology, there has been a constant effort to unite the different approaches of psychology. Phenomenological psychology, in spite of its own distinctive features is the possible platform for the unification. The very nature of ‘adaptive’ openness of phenomenological psychology enables it to have a communication and substantial rapprochement with all other contemporary systems in psychology.³³

³² Ibid., p.xlii.

³³ Op. cit., *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, pp.200-201.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barrett, William, *What is Existentialism?*, New York: Grove Press, 1964.

Bell, David, *Husserl*, New York: Routledge, 1995.

Berg, J. H. Van Den, *The Phenomenological Approach to Psychiatry: An Introduction to Recent Phenomenological Psychopathology*, Marvin Farber (ed), New York: Thomas, 1955.

Binswanger, L., *Being-in-the-world*, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963.

Bixler, J. S., "The Existentialists and William James," *American Scholar*, Vol.28, 1959, pp, 80-90.

Boer, Theodore De, *The Development of Husserl's Thought*, Theodore Plantinga (trans.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.

Bolton, N., *Philosophical Problems in Psychology*, London: Methuen, 1979.

Boring, E.G., *A History of Experimental Psychology*, 2nd edition, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950.

Brann, Eva T.H., *The World of Imagination: Sum and Substance*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1993

Brentano, Franz, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell and L.L.McAlister (trans.), London: Routledge, 1995.

_____, *Descriptive Psychology*, trans., Benito Muller, London: Routledge, 1995.

Brody, N., P.Oppenheim, "Tension in Psychology between the Methods of Behaviourism and Phenomenology," *Psychological Review*, Vol.73, 1966, pp.295-305.

_____, "Methodological difference between Behaviourism and Phenomenology," *Psychological Review*, Vol.74, 1967, pp.330-334.

Butt, Trevor, *Understanding People*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Bucklew, John, "The Subjective Tradition in Phenomenological Psychology," *Philosophy of Science*, Vol.22, No.4, Oct.1955, pp.289-299.

Cannon, B., *Sartre and Psychoanalysis: An Existentialist Challenge to Clinicalmetatheory*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991.

Caruso, Igor Alexander, *Existential Psychology from Analysis to Synthesis*, Eva Krapf (trans.), New York: Herder and Herder, 1964.

Caws, Peter, *Sartre*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,1979.

Chandra Shah, Ramesh, "Life World: Private and Public," *JICPR Special Issue*, Mar. 2002, pp.13-18.

Chrstina, Howcell, "Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom," *Studies in Soviet Thought*, vol.43, No.1, Jan. 1992, p.60.

Clare, Andy, "The Stuff of Consciousness," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol.40, No.161, Jan.1991, p.509.

Crane, Tim, "Introspection, Intentionality and the Transparency of Experience," *Philosophical Topics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, Fall 2000, pp.49-63.

Dandekar, Natablic, "Privacy: An Understanding for Embodied Persons," *The Philosophical Forum*, Vol.XXIV, No.04, Summer 1993, p.331.

Data, Amlan, "Life World: Private and Public," *JICPR Special Issue*, Mar. 2002, pp.19-22.

Descartes, Rene, *The Essential Writings*, J. Blom (ed.), New York: Harper and Row, 1977.

Dreyfus, H.L., *Husserl: Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, London: MIT Press, 1982.

Dukes, Sheree, "Phenomenological Methodology in the Human Sciences", *Journal of Religion and Health*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Fall -1984, pp. 197-203

Durant, Will, *The Story of Philosophy*, New York: Pocket Books, 1961.

Falzon, Chris, "Sartre freedom as imprison," *Philosophy Today*, Vol.47-2/5, Summer 2003, pp.126-137.

Feldman, Robert S., *Understanding Psychology*, 6th ed., New York: McGraw Hill, 2002.

Frankl, V., *Psychotherapy and Existentialism*, New York: Washington Square, 1967.

Garret, H.E., *General Psychology*, New Delhi: Eurosin Publishing Houses Pvt. Ltd., 1968.

Grene, Marjorie, "Authenticity: An Existential Virtue," *Ethics*, Vol.62, No.4, July 1952, pp.266-274.

Giorgi, Amedeo, "Phenomenology and experimental psychology-I," *Review of existential psychology & Psychiatry*, Vol.5, No. 3, 1965, pp. 228-238.

_____, "Phenomenology and experimental psychology-II," *Review of Existential Psychology & Psychiatry*, Vol.6, No.1, 1966, pp. 37-50.

_____, *Psychology as a Human Science: A Phenomenological Approach*, New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

_____, "Phenomenological Psychology: The Lonely Path of Truth," *Impuls. Tidsskrift for Psykologi*, No.2, Oslo, Norway, 1971.

_____, "Convergences and Divergences between Phenomenological Psychology and Behaviorism: A Beginning Dialogue," *Behaviorism*, Vol. 3, No. 2, Fall-1975, pp. 200-212.

_____, *Phenomenology and Psychological Research*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985.

_____, *The Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2009.

Golomb, Jacob, "Psychology from the Phenomenological Standpoint of Husserl," *Philosophy and phenomenological Research*, Vol. 36, No.4, June 1976, pp.451-471.

Grene, Marjorie, "Sartre's Theory of Emotion," *Yale French Studies*, No.1, Existentialism, 1948, pp.97-101.

Griffiths, A. Phillips, *Contemporary French Philosophy*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Grossmann, R., *Phenomenology and Existentialism: An Introduction*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984.

Gurwitsch, Aron "The Phenomenological and the Psychological Approach to Consciousness," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Mar., 1955), pp. 303-319.

_____, "Edmund Husserl's Conception of Phenomenological Psychology," *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 19, No. 4, June -1966, pp. 689-727.

_____, *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1979.

Hammond, Michael, Jane Howarth, Russell Keat, *Understanding Phenomenology*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991.

Hansen, Forest, "Critique of the Epistemological Skepticism of Campbell's Phenomenological Behaviourist Psychology," *Behaviourism*, Cambridge Centre for Behaviour Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall-1979, pp. 65-84.

Heidegger, Martin, *Basic Writing*, D. Krell (ed.), New York: Harper and Row, 1977.

Heider, Fritz, *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations*, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1958.

Hillgar, Earnest R., Richard C. Atkinson, Rita L. Atkinson, *Introduction to Psychology*, New Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1975.

Hodges, H. A. (ed.), *Wilhelm Dilthey: An Introduction*, London: Routledge, 1944.

_____, *The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952.

Hoeller, Keith (ed.), *Sartre and Psychology: A special Issue from the Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1993.

_____, *Merleau-Ponty and Psychology*, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993.

Howells, C., *Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Howells, C. (ed.), *Cambridge Companion to Sartre*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Hume, David, *A Treatise on Human Nature*, London: Ed. Selby-Bigge, 1896.

Husserl, Edmund, *Phenomenological Psychology: Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, trans. John Scanlon, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967.

_____, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. D. Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.

_____, *Logical Investigations*, trans. J. N. Findlay, London: Routledge, 1973.

_____, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy-Third Book: Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences*, T. E. Klein and W. E. Pohl (trans.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980.

_____, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy-First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, F. Kersten (trans.), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1983.

_____, *Cartesian Meditations*, D. Cairns (trans.), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988.

_____, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy-Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (trans.), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989.

Ihde, D., *Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction*, Albany: State University of New York, 1986.

James, William, *The Principles of Psychology*, New York: Cosimo, 2007.

Katz, David, *Gestalt psychology*, Robert Tyson (trans.), New York: Ronald Press, 1950.

Kerner, George C. (ed.), *Three Philosophical Moralists: Mill, Kant and Sartre: An Introduction to Ethics*, New York: Oxford University press, 1990.

Kersten, Fred, "Can Sartre Count?," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol.34, No.3, March 1974, pp.339-354.

Kockelmans, Joseph J. (ed), *Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation*, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, 1967.

_____, *A First Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967.

_____, *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967.

Koffik, Kurt, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1955.

Kohler, W., *Gestalt Psychology*, New York: Liveright, 1929.

Kripal, Jeffrey J., *Esalen: America and the Religion of No Religion*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007, p.137.

Kruger, Dreyer, *An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981.

Kuenzli, Alfred E. (ed.), *The Phenomenological Problem*, New York: Harper, 1959.

Lambert, Kenneth, *Existential Psychology: from Analysis to Synthesis: Igor A. Caruso*, Eva Krapf (trans.), New York: Herder and Herder, 1964.

Langer, Monika M., *Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and Commentary*, London: Macmillan Press, 1989.

Lethin, Anton, "How do We Embody Intentionality?," *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, Vol.9, No.8, Aug. 2002, pp.36-44.

Lauer, Quentin, *Phenomenology: Its Genesis and Prospect*, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965.

Lyons, Joseph, *Psychology and the Measure of Man: A Phenomenological Approach*, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.

Macann, Christopher, *Four Phenomenological Philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty*, London: Routledge, 1993.

McCall, R. J., *Phenomenological Psychology*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.

Matthews, Eric, *The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty*, Buckinghamshire: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2002.

Martin, Thomas, *Oppression and the Human Condition: An Introduction to Sartrean Existentialism*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002.

May, Rollo (ed.), *Existential Psychology*, 2nd edition, New York: Random House, 1969.

McAlister, Linda, *The Philosophy of Brentano*, London: Duck worth, 1976.

MacGill, V. J., "The Bearing of Phenomenology on Psychology," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol.7, No.3, March-1947, pp.357-363.

Mculloch, Gregory, *Using Sartre: An Analytical Introduction to Early Sartrean Themes*, London: Routledge, 1994.

Medcof, J., J. Roth, *Approaches to Psychology*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1984.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Colin Smith (trans.), New York: Humanities Press, 1962.

_____, *Sense and Non-Sense*, Hubert Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964.

_____, *The Primacy of Perception*, James Edie (ed.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964.

_____, *The Visible and the Invisible*, Alphonso Lingis (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968

_____, *The Structure of Behaviour*, Aldun L. Fisher (trans.), Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.

_____, *Adventures of the Dialectic*, Joseph Bien (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.

Misiak, Henryk, Virginia Staudt Sexton, *Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Psychologies: A Historical Survey*, New York: Grune & Stratton, 1973.

Morgan, Clifford T., Richard A. King, John R. Weisz, and John Schopler, *Introduction to Psychology*, New Delhi: Tata McGraw Hill Book Co., 1993.

Moran, Dermot, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, London: Routledge, 2000.

Moran, Dermot, Lester Embree (eds), *Phenomenology: Critical concepts in Philosophy*, New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2004.

Moustakas, C., *Phenomenological Research Methodology*, London: Sage Publications, 1994.

Natanson, M., *A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's Ontology*, New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1972.

Neisser, U., *Cognitive Psychology*, New York: Appleton, 1967.

Osborn, Andrew D., "Some recent German Critics of Phenomenology," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.31, No.4, July 1934, pp.377-382.

Panneerselvam, S., "Rationalization of the Life world," *JICPR Special Issue*, Mar. 2002, pp.61-76.

Pappas, George S., "Sensation and Perception of Ried," *Nous*, Vol.XXIII, No.2, Apr. 1989, p.155.

Peacock, Christopher, "Phenomenology and Non Conceptual Content," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol.LXII, No.3, May 2001, pp.609-615.

Pollard, David, "Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom," *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol.29 No.1, winter 1989, p.93.

Pradan, R.C., "The Life World and its Metaphysical Significance," *JICPR Special Issue*, Mar. 2002, pp.1-12.

Priest, Stephen (ed), *Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings*, London: Routledge, 2001.

Rabb, J. Douglas, "Empiricism from Phenomenological Standpoint," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol.46, No.2, Dec.1985, pp.243-263.

Rogers, Carl, *Counseling and Psychotherapy*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942.

_____, *Client-Centered Therapy*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951.

Romanyshyn, Robert, *The Wounded Researcher: Research with Soul in Mind*, New Orleans: Spring Journal Books, 2007.

Ruitenbeek, H.M. (ed.), *Psychoanalysis and Existential Philosophy*, New York: Dutton, 1962.

Russell, Roger W. (ed.), *Frontiers in Psychology*, Chicago: Scott Foresman, 1964.

Ryback, D., "Existentialism and Behaviourism: Some different Settled," *Canadian Psychologist*, Vol.13, 1972, pp.53-60.

Sartre, Jean-Paul, *The Flies*, New York: Hamilton Press, 1950.

_____, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, Hazel E. Barnes (trans.), New York: Philosophical Library, 1956.

_____, *Imagination – A Psychological Critique*, Forrest Williams (trans.), Ann Arbor: University of Michigan press, 1962.

_____, *The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness*, Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (trans. & ed.), New York: Noonday, 1957.

_____, *Literary and Philosophical Essays*, New York: Collier Books, 1962.

- _____, *The Words*, Bernard Frechtman (trans.), New York: Braziller, 1964.
- _____, *Nausea*, Robert Baldick (trans.), Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965.
- _____, *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, Philip Mairet (trans.), London: Methuen, 1971.
- _____, *The Psychology of Imagination*, Bernard Frechtman (trans.), London: Methuen, 1972.
- _____, *Existentialism and Humanism*, Philip Mairet (trans.), London: Methuen, 1973.
- _____, *Critique of Dialectical Reason 1: Theory of Practical Ensembles*, Alan Sheridan-Smith (trans.), Jonathan Rée (ed.), London: Verso, 1982.
- _____, *The Family Idiot: Gustave Flaubert, 1821–1857*, Volumes 1–5, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
- _____, *The Age of Reason*, New Delhi: Penguin books India Pvt. Ltd, 2009.
- Scheler, Max, *The Nature of Sympathy*, trans. Peter Heath, New York: Archon Books, 1970.
- Schilpp, P. A. (ed.), *The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*, La Salle: Open Court, 1981.
- Seamon, David, “The Phenomenological Contribution to Environmental Psychology,” *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, Vol.2, Issue.2, June, 1982, pp.119-140.
- Shaffer, J.B.P., *Humanistic Psychology*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1978.
- Sinari, Ramakant, “Life World as the Experiential Bases of Philosophy,” *JICPR Special Issue*, Mar. 2002, pp.23-38.
- Singh, Arun Kumar, *The Comprehensive History of Psychology*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 1991.

Skousgaard, Stephen, *Phenomenology and Human Destiny*, Washington, DC: CARP & University Press of America, 1981.

Smith, Barry, *Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1982.

Snygg, Donald, "The need for a Phenomenological System of Psychology," *Psychological Review*, Vol. XLVIII, 1941, pp.404-424.

Spiegelberg, Herbert, *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, Northwestern University Press: Evanston, 1972.

_____, *Doing Phenomenology: Essays on and in Phenomenology*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975.

_____, *The Phenomenological Movement*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.

Spinelli, Ernesto, *The Interpreted World: An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology*, 2nd edition, Sage Publications Ltd, Los Angeles, 2005.

Strasser, F., A. Strasser, *Existential Time-Limited Therapy: The Wheel of Existence*, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1997.

Strasser, F., *Emotions: Experience in Existential Psychotherapy and Life*, London: Duckworth, 1999.

Strasser, Stephan, "Phenomenological Trends in European Psychology," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 18, No.1, September-1957, pp.18-34.

_____, *Phenomenology and the Human Sciences*, Pittsburgh, Pa: Duquesne University Press, 1963.

Stewart, Jon, *The Debate between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998.

Sundararajan, R., *Studies in Phenomenology, Hermeneutics and Deconstruction*, New Delhi: ICPR, 1991.

_____, "Humanization of Transcendental Philosophy," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol.I, No.1, Jan.1995, pp.48-68.

Uriah, Kriegel, "Is Intentionality Dependent upon Consciousness?," *Philosophical Studies*, Vol.116, No.3, Dec.'03, pp.271-307.

Wann, T.W. (ed.), *Behaviourism and Phenomenology: Contrasting Bases for Modern Psychology*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Wilshire, Bruce, *William James and Phenomenology: A Study of the Principles of Psychology*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968.

Zahavi, Dan, "Beyond Empathy: Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity," *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, Vol. 8(5-7), 1998, pp.151-167.

_____, *Husserl's Phenomenology*, CA: Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2003.